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Abstract  
Sewing Garments, Sowing Lives: Two Generations of Migrant Workers’ Back and Forth 
to the Chinese Coast by Alice Tzou 
Advisor: Paul Attewell 
Migrant workers in China have been at the center of popular news media and scholarly 
attention for three decades, since they started to migrate to work in factories on the coast 
in the post-1978 Economic Reform era. As western and central China has developed and 
work opportunities have arisen in these migrant-sending regions, internal migrants have 
started to return home. Push and pull factors of internal migration have been reversed. 
Poverty and lack of job opportunities used to be the push factors; they are now replaced 
by new push factors—long hours of work and long-distance travel to and from the coast. 
Family reunions as well as work and entrepreneurial opportunities at home are the new 
pull factors. Since the Reform, there have been two generations of migrant workers: the 
older generation, who were teenagers at the time of Reform (born in the late 1960s and 
the 1970s) and who were the first wave to migrate out, and the younger generation, who 
are now in their 30s (born in and after the late 1970s and the 1980s) and who entered the 
workforce in the late 1990s and the 2000s. At the same time, factories are relocating to 
western and central China. In addition to giving an inside look at what work is like in a 
garment factory, this dissertation documents and compares both generations‘ return home. 
The older generation is returning home to retire or semi-retire, having made a livelihood 
out of their earlier migration. The younger generation is returning home on a less 
permanent basis, still job-hopping between the coast and home. Many of the younger 
generation return home to become small-scale entrepreneurs but job-hop back to coastal 
factories when entrepreneurship falters. I also interpret my findings in light of the larger 
cultural context in China to understand multi-generational life strategies and social 
mobility. 
Keywords: Migrant workers. Generations. Multi-generation. Social mobility. China.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
I grew up with a factory. My father, a small entrepreneur, had borrowed funds from his 
family to buy the export-oriented leather garment factory where he was working as a 
financial manager, just a few years out of graduate school. He ran the factory for the next 
30 years making leather jackets for Japan, the United States, and Europe. In the 1990s, 
wages in Taiwan had increased but selling prices had not. Like many other Taiwanese 
businessmen, he looked into moving the factory to Guangdong, China and did so in 1992. 
Growing up with the factory in the Special Export Economic Zone in Kaohsiung, 
southern Taiwan, I learned a few things. First, the labels on a garment are never as 
important for an intelligent consumer as its materials and workmanship. From a factory‘s 
point of view, as long as selling prices are satisfactory, it almost never mattered who the 
client or brand was. Second, stable orders from any client meant stable income for all, 
which meant a stable lifestyle for all. This seemed obvious, but it translated to something 
tangible for me to see and be part of.  
Every day, workers filed into the Zone on their mopeds (I still remember how vast the 
moped parking area was), got onto their sewing machines, and heard the chiming sounds 
of sewing machines mixed with the turning of ceiling fans and the hum of the air 
conditioning. For lunch, some brought their own food to be steamed in metal lunch boxes, 
and some went to the restaurants, separated themselves by location and numbers. As a 
child, I ate lunches with many white- and blue-collar workers in the Number 2 
Restaurant.  
It did not matter to the workers what brand the factory was producing that month—that 
was for the office staff to worry about. Most brands were Western, so their labels had 
Western characters on them. Most workers knew no English. They managed to recognize 
the beginning letters of the label—the office staff could sort it out—and knew to sew it 
onto the collar area of each garment. To me, a child at the time, it seemed that workers 
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were quietly proud of what they were doing or at least happily engaged with the leather 
jackets. It was not until I entered a sociology PhD program and read Marx intensively did 
I learn about the alienation of labor, that labor was supposedly alienated and unconcerned 
about whatever products they were making because their labor power was exploitatively 
sold to employers.  
Day in and day out, they came to work and went home, and they quietly brought up 
children. On several occasions, they invited my father to officiate at their adult children‘s 
weddings because it was he—as the owner of the factory—that gave the family a 
livelihood. And this was a gesture of honor to thank him. 
With the small wealth that my family accumulated making leather jackets, my mother 
and I set out to the United States where she thought I could receive a better education 
than the one in Taiwan. I was 15. In a sense, even the boss‘ family were migrants moving 
for a better future. By the time I was done with my American education in 2004, ready 
for a bright future in the United States if I wanted it, I realized I was homesick. Home had 
moved from Taiwan to Guangzhou, China because of the factory. So I decided to return 
home by joining the family business. I packed my things into ten boxes and shipped them 
by sea to China, and I took a one-way flight from the academic capital of the United 
States, Boston, to the manufacturing hub of the world, Guangzhou, China, the capitol of 
Guangdong Province. With the highest amount of foreign direct investment in recent 
years, accounting for nearly half of Chinese inward foreign direct investment in the 
period 1985 to 1994, Guangdong had the fourth highest per capita income of 30 
provinces (Rosen, 1999). The main engines of growth have been Hong Kong and 
Taiwanese companies investing in small and medium, labor-intensive, export 
manufacturing plants (Chiu and Frenkel, 1999). My father‘s was one such small plant. 
Keeping with my custom, since my childhood, of eating with workers in the factory, I 
was beginning to be fascinated by their stories. Stories that would change my own life. 
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With their various Mandarin accents, workers from all over China described their long 
hours of train travel to the Guangzhou factory. Their stories of generally poor childhoods 
and teenage years were intertwined with the present, often concluding with what they 
were bringing home on their next visit.  
Unaware then of the liquidity of capital, at work in the factory I was fighting hard to keep 
prices and dignity high when our fashion-industry clients demanded insultingly low 
prices. A major client had designed an Excel spreadsheet for contractor factories to fill 
out; it contained columns of material costs, labor costs, and administrative costs, leaving 
profit calculable by anyone with basic arithmetic skills. In other words, they demanded a 
transparent cost structure from their suppliers. My fights over prices for our goods proved 
to be futile, as fashion-industry clients had many options from which to procure their 
goods: alternative domestic Chinese locations as well as India and Pakistan. On the 
production side, we were beginning to lose workers. My father would come 
home—actually, another building on the compound of the factory—and report that 
so-and-so was quitting to go home.  
Over the course of the next ten years, I witnessed the factory‘s worker count drop from 
about 100 to less than 10. We found contractors in Hunan to supplement this labor 
shortage. I recall making trips to one contractor, explaining how a particular jacket ought 
to be made and negotiated the price. That factory was located in an old elementary school 
in XiangTan, Hunan, and staffed by local women who still farmed. Because farming was 
not a 9 to 5 type of job, they managed to both farm and hold on to the light industrial job 
of sewing. The factory‘s production schedule had to make way for farming needs like 
seeding in the spring and harvesting in the summer and fall. The owner of the contractor 
establishment received orders from all kinds of places, from export factories like ours and 
from a domestic upstream contractor like the one who had contracts to sew postmen‘s 
uniforms in China, which was what it was making on my trip. The setup was simple, 
revealing the transient nature of this line of work—the owner could close shop tomorrow 
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if there is no work coming in because workers were not on a long-term labor contract and 
were making piece-rate wages. 
While our relationship with this contractor was strictly between buyer and seller, it was a 
clear example of how we could move to central China to expand production capacity. In 
fact, if our orders had been more stable and steady, my father was ready to invest in 
building his own secondary factory in Hunan. And we were not alone. There was a 
widespread trend of expanding production into the western and central parts of China due 
to the labor shortages on the coast.  
As early as 2004, well before the 2008 financial crisis, many Chinese coastal factory 
owners had to hold their breaths after each Chinese New Year, waiting for their migrant 
workers to report back to work. Many workers returned home for good and others 
dabbled for a few months at home before returning to the coast.   
The push factor of destitution that impelled migrant workers during 1980s and the pull 
factor until the early 2000s of the then-good wages were starting to give way to a new 
pull factor: the wish to remain closer to home. As the inland provinces of China 
developed, with large-scale infrastructure projects and accompanying industrial setups, 
people began to desert their long-distance work destination for a closer work 
location—some in the very township of their own home where their parents and children 
live and others in towns located near their homes. Incoming industries included 
hydro-electric stations, coal mines, construction, and heavy equipment and high-tech 
manufacturing were springing up in the traditionally migrant-worker sending provinces 
of central and western China. Industrial projects brought with them light manufacturing 
and service industries like hospitality and retail. Depending on the geographical location, 
migrant worker-sending regions also developed tourism, which made traveling long 
distances to the coast for work unnecessary.  
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As a result of labor shortages on the coast, manufacturers of labor-intensive goods like 
garments, toys, shoes, and simple electronics were relocating to or opening secondary 
factories in southeast Asia or inland China. Symbolically representing global capitalism, 
Foxconn, the Taiwanese manufacturer for electronics brands like Apple, Dell, and HP, 
built three factories in ZhengZhou, Henan in central China in 2012, employing a total of 
140,000. Hong Kong‘s South China Morning Post reported in 2004 that Hong Kong‘s 
Hang Seng Bank said: ―Many factory managers in provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian, 
and Zhejiang are now reporting they have difficulty recruiting enough workers, 
challenging the conventional wisdom of a seemingly inexhaustible Chinese workforce.‖ It 
predicted that ―over the longer term, only the higher value-added industries will stay in the 
coastal manufacturing areas while low-end, labor-intensive industries will move to inland 
provinces.‖ The newspaper further reported in 2014 that publicly-traded Kingmaker 
Footwear Holdings,
1
 a manufacturer of footwear for Western brands like New Balance, 
Skechers, and Clark planned to shift production to Vietnam and remote Chinese provinces. 
Kingmaker was also studying the feasibility of setting up production in more remote parts 
of China. Its president stated: ―It should ideally be four hours by highway from Hong 
Kong or at most eight hours. The furthest we will put our factory is in Sichuan Province, 
but we prefer to set up a factory in Hunan, since a lot of our workers in Guangdong are 
from that province.‖2 
With a labor shortage in coastal areas, the bargaining power between employers and 
employees was beginning to change. Factories that used to impose stringent screening 
                                                          
1
 A Taiwanese company established in 1981 that became a publicly traded company in Hong Kong in 1988 when it set 
up an office there, as it looked for entry into the Chinese labor market. It set up its China factory in Zhuhai, Guangdong 
in the same year. 
2
 Toh Han Shih, Sept 25, 2004. ―Coastal labour shortage driving manufacturers inland; Firms shift factories from Pearl 
River Delta to remote provinces and increase production in Vietnam.‖ Business Post, P.3. South China Morning Post. 
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rules for their workers in the 1980s and 1990s were now chasing their workers when they 
returned home.  
My father living on the coast in Guangzhou retired, and the factory manager continued 
the factory‘s dwindling business under a different name. In 2013, on the invitation of two 
workers who lived close to each other in the same township in Hunan, I went home with 
them and started to document workers‘ journeys back home—not just temporary visits 
but for many their relocation.  
That trip grew into this dissertation. In 2015 and 2016, I made several other trips to visit 
townships and villages in Hunan, Sichuan, and Guizhou Provinces, where I spoke to 
ex-workers from my father‘s factory, current return workers in my father‘s friend‘s 
sweater factory, and home workers (in a putting out system) who never left their villages. 
I also spoke to people who had stopped working since their return home. Many of the 
past and present workers were proud and happy to invite me into the houses they had 
built with money saved from working in the factories. Houses that literally reflected 
sunlight off the tiles. The houses that were built with hard-earned money were sources of 
pride amidst neighbors‘ mud houses. One worker invited me to go home with her in 
celebration of her father‘s 70th birthday. The father lived in a mud house with bare light 
bulbs illuminating the space. But first, this did not mean he was poor. He had several 
sons—all owning motorcycles—and this daughter worked on the coast, bringing back 
money to help with his household expenses. Plus, one of the sons was already building a 
new house nearby. When it was done, the father would move into a new building, most 
likely just as shiny as the other new village houses. Second, the daughter had built a large, 
tiled, three-story house erected in midst of farmland, a ten minute drive from her father‘s 
house. In this house, I stayed in a large bedroom with a ―king-sized‖ bed (1.8 meters wide, 
the largest kind in China) and was told to tell my father about the big house. I took a 
photo of her and her birthday-star father in front of the house—she was grinning widely. 
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In a rural, farming community, often a cement or tiled house marks the presence of 
someone who has gone out dagong and who has ―made it,‖ able to build a new house. 
Building such a house, with modern interior facilities, is often a life-long dream and goal 
of migrant workers.  
Traditional Chinese culture heavily values a family‘s house—a place that one can call his 
or her own. Perhaps like all migrants or international immigrants, the first thing that 
traditional Chinese culture compels a migrant to do is to find suitable lodging. Unlike 
many other migrants (and international immigrants), however, the Chinese are almost 
always among the first to buy rather than to rent. Internationally, for example, the price of 
real estate in Vancouver has been greatly inflated, thanks to an overwhelming number of 
buyers from China, both Chinese immigrants to Canada and Chinese-national investors. 
The situation is so serious that Canada put in place in August 2016 a 15 percent tax on 
foreign nationals and non-permanent resident purchases. 
Back in the village of these migrant workers, many of these new tile houses stand empty, 
however, because the owners are too busy in their coastal work destinations to really live 
in them. Before the time arrives for them to return on a semi-permanent basis, the house 
is locked up or occupied by their elderly parents or core family members. Of course, to a 
sociologist, they also symbolize material success brought about with their hard-earned 
money from the factory. Such a new-tile house usually costs about RMB 200,000, which, 
with a wage of anywhere starting from RMB 3,000 and up per month, requires about ten 
years of work, give or take other factors like saving and remittance rate of wages. It is, 
after all, the most visible sign of improving one‘s family finances, a motivation so many 
migrants cite for their migration. 
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Figure 1 Migrant worker Z., her father, and author in front of newly built tile house, 
ShuangFeng county, LouDi City, Hunan Province. All photos in this 
dissertation were taken by author. 
The 1990s Nike sweatshop scandals alarmed the world about labor conditions at the 
brands‘ contractor factories. In Western Europe and the United States where many of the 
world‘s well-known apparel brands are headquartered, teams were put together to 
generate contractor compliance handbooks so that the brands could face consumers as 
socially responsible manufacturers. Their efforts translated into pressure on contractor 
factories like my father‘s concerning wages, overtime hours, overtime premiums, and 
safe working conditions.  
Company worker rights audit teams would visit our factory, walk onto the shop floor, 
select workers to interview in private, and generate a report and correction action plan for 
us to follow-up on and make improvements for the next audit scheduled three months 
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hence. Reasonable concerns for proper wages, whether overtime hours were paid 
according to law, and whether those sitting for a long time sewing had back support, or 
those standing up for a long time cutting fabrics had rubber foot support added to 
manufacturing costs. 
These audit teams created tremendous pressure on manufacturers because they often did 
not pay overtime wages as the government mandated premiums, 1.5 times the base wage 
on weekday nights and two times on weekend days. Brand manufacturing (as opposed to 
an importer) does not necessarily mean better selling prices; in fact, often the opposite is 
true. While their audit teams pressured factories to improve working conditions and 
increase manufacturing costs, their merchandising offices were happy to be slashing 
prices. Could a pocket on a jacket be taken off (to save cost)? Could we take off another 
zipper? Could we change to a cheaper fabric? And most often heard, Could you give us a 
better discount (because we are comparing prices with another factory)?  
To well-meaning friends who suggested that my father sell his factory as an exit strategy 
amidst this insurmountable pressure, we were embarrassed to reply that the factory 
contains little sales value because our clients had no loyalty. The brand companies that 
demanded this and that were never secure. We could not count on repeat clients from 
year one to year two. This may have been due to our special fabric category, which was 
more of a luxury than a necessity. Therefore, every product planning season, the sales 
force stressed out looking for orders. Without the promise of goods to make, workers 
dropped out, too.  
In my own career transition from being part of the futile factory sales force to becoming a 
sociologist, I set out to find out what workers‘ lives were like back home in their 
township or village, beyond their monotonous daily routines in the factories on the coast. 
Who were their family members? Whom did they have to support with their wages? How 
did they care for their children? How were their children doing with absent parents and 
 10   
often illiterate grandparents? How did they first come out to dagong
3
? What did they gain 
with this experience? Why did they return? What did they do after returning home? And 
how did their dagong experience help or hurt them on their return? In the end, because 
they had to make a choice either to work on the coast or at home inland, were they better 
off, returning home or continuing to work on the coast? 
At no point in my interactions and conversations with workers and ex-workers from our 
own or someone else‘s factories did I pretend to be someone I was not. I am privileged 
and belong by family relation to the owner‘s class. To put it bluntly, I was the boss‘ 
daughter when interviewing our own workers; I was the boss‘ friend‘s daughter when 
interviewing workers at my father‘s buddy‘s factory. If this class standing makes me stick 
out like a sore thumb among workers, my gender, and my familiarity with workers‘ and 
garment-industry lingo put workers at ease at the very least. Often, when I revealed that I 
was not planning to take over my family‘s business and that I was in a career switch by 
being a (doctoral) student, they understood immediately that I had my own battles with 
charting out a livelihood ahead of me. I also received what often felt like pity when I 
spoke about being in my thirties and single to women workers from farming backgrounds 
who had and were used to early marriages and early child births. Someone said that in 
their village, they knew of a woman who was already a grandma at my age. In a subtle 
but genuine way, I often let them feel that they were the privileged and fortunate ones, 
having established a traditional family early as opposed to later in life.   
I already knew that media attention to the negative aspects of dagong lives was biased 
and even exaggerated, and I admit that subconsciously I was trying to paint the opposite 
picture.   
                                                          
3
 The term in Chinese, dagong (打工), comes originally from Cantonese in Hong Kong where labor relations are 
determined by the market. Simply put, dagong means working for a boss, and connotates an implication of selling one‘s 
labor power as a commodity in exchange for a wage or salary (Lee, 1998).  
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It turned out, that the opposite pictures did not require much purposeful ―painting‖ on my 
part. Workers and ex-workers were glad to share their stories; more of them took me 
home—whether it was a working farm or an apartment in a township in their province of 
origin. Their stories were often multi-faceted and could not be reduced to a 
black-or-white judgment. Yes, going out to work on the coast was hard, the long-distance 
train travel was hard, the eating in the canteen was hard, the separation from their 
family—in particular, growing children—was hard, the long hours of physical work were 
hard, but sometimes the boss was good and warm. The relationship with co-workers was 
intimate, the camaraderie good, and the counting of cash on paydays rewarding.  
When sociologists and many left-leaning, Marxist-oriented journalists critique the unjust 
treatment of these workers by the government in their city work destinations that prevent 
them from receiving social benefits due to the hukou registration system, they are 
inherently also critiquing the fact that workers‘ social reproduction is completely done in 
their homes back in inland provinces. This horizontally cross-sectional view, while 
correct, does not consider that as the inland region develops, the offspring of the dagong 
workers no longer need to come out to the coast for a livelihood. With an education that 
their parents have worked so hard to finance, many of them are growing up to be 
white-collar workers in or near their homes of origin. Many of them are now united with 
their ex-dagong worker parents at home, with the latter helping with grandchildren.  
Deng XiaoPing, when he engineered the Economic Reform, said purposely that he will 
let ―a portion of people get wealthy first.‖ The idea is that the rest of the country should 
follow in the steps of the Special Economic Zones and become wealthy, later. We are 
now at this later point in time. If the portion of pilot people Deng meant to make wealthy 
first was the group of entrepreneurs who caught on with a presence in the Special 
Economic Zones, then those who were to become wealthy later were the groups that these 
pilot entrepreneurs employed and those in interior provinces (with the government‘s 
stimulus package that came decades later). If we look at those whom the pilot 
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entrepreneurs directly benefited, it is a pyramid of people: some white-collar 
management and staff, many suppliers and contractors, and lastly but surely, the migrant 
workers. Due to many factors including individual motivations, some migrant workers 
have risen to the middle and top of the factories, while others have stagnated in a low 
position. But migrant workers are no different than other workers; the more education 
and skills they possess the better their employment chances.      
Chapter 1 begins with studies of migrant workers in China in their historical context, and 
explores key ideas about the migrant worker phenomenon. Chapter 2 explains with 
ethnographic examples the departure of migrant workers from their inland homes to the 
coast, starting in the mid-1980s. Chapter 3 takes a closer look at what it is like in a small 
factory—the process of generating products, the pressure from clients, and the 
relationship between management and workers. Chapter 4 looks at the forces that 
contribute to the return of first-generation of migrant workers and the returns themselves, 
while chapter 5 examines second-generation migrant workers‘ return to their homes. Why 
did they return? What did they do after the return? How might the first-generation‘s 
motivations to return differ from the second generation of migrant workers? Instead of 
dagong, or working for someone else (on the coast), some of the return migrant workers 
have become small-scale entrepreneurs, while others dabble in entrepreneurship and 
dagong, with the latter as a surer way of making money. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the 
dissertation. 
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1.1 Relevant Literature Review: Putting Migrant Workers in Context 
Migrant workers in China have been the focus of scholars and the popular media. The 
Financial Times (Mitchell, 2009) called the annual human traffic in domestic China 
around Chinese New Year ―the world‘s greatest annual human migration,‖ likening the 
traffic created by migrant workers‘ trips to home provinces to that of an animal 
population‘s migration in response to changes in climate or food supply. Geographer 
Kam Wing Chan estimated that 200-250 million rural residents have moved to cities and 
towns in China in search of a better life (2012), earning in industrial factories more in a 
month than what they could earn in a year on the farm.
4
 This is, to put it in perspective, 
roughly four to five times the volume of the Great Migration of Europeans to North 
America from 1800 to WWI, which was estimated at about 50 million people (Tilly, 
1976).  
 
It is no wonder that the Financial Times made this above observation in 2009. Following 
the economic crisis in the fall of 2008, many coastal factories—most of them 
export-oriented—were forced to shut down, and workers laid off. In the return traffic 
witnessed in Chinese New Year 2009, many were at least temporarily destined to stay 
home. In fact, labor shortages were felt by factory management as early as 2004. They 
were due to pull factors such as wage competition with the north and east of China, and 
more attractive, closer-to-home location of interior China as it started to industrialize. 
 
Yet having a labor shortage, or having any labor relation at all in China is a recent 
phenomenon in the country‘s capitalist history. Taylor, Chang, and Li (2003) noted that 
there was no such thing as labor-capital relations, and industrial relations were essentially 
determined by the paternalistic Party-state. In the three decades prior to Deng‘s Economic 
                                                          
4
 R.A. ―The Largest Migration in History,‖ The Economist, February 24, 2012. Accessed December 22, 2014 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/02/china  
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Reform that ushered in capitalism, China was still a Leninist Party-state led by the 
Chinese Communist Party. Under this regime, the Chinese working class was proclaimed 
the ―master of the country,‖ and the interests of the Party-state, the workers, and their 
work units (danwei) had aligned interests. There was to be little tension and little 
competition of interests between a labor class and a management class. 
 
Partially as a result of the drastic changes since the Economic Reform, many aspects of 
migrant workers‘ lives—their working conditions, their marriage patterns, their bi-local 
existence, their children‘s education, their aspirations and fears and more recently, their 
return—have been the subject of study by Chinese and international scholars across 
disciplines.  
 
Leading the field is Pun Ngai. In her award-winning ethnography Made in China, Pun 
documented her year spent (1995-1996) as a student worker at a Hong Kong-owned 
electronics factory in coastal Shenzhen City, one of the first four special economic zones 
that were ushered in by Deng Xiaoping‘s economic reforms starting in 1978. 
 
Pun‘s observations on suboptimal work conditions, the transitory nature of work, and 
workers‘ silent resistance were characteristic of labor conditions and management-labor 
relations during the era when employment choices were few, when capital—represented 
by management—was king (and local government almost this king‘s subordinates), when 
desire to improve material well-being was so overwhelming that laborers were willing to 
go to great lengths to endure what happens at the workplace. Focused on young, 
unmarried female migrant workers, Pun celebrated these working girls for their sense of 
agency and bravery to protest against patriarchal family culture by migrating to coastal 
factories. She documents the young women‘s chronic bodily pains as signs of resistance 
to oppressive working conditions and suggests that a silent social revolution was 
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sweeping through China and that these young, female migrant workers were its agents. 
Different from the Western proletariat‘s path to class consciousness, migrant workers in 
China did not engage in public protests or form an important political force, yet they were 
a new class based on their collective experience as a cog in the production machine, 
subject to global capitalism represented by the Hong Kong-owned factory, state socialist 
power reflected in the government‘s recruitment of them, and patriarchal culture mirrored 
by the family demands that they return home, get married, and to never go out again (Pun, 
2005). 
 
Pun‘s ethnographic work is vivid and thorough, yet it reflects, timewise, life in the 
factory in a horizontally cross-sectional scope. The accounts about workers‘ pasts and 
futures were all coming from workers‘ first-person narratives; no family members of 
workers were interviewed and workers‘ homes were out of the picture. Consideration of 
workers‘ life circumstances were concentrated on the immediate surroundings of their 
work in the factory and did not include their families and homes from which they traveled 
long distances. I had the privilege to speak with workers‘ families and to spend time in 
their homes of origin, thus, placing workers in a more holistic picture than if I was merely 
interviewing them in their places of work. I hope this perspective helps readers 
understand these people‘s lives as a whole, the good and the bad, the black and the white, 
and equally importantly, the grey areas.    
 
Pun‘s line of work represents a stream of research that emphasizes the powerlessness of 
migrant workers. In a later paper, ―Gendering the Dormitory Labor System: Production, 
Reproduction, and Migrant Labor in South China,‖ Pun (2007) found in 2003 – 2004 in 
another electronics factory in Shenzhen that with its dormitory for its 70 percent female 
workforce the workday was lengthened and the division between work and personal life 
(and space) blurred. ―Housing provision is not for families, so factory owners are not 
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interested in the reproduction of the next generation of laborers. Instead, they focus on 
maximizing the utilization of temporary, migrant, and contract labor by controlling the 
daily reproduction of their labor power.‖ Pun also looks at dormitories as sites of control 
and resistance and shows how the dormitory labor system simultaneously provides 
workers with opportunities to resist management practices and achieve victories in 
improving working conditions because workers‘ easy access to fellow workers fostered 
possibility of enlisting solidarity and accelerating consensus. 
 
But in smaller factories, dormitories and owner(s)‘ lodging are often within the same 
factory compound. And in factories with less class conflict, dormitories can also be sites 
of camaraderie and bonding between owners and workers. Additionally, Pun‘s research, 
alongside Ching-Kwan Lee‘s, has looked at workers‘ lives in large-scale factories in the 
Pearl River Delta and have reported on their misery. While I do not—and cannot—wish 
to completely deny the difficult labor conditions many workers faced, I set out to 
examine workers‘ lives in small factories and their lives at home when they return from 
the coast. Did they benefit at all from this work experience? If so, how? 
 
In any event, time has passed, and labor shortages, experienced as early as 2004, peaked 
after the 2008 global financial crisis, suggesting that the table has slowly been turned and 
bargaining power between capital and labor, as Zhan indicates below, has in fact 
reversed.  
 
Researchers have pointed to the major role the hukou system has played in limiting 
migrant workers‘ life chances (Chan and Zhang, 1999; Solinger, 1999; Lu, 2003; 
Alexander and Chan, 2004; Loong-Yu and Nan, 2007). It was first set up in the 1950s to 
control government welfare, resource distribution, migration, and criminal surveillance. 
Citizen registration was divided into either agricultural or non-agricultural (urban), each 
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with different sets of benefits in healthcare, education, housing allowances, and pension 
insurance. Migrant workers, most of whom were born in farming villages, receive an 
agricultural hukou at birth, which denied them benefits in urban areas they might migrate 
to for work. Gradual reforms have been instituted to increase internal equality. 
Point-system schemes have been in place in some cities allowing for official migration, 
not unlike skilled international immigrations to Canada or Australia. Partially due to these 
reforms, the hukou‘s impact on migrant worker lives has arguably declined. Leading this 
view is Shaohua Zhan (2011), whose ethnographic research shows that market resources 
and social exclusion are two much stronger influences than the hukou in determining 
migrant workers‘ life chances. Many migrant workers interviewed by Zhan reported 
experiencing identity-based social exclusion and separation of social networks; they are 
also aware of their lack of two important market resources: human and economic capital. 
When asked about the hukou, many did not perceive it as a hindrance to their social 
mobility. While hukou had played an important role in deterring migrant workers‘ 
permanent, or long-term settlement in urban regions, their effect on migrants‘ movement 
is declining as a result of hukou reforms.  
 
In Ching-Kwan Lee‘s Against the Law, she described two different types of labor unrest 
in contemporary China, unrest from laid-off ex-state enterprise workers and from laid off 
ex-private enterprise migrant workers. While the comparison is meaningful, the plight of 
southern migrant workers is more desperate than that of their northern counterparts. The 
former have—far away from home and prohibited by the hukou system from receiving 
local government benefits—little support or recourse and are faster to resort to marching 
and relying on labor bureaus. Yet despite Lee‘s evidence and observation of migrant 
workers‘ legal recourse, migrant workers reject cumbersome and costly legal processes 
and often acquiesce to unjust treatment in the name of cutting losses. More often than not, 
after they are laid off—without proper severance package that many small factories are 
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unable to afford—they quickly resume looking for new work in pursuit of new wages to 
satisfy imminent livelihood needs of themselves and family members back home.    
 
The work of Zhan and Huang (2013) shows that legal recourse is absent at best. Local 
governments are often complicit with foreign capital to begin with anyway. They observe 
that incomplete proletarianization, different from what traditional labor scholars would 
have foreseen, actually increases labor‘s bargaining power in China. Ties and 
entitlements to farmlands at home offer them the ability to exit the coastal labor market 
altogether, thus, giving them bargaining power with (current or would-be) coastal 
employers.
5
 Dagong is no longer that attractive as alternatives became available.  
 
Using evidence from fieldwork in a 600,000-resident county in Inner Mongolia, a 
migrant-worker sending region in the 1990s, Zhan and Huang (2013) show that migration 
has been reversed in the 2000s due to changes in state policies that have promoted rural 
economic development (and the accompanied increase in employment choices at home). 
Staffers interviewed at the County Bureau of Employment in the mid-2000s felt that 
―before, we used to beg them [employers from large and coastal cities in North China] to 
hire our laborers, but now they beg us to send them our workers.‖  
 
In light of this, one important aspect of my research is to investigate return laborers‘ life 
chances outside of the hukou system and social exclusion, situations in which migration 
                                                          
5
 Erik O. Wright (2000) differentiates two types of workers‘ power: associational power and structural power. 
Associational power comes from the formation of collective organizations of workers, such as trade unions, political 
parties, or any other form of institutional representation of workers. Structural power results from workers‘ location 
within the economic system. Wright (2003) further divides structural power into marketplace bargaining power and 
workplace bargaining power (see also Silver, 2003). Zhan argues that incomplete proletarianization in the China 
context—meaning migrant workers‘ ties to their rural farmlands at home and the resultant nonwage sources of 
income--gives them the ability to exit the coastal labor market; this credible threat then empowers them to negotiate for 
higher coastal wages and better benefits and working conditions.  
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is not involved. Specifically, how do workers make a living now at home? Is their return 
home final, or temporary? Are they making the same level of income doing what they do 
now compared to their jobs in the coastal factories? How have their dreams changed or 
remained the same about life? Have they gone home in time to improve their parent-child 
relationships? What aspirations do they have for their children? 
  
Starting in 2001, when Chinese scholar Chunguang Wang (2001) coined the terms ―new 
generation migrants‖ and ―second generation migrants,‖ two groups of scholars have 
been conducting research on the differences between older and younger generation 
migrant workers on the coast. To avoid confusion with ―first and second generations‖ of 
immigrants from international immigration, I will use ―older‖ and ―younger‖ generations 
throughout this dissertation.  
 
In the most recent work with her research teams, Pun published Migrant Labor in China, 
a book devoid of the ethnographic detail of her earlier Made in China. She updates her 
work, adds an analysis of the construction industry, which employs male workers, and 
portrays the difference between the older and younger generations of migrant workers 
(Pun, 2016). Pun stresses that while the difference between the older and younger 
generation of workers should not be exaggerated, the younger generation is on the whole 
more individualistic, better educated, and more oriented towards urban culture and 
consumption. Pun concludes that the younger generation is also more prone to harboring 
resentment and anger towards life circumstances as migrant workers. While this seems 
logical, my research found a slightly different result among the younger generation. I 
believe it is their youth, not their resentment or dissatisfaction, that fuels the younger 
generation‘s drive to seek social mobility. Now in their 40s and 50s, the older generation 
are generally happy settling into semi-retirement at home. In many ways, the younger 
generation‘s return to their home township or village is less final, because they have not 
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completely ruled out leaving home for dagong on the coast again, especially those who 
still want or need a better wage.  
 
One group of scholars—like Pun— finds that the younger generation of migrants have 
higher educational attainment, higher occupational status, and higher employment 
expectations, an increased proclivity for urban consumer culture (Davis, 2000; Pun, 2003; 
Yan 2008), less constrained economic circumstances, greater pursuit of personal 
development and freedom (Jacka, 2006), and a higher job turnover rate and less loyalty to 
their work (Smith et al., 2004), compared to the older generation of migrants. These 
scholars find the younger generation of migrants to be less resilient than the older 
generation in their employment, having few emotional ties with their rural places of 
origin, and strongly identifying with the destination cities, and they have strong desires to 
stay in destination cities (Liu, 2010; Liu & Cheng, 2008; Liu et al, 2012; Luo & Wang, 
2003; Wang, 2001, 2010). 
 
The second group of scholars challenges the first and finds evidence that the difference 
between the two generations of migrant workers has been exaggerated, and that the 
dichotomous approach in comparing the two generations of migrants is inadequate and 
too simplistic (Yang, 2010; Zhu 2010; Zhang, 2011). My research sample of 40 supports 
this second group of scholars, as does a study by Zhu and Lin (2014). They first 
interviewed 3011 respondents, including roughly 2000 females and 1000 males.  
 
Demographically, 97 percent of the older generation of respondents are married, 
compared to only 38 percent in the younger generation. In terms of educational 
attainment, the older generation has 31 percent primary school graduates and 36 percent 
junior secondary school graduates, while the younger generation has 55 percent junior 
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secondary school graduates. The following chart shows occupational structures of the 
first and current employment of the two generations of migrants.  
 
Table 1 Occupational Structures of Older and Younger generation Migrant 
Workers in China 
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Zhu and Lin (2014) maintain that even though a slightly greater percentage of younger 
generation is employed as sales, service, and clerical workers than the older generation, it 
does not constitute significant upward mobility, because there are many menial sales, 
service, and clerical jobs for migrants that require no more education or sophistication 
than production and transport jobs and that command just as low an image and wage. 
 
Both generations had production and transport workers as the dominant job category. Not 
reflected in this chart but revealed in the survey is that employment for both generations 
was unstable: only 55.4 percent of older generation and 56 percent of younger generation 
signed contracts with their employers, with insignificant difference between the two 
generations. Of those who did sign contracts, they were mostly short-term, with those 
shorter than 3 years accounting for a great majority of the older generation, as well as the 
younger generation. 
 
In terms of identification with the places of origin and destination and settlement 
intention in the cities, 61 percent of the older generation identified themselves as rural 
residents, while only 55 percent of the younger generation did so. However, this 
difference was small and the statistical significance was not high; second, this difference 
might be accounted for by the alternative survey choice of feeling difficulty to identify 
themselves—22 percent by the younger generation—compared to the 17 percent of the 
older generation. In other words, it is possible that both generations feel a similar degree 
of identification with places of origin, but because of survey designs that gives the option 
of choosing ―feeling difficulty to identify,‖ on the surface more of the older generation 
has an affinity with their places of origin. 
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Another survey result is telling: The average amount of money sent back by the younger 
generation migrants was RMB 5950, which was RMB 140 more than that sent by the 
older generation. Even though this is only a 2.5 percent difference, and the data source 
does not give information on whether inflation is accounted for and whether this was 
constant RMB, this evidence further suggests that emotional ties felt by the younger 
generation migrants to their hometowns are not necessarily weaker compared to the older 
generation.  
 
In short, Zhu and Lin‘s large sample-sized survey revealed that there are more similarities 
between the old and younger generation of migrant workers than there are differences. 
 
In Lu Zhang‘s 2015 book, Inside China’s Automobile Factories: The Politics of Labor 
and Worker Resistance, she deftly observes a labor force dualism, the divide between 
formal and temporary workers as a central component of labor relations in the Chinese 
auto industry. She argues that widespread grassroots protests among autoworkers in 
China have largely succeeded—they have won wage increases, improved conditions on 
the shop floor, and pressured the government into enacting new labor laws and policy 
changes (Zhang, 2015). 
 
First, while this is happening in the automobile industry, the story in the garment 
manufacturing industry is altogether different. One might first assume that automobile 
workers have less bargaining power than garment manufacturing workers because there 
are a small number of automobile makers (employers). But upon closer examination, 
garment manufacturing workers have a grimmer plight. This is because the entry barrier 
to garment manufacturing is much lower—one can much more easily train to become a 
worker in garment manufacturing than in the automobile industry, making job positions 
in garment manufacturing highly replaceable. Also, the entry barrier to establishing a 
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garment factory is low, with many small or unofficial workplaces where employment 
practices fall outside official rules.  
 
Second, not all enterprises can meet all the requirements of the new labor laws and policy 
changes that the country enacts as it upgrades its industries to become more high-tech, 
less labor-intensive. Workers who were laid off from these outdated enterprises did not 
necessarily benefit from the new labor laws. We will learn in chapter 3 the plight of small 
garment manufacturers.  
 
Garment manufacturing workers are less like automobile workers in Lu Zhang‘s book 
because auto manufacturing is a capital-intensive industry where workers have structural 
power against their employers. Except for the gender factor, garment workers are more 
like informal construction workers described in Sarah Swider‘s Building China (2015). 
Construction workers are predominantly male, and the garment manufacturing sector 
predominantly female. Like construction workers, few garment workers have signed 
labor contracts, especially if they are working either as seasonal workers or workers of 
disposable positions.  
 
Swider observes that the informal working class consist of migrant workers, who protest 
against the state rather than their employers, and issues are framed as universal and 
symbolic of larger social struggles, increasing the potential for cross-class support. She 
argues that although these migrant workers have not been incorporated into the new legal 
framework, they have emerged as a central component of China's economic success and 
an important source of labor resistance.  
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My sample size and the factory sites of my research are too small to include many who 
have participated in labor resistance (only one of 40 did). Militant workers are in the 
minority, but labor is only acquiescent until it is not. 
 
What I have found from my study of two small garment factories is that labor and capital 
are not as frequently in conflict as standard Marxism would make it seem. Often in small 
factories, labor and capital are aligned to face the same enemy of globalization, a social 
force that is more fundamental in why both labor and capital classes suffer.  
 
For example, I found that wage arrears in the garment manufacturing industry have been 
tolerated and normalized by workers and are never protested. Labor has internalized such 
illegal practices, which the government has turned a blind eye toward since the 1980s as 
it was complicit with global capitalism, to consider it normal. Of course, it is still the 
factory‘s responsibility to pay workers on-time even if the end client has not; workers can 
at least be somewhat understanding (though still angry) when owed wages because of the 
sense of camaraderie with factory owner against globalization. 
 
Roger D. Waldinger wrote in in his 1986 book, Through the Eye of the Needle: 
Immigrants and Enterprise in New York’s Garment Trades, that while firms owned by 
members of a racial majority often interpret ethnic minority workers‘ behaviors in 
racially stereotyped ways, firms owned by members of a racial minority that hire their 
co-ethnics practice personal loyalties, ethnic allegiance, and a generally reciprocal 
employment relationship. In the context of a garment factory in China where both capital 
and the working class are ethnically Chinese, there is not a co-ethnicity to speak about, 
but there can be a general sense of camaraderie and a similarly reciprocal relationship 
between the two classes that are psychologically aligned to face globalization forces.   
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1.2 Research Questions 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to study migrant workers‘ lives, whether they include 
a departure from or return to their homes of origins. Why did they leave home in the 
1980s and 1990s, and why have they returned? This question will be asked to both older 
and younger generation of migrant workers to see how their motivations might differ. For 
both groups, I wanted to see whose lives are affected by these moves in both directions. 
Whose lives have been bettered and in what ways? Where are the hard choices made 
consciously, and what social forces contribute to the hard choices?  
At work, do both generations of migrant workers have a labor contract with their 
employers? If not, why not? Do they receive proper overtime pay? If not, why not? Do 
they receive from employer and contribute personally to proper social security schemes? 
If not, why not? How do migrant workers manage health care and old-age retirement?  
With the younger generation of migrant workers who have returned home, how much of a 
pay cut must they swallow? By choosing to return home, there must be non-monetary 
reasons, so what are they? What drives some to become small-scale entrepreneurs? What 
lessons have they learned from the coast—be they business models or general life 
experience in a more developed capitalistic region of the country?  
1.3 Research Methods 
 
This dissertation draws on a variety of data sources—in addition to participant 
observation, informal focus groups, open-ended interviews, and social media 
conversations, I worked in my father‘s factory for seven years full-time. This gave me 
insight into the underpinning of the factory‘s management, challenges, its relations with 
labor—even if from the employer‘s perspective. Because of my close contact everyday 
 27   
with workers, I naturally also absorbed their points of view on things. All of this, as well 
as written documents and secondary resources like newspapers and help-wanted ads. 
From 2004 to 2011 before I entered the PhD program in sociology at the CUNY Graduate 
Center, I worked full-time in my father‘s leather garment factory. In fact, in the first two 
years of my time as a doctoral student between 2011 and 2013, I was living in New York 
and acting as the factory‘s sales representative by visiting clients in New York. I 
supported myself this way. In 2013, the factory changed ownership, and two workers 
happened to invite me home. The change of ownership conveniently helped with the 
passing of my IRB regulations in regards to conflict of interest. But of course, all the 
knowledge about small factories and their workers, I had acquired during my seven-year 
prior tenure.  
Because of my unique vantage point, access to the factory, which can frustrate other 
researchers, has never been a problem. I also quickly gained the consent of my father‘s 
friend to interview workers in his factories in Guangzhou, Guangdong and Weiyuan, 
Sichuan in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Speaking with my father‘s friend on social 
occasions about his business conditions also provided context for his business operations.  
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Figure 2 Map showing location relationship between Guangzhou, Guangdong and 
Weiyuan, Sichuan. Source: Society of Anglo-Chinese Understanding 
http://www.sacu.org/provmap.html, accessed January 10, 2017 
 
This dissertation is a product of much travel and countless mileage. In my first trip with 
workers to their homes in 2013, I took a six-hour evening train from Guangzhou to 
HengYang, Hunan. We arrived around 4 am, and stopped at a rest station for a 
connecting small van to their village. We were only able to get two seats for the three of 
us; so in the six-hour journey, we bonded over taking turns on the seats (but the two of 
them were too deferential to ever let me stand) and exchanged stories about their past 
journeys and their homes that I would never had discovered if I only stayed in the factory 
working with them under normal circumstances.  
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As my father‘s friend agreed to let me camp out at his secondary factory in Sichuan, I 
traveled there and stayed for two months in 2015, then again in 2016. As I got to know 
some of the workers better, I became more involved in their lives. One first generation 
worker, after receiving my recruitment ad, said her daughter saw the piece of paper and 





 grades. I gladly took the job and met with her once a week. 
Through interacting with her, I learned about her expectations of life, her parents‘ 
expectations of her, and her relationship with her migrant worker parents. Another 
worker was simply kind enough to take me home, an hour away from the factory in the 
township. We toured around a vineyard in her hometown, chatting away in depth in a 
unpressured way. That evening, we slept in the same bed. In 2016, I made another trip to 
Sichuan to visit the interviewees—by now we were keeping in touch over social media 
and had become friends.  
 
This is an exploratory study of migrant workers‘ return home. I conducted interviews 
with 40 people, and all of their stories were eventually included.   
 
Chapter 2 The Departure of Older Generation Migrant Workers  
The number of migrant workers have risen since the start of Deng‘s Economic Reform. In 
1983, migrant workers accounted for only 2 million in the population, and this number 
increased 15 fold to 30 million in six years. Then in 2002, according to the National 
Statistics Bureau, migrant workers reached 105 million, and in 2008 225 million. The 
most recent census count shows that in 2014, there were 274 million, a 1.9 percent 
increase from the count in 2013 (JunJie Wang 王俊杰, 2015). 
2.1 Definition of Migrant Workers (nongmin gong) 
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The term nonmin 农民 gong 工 refers to migrant workers‘ bi-local existence, with 
nongmin referring to their official agricultural hukou status of being farmers, and gong 
referring to their activity as industrial wage workers.
6
 In English, the term ―migrant 
workers‖ is often short for ―agricultural migrant workers.‖ Ironically, many of the 
younger generation of agricultural migrant workers who left their farming villages for 
city jobs have already lost knowledge of farming independently from scratch and by 
themselves. They might be able to provide peripheral help like harvesting to their farmer 
parents, or be extra sensitive to recognize the lunar calendar because it revolves around 
various farming seasons, but they were no longer capable and knowledgeable of farming 
independently from start to finish. The term, ―migrant workers‖ seems to convey—thanks 
to media that has often taken perspectives out of context—a negative image of a dirty, 
aimless, floating, and even riot-prone population. They are in fact the opposite of those 
descriptions.  
Here, I first provide a history of the hukou system that had until recently made settling in 
urban work destinations nearly impossible.  
From 1949, when the People‘s Republic of China declared its sovereignty, to 1958, 
citizens were free to move within the country. The earliest form of the hukou system 
started in 1951, when the government merely sought information on people‘s 
whereabouts by requiring registration at a local bureau three days after any move. Local 
registration was unconditionally granted after three months of moving to a new location.  
Hu means a unit, or a family; kou means persons. Together as a term, hukou refers 
generically to the sums of units of families and people. In this early era in the People‘s 
Republic, hukou functioned mainly to manage public safety and the population census. 
As the People‘s Republic in its infancy realized its backward economic development, it 
                                                          
6
 Online news source (in Chinese): http://news.sohu.com/20110701/n312188157.shtml, accessed 
November 11, 2016 
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sought to develop heavy industries as a national priority to accelerate the process. This 
way, it could ―grow up fast,‖ so to speak, be self-sufficient (as opposed to being reliant 
on foreign imports), and be equipped with industrial facilities and a modern national 
defense system, especially during a time when the world was hostile to socialism and the 
forming of a new socialist country. Heavy industries were 85 percent of all industrial 
investment at this point. With no other plans for building a socialist country, the nation‘s 
leaders mimicked the development of the former Soviet Union. Jobs in heavy industries 
then attracted a large number of peasants. During this free-moving period from 1952 to 
1957 (the government‘s first five-year plan), 20 million agricultural workers moved to 
towns and cities.  
However, this massive number of peasants crowding into towns and cities created 
overcrowding and food shortages, prompting the government to establish a series of 
hukou control policies, culminating in the 1958 separation of agricultural and 
non-agricultural registration and the prohibition of the free movement from an 
agricultural to a non-agricultural hukou in towns and cities, except in cases of acceptance 
into jobs or higher education institutes in urban regions. By forcing peasants with an 
agricultural hukou to stay on their farms, the government made sure that peasants had to 
engage in farming, as opposed to becoming industrial workers and crowding out urban 
resources. Moreover, peasants were taxed and exploited by having to submit a 
disproportionally large quantity of their crops to the government (which would then 
distribute the food to the industrial and urban populations), creating food shortages in the 
villages as well. As a result, peasants were forced to uproot themselves and flow into the 
cities again, now violating the hukou regulations. 
This foreshadowed the massive movement of agricultural migrant workers in the 1980s 
after the Economic Reform.  
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The rationale for the hukou system was to prohibit this flow of peasants into the 
already-crowded cities. The policy prioritized the protection of urban resources and 
stability over the equality of all citizens. On the ground, it created a two-class society that 
featured much inequality in areas of transportation infrastructure; water, electricity, and 
gas infrastructure; housing; education; healthcare; and other social benefits. Urban hukou 
holders received much better treatment than their agricultural counterparts in the above 
aspects of life, in terms of greater quantity and higher quality.  
Particularly for state sector employees, vital services and welfare entitlements were 
routinely provided to urban residents, including free or subsidized health care, retirement 
benefits, and subsidized food and housing (Cheng and Selden, 1994). As if the disparity 
in the abovementioned provisions were not enough, imagine urban hukou holders 
receiving more than agricultural hukou holders in compensation for deaths, when the 
deaths had occurred, for example, in the same car accident.  
All of this started to change in 1984 on a small scale, and in larger steps in the 1990s, 
then most recently in the 2000s. Those with an agricultural hukou but who are engaged in 
entrepreneurship, labor, or providing services could change their hukou status to an 
intermediate ―Self-Funded Food hukou” if moving to small townships, meaning they 
would grow and generate their own food (as opposed to qualifying for the urban hukou‘s 
government-provided food ration). This meant that education, skills, and capital were 
tickets to upward mobility, i.e., peasants were no longer ―stuck‖ in villages but could live 
in small townships. This intermediate Self-Funded Food hukou was not yet a full-fledged 
non-agricultural hukou, it only allowed for those in the villages to work in small 
townships (note the policy change started with small townships). This pilot policy—and 
the small step towards loosening the overall hukou system—served as an exploration and 
experiment for the same policy to take effect in large cities and on a larger scale later. See 
section 2.3.2. 
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It is no coincidence that the timing of this policy change was aligned with the massive 
wave of older-generation agricultural migrant workers who traveled long distances to 
work in coastal factories—the demand to loosen the hukou was tremendous. Suddenly, 
alongside China‘s Economic Reform, people needed money to live. Everything that used 
to be provided for by the Communist government now required cash. Social reproduction 
had a price tag. People needed money to buy food and other everyday items, to educate 
their offspring, and to pay medical bills when they or their aging parents were sick. This 
is not to mention the more advanced needs of culture and entertainment. And therefore, 
they began moving to the coast to make money.  
 
2.2 Stereotypes of Migrant Workers  
 
Disheveled and dirty? No. Most factories and their dormitories on the compound are 
surrounded by small shops and small supermarkets that sell a wide range of personal 
hygiene products; it could also be counted on that at least two small hair salons would dot 
the block nearby: most workers have normal standards for personal appearance, not to 
mention that basic grooming and uniforms—depending on the size and management of 
the factory—were often workplace requirements.  
Aimless and floating? No. Chain migration happens with an aim. Migrants from the 
hinterlands know who they are seeking and where they are staying. They strive to stay 
together with a trusted friend, cousin, sibling, or relative who has come before them, who 
has helped recruit them to work at the same or nearby factory. And while it is true that 
some workers job-hop until they find something satisfactory, this search cannot be 
described as aimless or floating. Given every worker‘s preferences, constraints, and 
desires, everyone—like people working for a wage or salary—is searching to maximize 
their utilities on the job. It can mean different things for different people. Some want to 
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earn as much as possible and thus seek out high-wage jobs. Others want to work less 
overtime with more free time. Still others have health concerns that encourage them to 
seek a healthier work-life balance. Many workers I interviewed in my study reported 
having a good relationship with their bosses. ―The boss is really nice to me,‖ they would 
say, and this often compensated for what workers considered low pay, or a sub-optimal 
conditions in their factory lives.  
Riot-prone? No. If anything, migrant workers are one of the most docile groups of people 
in contemporary Chinese society. Armed with around nine years of compulsory education 
and coming from simple farming families, most wish to have nothing to do with riots. 
They are neither wave-makers nor militant. Even when they are owed wages for 
nonpayment or arrears, they wish to resolve the problem in a non-confrontational, 
non-violent way. The purpose of coming out to dagong is not to make trouble but to 
secure a better life for themselves and their families back home. Anything that distracts 
from that purpose, like involvement in a riot or a strike that risks further conflicts with 
management is something they think twice about. 
 
2. 3 The Departure of Older Generation Migrant Workers 
 
In this chapter, I explore why older generation of migrant workers leave their homes. 
Naturally, the older generation will have had a longer, different work trajectory than the 
younger generation or wave of migrant workers. In the next chapter, I explore the return 
of these older-generations migrant workers, and in chapter 4, the return of the 
younger-generation migrant workers. In some cases, the older generation‘s decisions to 
return home will be more final simply because they are older and have reached retirement 
age. Going out again to dagong destinations would be fighting a greater inertia and with 
competition from younger generations, tougher.  
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Eighty percent of migrant workers in the eastern (coastal) region remain within their own 
provinces, only 16 percent go outside of their provinces of origin for work. Migrant 
workers in western and central China, however, are much more likely to travel outside of 
their provinces of origin for work. Fifty-seven percent of those from western China and 
67.2 percent of those from central China migrate to provinces outside of their provinces 
of origin (JunJie Wang 王俊杰, 2015). 
After China‘s Economic Reform in 1978, Special Economic Zones were linked to 
specific inland region labor bureaus in recruiting able-bodied agricultural migrant 
workers to move to coastal factories for work, with room and board provided. For 
example, the then labor bureau of my ethnography location, Weiyuan Sichuan, was 
linked to enterprises in Guangdong Province. Ruth Milkman wrote that as manufacturing 
in the U.S. withered, the traditionally female-employing service sector expanded; surging 
demand for female labor drew more and more married women and mothers into the 
workforce.  (Milkman, 2016)  China had another situation at the time of its Economic 
Reform.  Both men and women were recruited to go to coastal factories, but many 
industries preferred women over men because women were perceived to have finer hands, 
to be more careful and detailed oriented in industries in which such qualities are 
warranted, such as the electronics assembly lines and garment sewing productions.  
Informant P.X. was one of the few pioneer women from her home in Sichuan who, in 
1988, migrated out to Guangdong through labor bureau recruiting. She left just before her 
16
th
 birthday with her cousin because they were afraid of individual enterprise 
recruitment ad scams. Informant M. went with an organized group of 200 unmarried 
female workers in 1989, just before she turned 17.  
Thirty years after the initial stifling hukou system, policies in large migrant 
worker-destination metropolises have started to loosen up. Shanghai in 1994, Shenzhen in 
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1996, and Guangzhou in 1998 took the intermediate step to grant hukou status to 
outsiders who had an investment, a residential property of a certain size, or a legal job in 
the city, provided that they had obeyed the one-child policy and paid taxes.
7
 
While it seemed like migrant workers would now finally switch into urban hukou with 
this policy change, the majority do not bother to apply. First, because of their long hours 
and accommodation at factories, most lack child care ability and facilities. In the example 
of Guangzhou, the urban hukou was only given to those aged 16 to 60, making migrant 
workers‘ parents ineligible to move, even if they themselves were eligible. Not only are 
age limits a problem, housing for parents and children is impossible when migrant 
workers live in the dorms.  Living in the dorms and having little expense themselves, 
alongside having social reproduction shifted to the villages, enables them to send 
remittances back home to support the lives of their aging parents and children.  Second, 
conceivably, migrant workers also have a strong affinity and loyalty to the land that they 
come from and the community they belong to back in the villages. It has always been 
clear to most migrants that there is an end date to their work experience somewhere in the 
distant future, when they will have made enough money, when they will have helped 
family members through a particular crisis, or through a period in which money is 
especially needed, such as a sibling going to school, after which they will be able to go 
home.  
Indeed, some scholars have noted that returning may not be rational, that cognitive and 
psychological factors tend to be underestimated in studying settlement intentions (Ding, 
2005; Hu and Hu, 2009). In China‘s context, affection for home and geographic 
attachment may be parts of the values and traditions of many rural urban migrants; 
                                                          
7
 The implementation of this policy is such that the process to verify education can be so extremely difficult that many 
applicants resort to giving up after a few attempts. Schools back in inland provinces refuse or do not have the ability to 
re-print diploma copies, and many  applications are stalled and cannot be pushed beyond this step. 
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migration behavior may be hardly anticipated by neoclassical economic factors like 
utility maximization (Huang, 1999; Zhang, 2002).   
My finding confirms this view. Overwhelmingly, in my sample migrant workers from 
both generations noted that hukou was never a concern in their decisions to depart or 
return, except for a few who were exceptionally motivated to stay and earn the urban 
hukou. In their departure into the coastal host cities, as long as they obtained the 
Temporary Resident Permit, applied for through their job, their stay was fine, and they 
were free to move about locally. When I inquired whether the lack of an urban hukou 
posed a problem, an informant laughed and challenged me: ―Not everyone wants to 
immigrate like you.‖  
Indeed, moving from the hinterlands to the coast and obtaining an urban hukou is like 
international migration. It is often a self-selected group of exceptionally motivated people 
who wish to (im)migrate vs. those who wish to return home one day. A small minority of 
my sample strove to get an urban hukou: L.A., Y.Y. and L.C.  
L.A. came to Guangdong from Sichuan at the age of 16, just after she graduated from 
middle school. It was at a time when foreign-owned factories were just starting to come 
in and set up shop and more people like herself wished to get a job than there were jobs. 
Through her relationship with an aunt who had married and settled in Guangzhou she 
landed a job in a sweater factory fixing the main label onto the collar area, a very 
rudimentary task. It was typical of the 1990s, that getting even an unskilled job in a 
factory, that entering a factory at all, required a relationship, someone who knew 
someone at the factory. A self-motivated person, she continued to go to night school. At 
first she studied accounting, but one day in 1993, the teacher announced that without a 
local hukou, she could not acquire an accounting certificate so she switched to garment 
making.  
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As soon as I knew accounting could not qualify me for the local hukou, I 
thought, my first goal was to get the local hukou. So I took actions to get it. 
Through relationships, my aunt was able to buy one legally. It cost her just 
a few thousand at the time. 
 
The 1990s ushered in such policy changes that allowed for buying a hukou by 
agricultural-hukou holders. The city was ready to open up and receive those with means, 
in the name of expansion.  
 
After she received the Guangzhou hukou, she moved her mom into the city to live with 
her. Five years later, together with the income her mother was making cooking for a 
factory, she bought an apartment that she invited me into. When I commented that she 
was a very self-motivated person, she revealed her trajectory at work.  
 
After I switched to garment making, I started to incorporate everything I 
learned at the night school with everything I was learning on the job. So I 
started to seek out new positions within the garment factory, like sewing 
and being responsible for other more difficult parts of the garment 
manufacturing, no longer just a label-sticking girl. Slowly, one step at a 
time, I learned pattern making and eventually became a pattern maker. 
 
Today, in addition to working in a small sweater company as a pattern maker, she bought 
another space in town and invested RMB 10,000+ in a set of pattern-making 
computerized machines to do freelance jobs. It is a way of making extra income, as well 
as insurance against the company‘s failure or ever being made redundant. Without a local 
hukou, establishing her own business would be more complicated and difficult. Now, L.A. 
enjoys her back-up business set-up, and her daughter enjoys going to a local public 
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school. Mimicking her mother‘s path of success yet striving to advance beyond it, L.A.‘s 
high school-aged daughter studies painting and will rely on her artistic skills to get into 
college. Had L.A. not had a local hukou, her daughter would not have been able to go to a 
local public school, and her subsequent artistic skills would not have been developed.  
 
Y.Y. is a Hunan native who has been living and working in a Dutch-owned business in 
Shenzhen for years, and therefore goes by her English name among her colleagues. She 
said:  
 
I thought I would eventually go back home. But having a Shenzhen hukou 
is beneficial for having my 3-year-old go to public school. Also, although 
there is a long line for it, having a Shenzhen hukou gives me the 
opportunity to rent or buy government-assisted housing, which is below 
the horrendous market rate in the Shenzhen real estate market. 
 
We next turn to L.C.‘s rich and multi-layered story of turning her hukou from rural 
Sichuan out to Shenzhen.  
 
2.3.1 Multigenerational Mobility and Life Strategies 
 
In rural China in the 1980s, resources were tight, as the country was coming out of 2. 
years of being poor under the Communist regime. Families consciously and 
unconsciously made their everyday and longer-term decisions as a unit. They strategized 
their divisions of labor and rewards: who is to work and earn money, when and how? 
Who is to be supported by this money, why and for how long? Who stays home to take 
care of whose kids? All arrangements of this sort served to improve the family‘s upward 
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mobility as a unit, and they had an internal logic that originated from a deep cultural 
background.  
Quach and Anderson (2008) state that the family constitutes a crucial support network, 
particularly through intergenerational relationships, even as the Chinese households are 
undergoing substantial changes. What I have observed in the field is that the family 
constitutes a support network especially when Chinese households are undergoing 
substantial changes.   
Individual decisions are embedded in collective family decision-making structures. Girls 
may decide, and have decisions made for them, to give up school and start earning a 
wage to support boys in the family. Older siblings may decide, and have decisions made 
for them, to help with the expenses of younger siblings. Teen and late teen girls may 
decide, and have decisions made for them, to be married off so there is one less mouth to 
feed in the family.  
This is how families function in a collective culture: family members intertwining their 
lives for collective life improvement. They therefore also take pride and feel shame that 
much more strongly from family members‘ behaviors and performance in life. Migrant 
workers‘ success or failures is not to be determined simplistically on personal successes 
or failures but taken to include family members. The Chen family illustrates this point.  
L.C., 40, a triumphant converted Shenzhen (urban) hukou woman got to where she is 
today from a difficult beginning. Her mother‘s sister had married someone in coastal 
Fujian, so the mother, B.W., had the idea two or three months after her own father died of 
leaving their home in Qu County, Sichuan to dagong. At the age of 7 or 8, L.C. was left 
at home to be cared for by her father and grandparents. During this time, B.W., the 
mother, worked hard at all kinds of physical and odd jobs to send money home. She had 
worked on construction sites moving rocks and bricks, stocking ships with goods, and 
passing sand in a line of workers. ―Whatever a man could do, I did, too.‖ Even at this 
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physically demanding job, she would skip lunches to save money to send home. B.W. 
was making RMB 3 a day.  
 
 
Figure 3 Map showing location relationship between Fuzhou, Fujian and Qu County, 
Sichuan. Source: Society of Anglo-Chinese Understanding 
http://www.sacu.org/provmap.html, accessed January 10, 2017 
 
So when B.W. finally got a contact that would help her start working indoors in a factory, 
she was thankful. She thought life in the factory was quite good. ―You are fed in the 
canteen, and you are not exposed to the elements.‖  
 42   
As a practice to control labor, B.W.‘s boss was keeping workers‘ IDs so that they would 
not escape or job hop. But every few months, B.W. would take a three-day-four-night 
train ride with two or three transfers to go home and visit. This lasted for eight or so years 
until L.C. turned 16 or 17. She said to her parents, ―Mama, I will go out to dagong with 
you. I will help make money for [her two] younger sisters to study. If I continue school, 
there will not be enough money left for younger sisters.‖ 
Thus, L.C. stopped school after junior high. She first went to Fujian to make money with 
her mother, where she learned, at the age of 16 or 17, how to drive a large truck. Then she 
went to Guangzhou to look for a job with her cousin. 
 
Today, the three sisters‘ bond is as great as ever. They are all mothers themselves—L.C. 
in Shenzhen, the middle sister F.C. in Da County in Sichuan, who never left, and J.C., the 
youngest sister who returned to Sichuan (ShiMian) after a few years of working in 
Shenzhen—and are always thankful for what their eldest sister did for them. L.C. picked 
up her missing high school education with a ―GED‖ diploma, which led to a vocational 
degree, and eventually a bachelor‘s degree, all while working full-time at Philips, the 
lighting multinational company‘s China headquarter in Shenzhen.  
The youngest sister has an associate degree in accounting. But to the middle sister F.C., 
this was not good enough, and she felt somewhat responsible. She said: 
Mama was out dagong in Fujian. Older sister is out dagong in Guangzhou. 
I remember it was just me and Dad looking after J.C., the youngest girl. I 
was always burdened with the task of putting dirty clothes into our 
bamboo basket on my back and going to the river to wash them. I 
remember that J.C. would always just play around me and she would 
never help. But anyway, it was OK because I was older. I just wished that 
she could have done better on her physical education test. If so, she could 
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have gotten into a teacher‘s college, and then she might have been better 
off today as a teacher, as opposed to having to find a job in accounting in 
the private sector, which is always unstable.  
Multigenerational life strategies mean something as tender and deep as siblings‘ feeling 
responsible, proud, or ashamed of one another‘s life outcomes, as they do something as 
simple as the division of chores. In China, the reliance on machines is minimal because 
people are used to doing things by hand, especially in rural regions or by people with a 
rural history. So today, B.W. is not bothered that she does not have a washing machine in 
a household of four adults (she and her husband, plus their daughter L.C. and her husband) 
and two young children.  
They live in a walk-up apartment in Shenzhen for L.C.‘s job at Philips Lighting. One day 
I visited L.C. during the lunch hour so she could help me decipher an informant‘s 
recorded spoken words in Sichuannese. When I saw her walking into the doors of the 
restaurant, I immediately commented on her sharp appearance. She was wearing a blue 
top that showed the tops of her bare shoulder, and a pair of high heels, making her look 
like the powerful career woman that she indeed is. She thanked me for my compliment, 
and we proceeded to lunch and to the recording. The short lunch hour proved insufficient 
for her to listen to the entirety of my recording and to make sense and explain it to me 
properly. So we agreed that I would visit her home that evening. Her father, B.W.‘s 
husband, the family‘s designated cook, treated me to a five-course dinner in their small, 
crowded apartment. And during dinner, I saw B.W. coming out of the shower from the 
one bathroom they had, with the very same blue top I had complemented L.C. on earlier 
in the day, now ready to be dried on the balcony. It was roughly 7 or 8 pm, the 
grandfather of the household was cooking for the guest, me, and the grandmother of the 
household was taking a shower plus already washing by hand the daughter‘s clothes from 
that same workday. The operation of this family is an example of multigenerational life 
strategies.  
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Xu et al. (2007) sums this up concisely,  
Chinese culture, being collective in nature, is well-known for its emphasis 
on family relationships and support. Families are described as close-knit 
units, manifested in three-generational households. Research shows that 
despite the changes, family remains the main pillar of the social support 
network. Families are still greatly valued by the young and the old. 
Intergenerational relationships are not to be undervalued or underestimated. 
Child care and elder care remain families’ responsibilities both in urban and 
rural China (Xu et al. 2007). 
 
2.3.2 Urban Hukou  
 
We will use Shenzhen as example to discuss the recent hukou changes since 2005. The 
total population of Shenzhen has grown from 2.61 million to 11.55 million in 20 years 
between 1992 and 2012, and with about four million coming and leaving each year, 
indicating how great mobility is in Shenzhen (ZhenJing Li 李振京、LinShan Zhang 张林
山 et al., 2014). 
Statistics indicates that at the end of 2012, the total population of Shenzhen was 11.55 
million; within it, 27.3 percent (2.88 million) had a Shenzhen hukou, and the rest 72.7 
percent (7.67 million) lacked one. The ratio is 1:3. In fact, the non-hukou population has 
hovered around 70 percent for the past 20 years. They live mostly in traditional 
manufacturing districts like Bao An and Long Gang. As expected, even though those with 
higher education (associate and bachelor degrees) have increased among the non-hukou 
holders, the majority remain poorly educated (ZhenJing Li 李振京、LinShan Zhang 张林
山 et al., 2014). 
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In Shenzhen‘s 2011city-wide five-year policy plan, there was a goal to reduce the hukou: 
non-hukou ratio from 1:4 in 2010 to 1:2.3 in 2015 by increasing Shenzhen hukou holders 
by 280,000 people annually, doubling the growth in the last five-year planning period 
(ZhenJing Li 李振京、LinShan Zhang 张林山 et al., 2014). 
 
How does Shenzhen achieve this goal? Compared to Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, 
as we will see in the below chart, Shenzhen‘s hukou application threshold starts rather 
low, requiring just evidence of one year of social security payments. Using a point system 
not unlike that used in international immigration to Canada or Australia, Shenzhen has 
simplified the hukou application process for those with a special occupational skill and 
those with at least a bachelor‘s degree in a mid-level position. More important, like 
Canada and Australia, individuals are allowed to apply for their own migration, as 
opposed to relying on their employers‘ to apply (like in U.S. immigration), further 
lowering the standard so that more are eligible. 
The following table shows the points-based hukou system for agricultural-hukou holders 
to qualify in mega cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen.  
Table 2 Criteria of Qualifying for Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen 
Urban Hukou  
 Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou Shenzhen 
Social Security Evidence of 
continued 
payment for 7 
and more years 
Evidence of 
payment for 7 
years 
Evidence of 
payment for 4 
years 
Evidence of 
payment of 1 
year 
Place of No No Must have a No 
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Residence requirement requirement legal residence requirement 
Age Not older than 
legal 
retirement age.  
20 points more 
for those less 
than 45 years 
of age 
5 points for 
56-60 years of 
age. 2 points 
more for each 
year less. 
Not older than 
45 years of age 












































Source: Chinese Business Industry Research Academy 中商产业研究院 
                                                          
8 Resident permits are a more temporary type of permit that allows legal residence in the city but does not entitle 
holders to the same benefits as the permanent hukou. 
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http://www.askci.com/news/finance/20160824/11502256628.shtml, accessed November 
11, 2016 
A careful analysis of the chart shows these mega cities are welcoming productive workers 
(those who have paid for social security through their employers) in their prime 
productive years of age. 
According to the Five-Year Plans (policy directives) in these mega cities in 2015, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen set population goals respectively to be 23 million, 
25 million, 15.5 million, and 14.8 million. And respectively, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen have a shortfall of 1.3 million; 847,300; 2 million and 3.42 
million people. As a result, the population policy has now turned 180 degrees to invite 
non-urban, agricultural-hukou holders who are of productive utility to the mega cities. 
Like movements to mega cities, rural agricultural-hukou holders can also move and 
register for town hukous with similar requirements. Instead of moving to mega cities, 
many choose to and more easily manage moving to nearby towns for the better schools 
that attract better teachers.   
Gradually, China has been seeking equal public services for all citizens without 
discrimination. Again, in the example of Shenzhen, a resident permit has been in place 
since 2008 in lieu of the temporary resident permit, which had a connotation of 
discrimination against the holders to be just ―temporary‖ sojourners. City-wide, more 
equal public services have been put in place, more community clinics and the coverage 
for all residents in these clinics, providing nine categories of free-of-charge basic medical 
services to all residents. In terms of housing, the policy endeavors to increase the amount 
of guaranteed low-rate housing available for rent and purchase.  
Getting an urban hukou is in many ways similar to international migration, which attracts 
those with above average motivation. First, those that wish to apply tend to have an above 
average drive to ―make it‖ in the more modern urban life. Indeed, since education and job 
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are two crucial factors in obtaining an urban hukou as we saw in Table 2, this domestic 
migration necessarily attracts those with a greater motivation in life. L.C. is but one 
example of this group.  
Since L.C. went to Fujian to dagong with her mother, she did not attend high school. 
After Fujian, she went with a cousin to Guangzhou to look for a job. At first, she was an 
assembly worker in a factory. Then she submitted an essay to the factory management to 
be hung on the walls. In it, she lied about high school, she wrote, ―I was very frustrated 
after failing the college entrance exam…‖ when in fact she had not gone to high school, 
let alone eligible for the college exam. But this apparently got the attention of 
management, which was facing a rapidly growing Chinese economy and urgently in need 
of human resources to help with expanding business in the factory. So they promoted her 
into the office. Now she became a shipping clerk.  
L.C. moved her hukou two times before finally registering it in Shenzhen. A native of Qu 
County in rural Sichuan, L.C. first moved her hukou by default by marrying someone in 
Guangxi. Then, when she had a job on the border of Shenzhen and the manufacturing city 
Dongguan, she bought an apartment with savings and moved her hukou to Dongguan in 
2011. ―I didn‘t have my college-equivalent diploma yet, but the city considered this an 
eligibility as long as you paid an RMB 10,000 ‗land construction fee.‘ This was a wrong 
move on my part, had I known that later I was eligible for the Shenzhen hukou, the hukou 
of a real big city. In hindsight I wasted this $10,000.‖ In 2013 she gave birth to a set of 
twins. According to the Dongguan Health and Family Planning Bureau, after the first 
pregnancy, women were required to have an intrauterine device inserted and after the 
second pregnancy, tubes tied (tubal ligation).  
But the Dongguan Health and Family Planning Bureau considered her pregnancy with 
twins as having two children and therefore forced her to tie her tubes. This policy and the 
argument with the Bureau made her indignant. ―In 2015 (at age 39), I finally turned in my 
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college thesis and received my diploma, so now, for Shenzhen‘s points-based hukou 
entries out of 100 points, I could receive 85 points for education.‖ Besides education, 
there were two more items required: a residential permit, which one automatically gets if 
one has been paying social security at a job, and social security itself. L.C.‘s motivation 
for the Shenzhen hukou in 2015 was to be eligible for government-assisted purchase of 
housing, to avoid the Dongguan Health and Family Planning Bureau‘s policy on birth 
control, and to eventually send her twins to Shenzhen schools when they reach school 
age.  
This is her understanding of Shenzhen‘s hukou policy. ―Shenzhen is an international big 
city and it needs human capital. With a stable population of 11 million and a floating 
population of 3.4 million, it is still not considered a mega city, so it wants to retain people 
on the edge of staying vs. leaving for their inland homes of origin.‖ She continues about 
her social circle. ―There are a lot of people from second- and third-tier cities who have 
bought land or apartments in Shenzhen that have since risen in price. Once they capitalize 
that, they can leave and live like kings at home, given the lower living standards inland. 
So why not? For these people, the calculation is simple. I think as a result of losing this 
group of people, Shenzhen‘s population policy loosened up.‖ 
Indeed, an urban hukou means giving up the benefits of an agricultural hukou, which 
includes giving up profits from renting out a plot of land. These benefits may, in financial 
terms, be larger than the benefits of having an urban hukou, especially because with more 
public services in cities and the greater ease in obtaining an urban hukou, an urban hukou 
is relatively common nowadays. 
L.C. continues her story: ―The whole export-oriented factory was 1,000 people including 
workers. Only the owner and the one secretary knew English. Even the vice president did 
not know English. This inspired me and inspired my interest in English.‖ L.C. faked a 
high school diploma (a common behavior in the 1990s in which a large ―infrastructure‖ 
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of small businesses printed school and other certificates) and enrolled in the continuing 
education school to study English at Guangdong Foreign Language University. ―My level 
was not at all up to par to attend the classes. I only knew things like ‗What‘s your name?‘ 
I had to go to the school and begged them to change my course to be a lower level 
English class, because I did not go to high school I said to the school, ―Please, please help 
me. I have savings of RMB 10,000, my parents are working as nannies in the factory, and 
this is the only hope for my future.‖  
The school agreed, to her relief. But besides her own level of classes, she also listened in 
on business English classes by lurking in the classroom. Despite faking the high school 
diploma, a few of her officemates in the factory saw her trajectory and copied it. ―I think 
business was much easier back then, so there was not a lot of emphasis on diplomas, and 
I could get my way. When I now look back on old emails sent by old colleagues, I‘m 
appalled by the poor English. But the country needed people to work, however badly 
trained they were!‖ She explained that a lot of her then officemates, for example, those in 
the purchasing department, also just had a middle school education and faked their high 
school diplomas.   
After 1 1/2 years at Guangdong Foreign Language University, I went for 
an interview for a European lighting company, stuttering. But I passed! 
My immediate managers were an expat couple. They had just gotten 
married and the husband was called to relocate to China. He negotiated 
with the company to have his wife follow him with a job offer, in training, 
in the same company. The trouble was, she had no experience in shipping. 
So she taught us English, and I taught her shipping. Every email I would 
send out, she would read and correct it first. I learned very fast during this 
period.  
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When L.C. finished her studies in the Continuing Education School at Guangdong 
Foreign Language University, she had an associate‘s degree, with which she was then 
looking for a job at Philips. At this point, she was armed with the previous lighting 
company‘s work experience and now English. More important, now that she had the 
associate‘s degree, she did not have to justify herself and explain all of her past mobility 
climbing step by step. Her CV looked just as normal and chronological as is expected of 
young women her age.  
L.C.‘s story illustrates the existence of agency in an otherwise overwhelmingly rigid 
hukou system. Her sense of tenacity, exhibited since age 16 or 17 when she decided 
consciously to go out and dagong with her mother on the coast, accompanies her 
throughout her adulthood, trials after trials, and hurdles after hurdles. She jumped through 
these hurdles and overcame the trials. Coupled with the loosening up of Shenzhen‘s 
population hukou policies, she finally qualified for a Shenzhen hukou at the prime age of 
39. Now, her children can legitimately enjoy the better schools that a Shenzhen-hukou 
parent is entitled to, as opposed to having to go to the type of schools for migrant workers, 
with worse resources for the students and more expensive—the type of schools that 
L.C.‘s youngest sister J.C.‘s daughter had to go to, before their return to Sichuan. We will 




: Swallowing Hardships to Depart  
 
Of those who returned, P.X., now 43, remembers why she came out to dagong. A 
somewhat typical narrative, P.X. left in 1988 because she wanted to help her family 
reduce its financial burdens. ―Plus, I was already proving that my studies were not good 
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anyway, so I wanted to give up and start earning money.‖ She recalls her train travels 
between her Guangdong work destination and Sichuan home.  
I was this small 16-year-old girl carrying a disproportionally huge backpack on 
my back and my two hands were also full of stuff I bought in Guangdong to 
bring home. Better material, everyday things that were hard to get in Sichuan 
because it was less modern, less industrialized, and lacked these commodities. I 
quickly learned the hard way that there wasn‘t any space for all my stuff on the 
train! I had absolutely no space and no strength for all I wanted to carry…in the 
end, someone from the same province helped me carry a lot of them. When I 
looked up, it seemed like everyone from the crowd was so big and tall. I felt so 
inferior and overwhelmed at the train stations. And when I tried to run, my legs 
were so weak. 
Before Chinese New Year, you might as well forget about having a seat on the 
train. You are lucky to have a spot to stand and rest your feet. And you had to 
constantly say ―excuse me‖ to attempt to pass people on the train Traffic was so 
much during this time that the train authority was putting out cargo trains 
without windows to transport people.  
Men were lucky they could pee in used water bottles. The toilets on the train 
could also be filled with people. That was how crowded it was. If a woman had 
to use the toilet, you would just have the people who were squeezed in there 
look the other way while you did your business.  
Q.H.H. came a little later than the pioneer cohort, and she came having already gotten 
married and given birth to two children.  
I came here in October 1993. At the time, I had borne two children, I had no 
money, and had to pay the fines under One-Child Policy (to have a second child). 
Then a neighbor helped bring me to Guangzhou.  
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I came to Guangzhou, stayed for a few days, then went to get tested at MTY 
Factory. It was a very reputable factory, very hard to get in. It had sewing tests 
for us. I already knew how to sew back home, using a mechanical sewing 
machine, but not an electronic one. They used electronic ones in the factory, so I 
did not pass the test the first time. I went to a training center to get training on 
operating electronic machines. The second time I tested, I had a low pass into 
the factory. 
My life was very painful at that time. I knew I needed to go out to make money. 
If only my husband worked, we could not have had any savings after all 
expenses are accounted for. If we both worked, our situation would be better. 
My children were small.  For elementary school, I put my children in the home 
of my older sister. But by middle school, they lived by themselves, the two of 
them together, and my father-in-law would come to our house to check-in on 
them. By high school, they went to a boarding high school and went home by 
themselves on weekends. At this time, they wrote me a letter saying that they 
felt cold and empty when they returned to a home of no parents. It made me cry 
reading that letter, I could barely finish it.
10
 
Today, Q.H.H. is the only sewing machine operator left in MTY factory because some 
have moved on to nearby factories with better and more stable orders, while others have 
gone home to retire and look after their grandchildren. A veteran at her factory, she has 
grown sympathetic to her stressed out owner, who is close to giving up on the business. 
Q.H.H. said, ―tell the boss to give up. If business is so difficult, forget it. We will all be 
alright. We can go home and look after our grandchildren. My son is working now, he 
can take care of me, and once he gets married and has a child, I can occupy my time 
looking after the grandchild. We will be alright.‖  
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2.5 Refusing Arranged Marriages 
 
M.J. went out to dagong at the age of 16 partly to help support her older brother in high 
school and partly to try carving out a different life trajectory than the one that would have 
been, i.e., getting married off in a year or two.  
I have four siblings. My older brother was in high school, my two younger 
brothers were respectively at middle school and elementary school. I was 
part-time helping my parents out on the farm after failing to enter middle school. 
My older brother who was boarding at his high school kept needing to come 
back for cash to continue; our family had to start selling objects for his expenses. 
I was 16, I thought, if I left to start working, the family did not have to cover my 
expenses and I could still help the family. Plus, if I did not go, I probably would 
have been married off at 17, 18, that would have been my destiny. So in 1988, I 
came out to a Hong Kong-owned factory in Guangzhou. The labor bureau came 
to recruit, so I went. I got my initial training in the factory. I was making a wage 
of RMB 2.5/day, which was too low and the factory did not have a large flow of 
goods for us to work on. For two or three years, I was jobbing around among a 
few factories.  
At first, people back home thought, gosh, what could young girls do when they 
get to Guangzhou? Nothing dirty?! It was very heart-breaking, old men in 
Guangdong would cat-talk to us and say offensive things to us outsider
11
 young 
girls. Well, but in fact, men and women alike, many have turned bad—for 
example, a male acquaintance went to Guangzhou, started to use drugs, and died 
at the age of 23. I was the first to go out from our hometown. There were a few 
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others ahead of me, but within the next few years, I was the first. I then helped 
others to go out after me. 
M.J. was shocked in her initial days at her first factory. Even if she came from a farming 
household in the village, she was a normal teenager who had most of her needs met at 
home, certainly her basic need to eat. But suddenly in the factory, this basic need became 
an expenditure for the factory, a social reproduction cost that management wished to keep 
as low as possible. 
I soon learned that life at home was much better, much more comfortable. 
However poor we were, we could at least satisfy our stomachs. In the factory 
canteens, there wasn‘t more to eat if you wanted it. I had to save and save and 
save. I could get the simplest dishes with my meal tickets (everyone had to 
purchase meal tickets from the factory): RMB 0.2 for a bowl of rice, and RMB 
0.1 for one vegetable dish. But even this cheaper vegetable dish I would skip 
every now and then. I would just add soy sauce, salt, and spring onions to make 
my rice edible. There were RMB 0.3 dishes, which were better, and of course, 
RMB 0.5 deluxe dishes with meat. I wouldn‘t get them; rather, I would save up 
from my meal tickets to trade cash with colleagues who wanted to eat more. I 
was very homesick. My dorm was on the fifth floor, and my diet was so poor 
that I wouldn‘t have the strength to climb all the way there. My feces was also 
always very soft, too soft and small, it showed how insufficiently I was eating. 
After 3-4 months, I stopped selling my meal tickets and decided to treat myself 
better by eating better because by now I was making money and could do so. 
My brother did not get into a college the first time around and wished to get our 
father‘s approval to repeat a year and try again. He wrote a letter to me and 
wanted me to convince our father to let him do that. Me because I had clout in 
the family since I was making money and contributing to the family expenses. 
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But I wrote him back and said, ―You can consider coming out to dagong, too, 
like me. I only have an elementary school diploma and I am making RMB 1200 
a month. Studying is no use. You can start making money already. 
I still remember to this day what he wrote back in response. He said, ―Sister, you 
are right. But that is because you are short-sighted and have no culture 
(education). If you had more education, you would not have said this.‖ 
Indeed, to many poor farming families, providing for children past China‘s compulsory 
nine years of education, into high school and behind would be considered an act of 
delayed gratification, delaying the immediate possibility of earning a wage in a coastal 
factory. 
Today, M.J.‘s older brother, college-educated, lives an upper middle-class lifestyle in 
Beijing. M.J. speaks in a somewhat bittersweet way about her brother and his lifestyle as 
he portrays it in his posts in social media, showing his family‘s vacation trips all over the 
place. She knows in a deeply proud sense that her brother‘s present success would not 
have been possible without her sacrifices, yet was she stupid to have sacrificed? What has 
she herself gained? 
M. is a cheerful lady who keeps her figure slim and her manner upbeat and pleasant at all 
times. She left for Guangdong before her 17
th
 birthday in 1989, when the local labor 
bureau organized 200 unmarried female teenagers to go together. Of the 200 that went, 
only 45 persisted and stayed; the others drifted away or went home because they 
―couldn‘t eat bitterness.‖ 
 
These examples recall the mid-1990s workers portrayed in Pun‘s Made in China, who 
were ―active agents in living their own lives.‖ ―Workers in the Meteor workplace often 
were proud of their earning capacities, their work skills, and their dagong identities. 
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Attempts at transgressing, such as escape to work in the city or refusal to go back home 
for marriage, worked to challenge the patriarchal power of the family and submissive 
images of Chinese women.‖ In my study, both M.J. and M. were brave and active agents 
in charting out their individual paths by refusing to stay home passively and wait for the 
marital fates arranged by their families. Even though M.J. is divorced now, she spoke of 
her undaunted heart leaving home at 16 partly because ―otherwise I would have been 
married off a year or two later at 17 or 18.‖ Dagong, earning a wage and therefore a rite 
of passage, was a much better alternative than being in a voiceless marriage. 
A few days after I distributed my recruitment flyer in the Top Weiyuan factory (my 
ethnography site, which I will describe in detail in Chapter 4), which explained the 
purpose of my trip and presence, I was surprised to receive a phone call from M. She took 
the initiative to call me one evening at 8 pm, inviting me to a dam park nearby to chat. 
We walked around for nearly two hours, and in the end, we climbed up from the valley 
dam area back into town along a small pathway only a local would know. 
Afterwards, I went to her house twice for meals (one of which included her husband 
dashing in to have a meal before rushing out for his night shift job), and we went out 
again to another park to walk around, this time with her 18-year old daughter. 
The third factory I was at was a state enterprise that produced silk. I was then 23 
years old, and my mom was very anxious about my marriage prospects. She 
arranged many matchmaking sessions for me, and I rejected them all. But there 
at this factory, I met my husband out of free love
12
. Some co-workers were 
joking about us and wanted to set us up. So they told me one day that this guy 
wanted to ask me out for a movie date. I waited and waited, he never came. I 
was very pissed off. A few days later in the canteen, he called my name when I 
was on my way to get lunch. I was very surprised that he had not eaten yet 
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because the kitchen folks were his buddies, so he normally eats in advance of 
everybody. He said, ―Look, we were originally going to be together anyway. 
Now it‘s an opportunity again.‖  
I didn‘t say yea or nay right there and then because I did not know how to 
manage the situation, but I was touched that he sacrificed his early lunches to 
catch me and speak with me. 
 
M.J. and M. and a countless number of young Chinese girls exhibit tremendous courage 
and desire for choice and freedom by refusing to follow family arrangements. 
Traditionally, families, relatives, and matchmakers back in the village would introduce 
suitable marriage partners to young girls from a nearby neighborhood. The expectations 
would be that they would get to know each other over a short period of time, then get 
married. The girls would move into the husband‘s homes to live with her parents-in-law, 
take up the farm work of the husband‘s family, then it would be time to have children—
and so the entirety of a girl‘s life: to be a wife, a mother, and a farmer.   
M.J. and M., by having made the decision to go out to Guandong to dagong, defy this 
tradition. Consciously, they chose to work in a factory and put their marriage prospects 
on the back burner. The transition of life from the village to the city involved trading a 
communal, collectivist system to one of individual risk-taking and rewards.  
M.J. is quietly proud of having seen ―the world‖ in Guangdong for nearly twenty years. 
―If I had never gone out, I would only be able to meet my children‘s more basic needs. I 
could not have offered the worldviews and perspectives on things that I do. And this is 
the result of having seen the outside world.‖ She feels quietly superior to an elementary 
school classmate when she compares herself. The classmate, due to being exposed to the 
elements from farming, looks physically older and has never been to the nearest big city 
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of ChengDu, just two hours away. ―Whatever the husband decides counts; she has no 
voice. This is not the kind of life I could live.‖ 
Today, a divorced woman, M.J. still looks at her life with a sense of empowerment that 
might have been impossible without her dagong credentials.  
It would be much worse if I were divorced and living in the village. If I were 
divorced and having to bring up children on my own…and going back to my 
parents were not an option because the divorce was a shame on the family, how 
bitter would that be? It is possible then that you would get re-married too 
casually again too soon just to have security in life. And if it‘s not a suitable 
partner, you would separate again. 
What M.J. is conveying is the tangible ability to earn a livelihood that a woman must 
have, as well as the intangible sense of empowerment and making one‘s decisions, which 
she believes is crucial and is quietly proud of having.  
 
Perhaps like any financially independent divorced woman anywhere around the world, 
M.J.‘s dagong experience, or earning her own livelihood, solidifies her world. She told 
me, ―Maybe when my second child becomes an adult or has her own home, I will 
consider looking for a partner again. Just someone to have company with because at that 
point, finances wouldn‘t be a threat any more, and you wouldn‘t be calculating each other 
like when you were a younger couple.‖ 
 
2.6 Building Houses that Stand Empty until Further Notice 
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Freelance electrician G.C.C. is 48 years old. Like many migrant workers, he decided to 
stay in Guangzhou and it does not deter him that he cannot get a local city hukou. He left 
his last fixed-wage job as an in-house electrician in 2013 and started to be an independent 
electrician, serving as many as 22 factories that needed his services in the area. 
I was in the last factory from June 1, 2001 to April 30, 2013. Before that, I was 
in a factory in Dongguan for three years. It was a large 6,000 people factory that 
had a team of 22 electricians responsible for 28 shop floors. My father had died, 
and according to our customs, you have to be beside him for seven days. I asked 
for a personal leave for a week – with travels to and from Guangzhou, I needed 
about ten days. Well, I was back 3 days late, and my work was gone. Nobody 
had told me that…except when it was too late. The security guards told me that 
when you were late for 1 day, your monthly bonus is gone. When you are late 
for 2 days, your annual bonus is gone. When you are late for 3 days, your work 
is gone entirely. I found out the hard way. 
I have an electrician‘s license for high-power (high-voltage) electricity from my 
home village. But I first came to this factory not as an electrician – I thought I‘d 
try it for one to two months.  
Despite the lack of a local Guangzhou hukou, G.C.C. decided to have his wife and two 
children come live with him, leaving the new house that he had built back home in Hunan 
empty with weeds growing around it.  
In 2012 September, my wife and two children came to live with me in 
Guangzhou. It‘s warmer to have the whole family live together. If I did not come 
out to work, my children could not have come out here, either, and I could not 
have helped them expand their horizons. 
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Of course, our expenses are also greater as a result. Before I could save and send 
home about 80 percent of my earnings. Now my wife runs a small mom-and-pop 
grocery store in the neighborhood. Before they moved here, my monthly water 
and electricity bill was about RMB 60/month, we now spend RMB 1500/month 
renting a living and shop space.  
For my daughter, we couldn‘t get her into a public school, which charges RMB 
8,000/year and needs to be paid all once. We then searched for more schools and 
found a private school that charges RMB 2,600/semester which includes all 
expenses including school bus. Her grades are better than when she was at home 
in our village. I believe this is because the school—even the ones that are 
considered worse, that are reserved for children of migrant workers like us—is 
better quality here in Guangzhou than in our home village in Hunan. 
    
2.7 Factory Life: Some Perceive That It Is Not All Bad 
 
Most older-generation migrant workers went out to dagong as unmarried workers. They 
started as young as 15 or so, with seven to nine years of education,
13
 and found their 
work either through the labor bureau‘s linkage with coastal factories or together with 
fellow provincials. Pun Ngai in her award-winning book Made in China gave a vivid 
portrayal of what their lives were like in a Hong Kong-owned Guangdong electronics 
factory, manufacturing for the export-oriented market. Pun‘s work was done in the 
mid-1990s, in the glorious days of the factories, when these migrant workers had just 
arrived. The factories were glorious because they were just starting to be built, so there 
were more workers wanting to get in than there were job spots.  
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In a way, factories were also glorious for workers—one could be proud of working in a 
modern factory. They had proper regulations and policies, which indicated not everyone 
could get in to work. It was a badge of honor to be able to. My work was done between 
2013 and 2016, when the same wave of migrant workers had aged from their teenage 
years to middle age, becoming mothers and grandmothers on the way. Their financial 
burden had eased as they experienced a lifetime of working, a house had been built and 
the interiors had been renovated on the money they had worked so hard to earn, and their 
children were now adults able to make money. 
The 36 year-old sewing machine operator L.S.L. from Hengyang, Hunan, already had 
more than 20 years of work experience under her belt.  
 
When I was 14 years old in the second grade of junior high school, I knew I was 
not going to make it to a good high school, and because the economic situation 
of my family was not very good, I wanted to help out. So I left home and 
followed a 16-year-old cousin out to Guangdong. My first job, I helped make 
rice noodles; then I entered a shoe factory and a toy factory as a quality control 
and craft worker. I learned that there was no overtime after work, I could play 
and stroll the streets on my free time, watch movies and go skating, etc. 
Factory life for these unmarried workers is not the all-consuming sweatshop that Pun 
describes from her ethnography site at the large electronics factory. Many factors 
contribute to the different treatment migrant workers receive and the different fates they 
encounter. Small- and medium-sized factories, especially those run by small families, can 
be less stifling, and some employees even report working and living a homelike 
experience.  
L.Z.L., now a worker in Zhejiang‘s Haining region and a mother today of a junior at 
Hainan University, spoke of the good old days at her last factory in Guangzhou. She was 
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an excellent seamstress and was working in the sample room of a Taiwanese-owned 
leather garment manufacturer. The boss, his brother, the brother‘s wife, and his 
90-year-old mother were living on-site in the factory, opposite from the workers‘ 
dormitory. The factory and the dormitory, rebuilt in 2005 under pressure from an 
American brand company‘s workers‘ rights audit, were modern in comparison to others 
in the Guangdong region. The dorm offered husband-and-wife rooms for couples instead 
of the typical sex segregated dormitories or floor divisions that were the standard practice. 
The bedrooms had attached private bathrooms with hot water, a rare deviation from the 
standard cold-water communal shower bathrooms. Otherwise, there were communal 
faucets to collect hot water.  
This factory‘s business dwindled in the new millennium, and L.Z.L. left in the first 
decade. Having worked a number of years there, she kept in touch with fellow workers 
over social media. In 2016, when I interviewed her on-line, she had moved on to making 
more each month in Haining, Zhejiang, a region famous for its leather-garment 
manufacturing. Six years after she left, though, she still reminisced over the good old 
days at the Guangdong factory. ―Is the boss still running it? I want to return and work 
there.‖ When I asked her why, she said, ―Because there was a homey feeling that‘s absent 
here. We used to watch TV and play poker together after work if there was no overtime. 
Here, we go back to our dorms—singletons to dorms and others to their outside rentals, 
and there is no communication after work.‖  
 
2.8 Empathy for the Nation 
 
It seems natural for workers and citizens to rely and fall back on the law when they feel 
like their rights may be infringed. Yet what if you are workers and citizens of a nation 
that has yet to develop laws that govern and protect you because law-making cannot 
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catch up with the speed of socioeconomic happenings on the ground? Such is the case 
with China following Deng‘s announcement of the 1978 Economic Reform. Labor law, 
by definition, is a product of capitalism. Only with capitalist relations between the 
capitalist (owners of factories and businesses) and labor (in this case migrant workers) 
would there be a need for labor law to govern this relation.  
China experienced two periods of labor relations. First, before the Economic Reform, was 
the planned economy period of relations between state-owned enterprises and state 
employees. In this period, there were no labor laws per se. The legal framework relied on 
guiding documents issued by the national government with details mandated by the local 
government and exact specifics executed by the enterprises. During this time, the nation, 
the local government, and the enterprise were bound together. National policies were 
enterprise policies, and nobody dared to transgress regulations. Therefore, no need 
existed for labor laws to adjust labor relations and conditions. 
The second period is the period after the Economic Reform. With the introduction of the 
market economy, labor-capital conflict arrived. The 1980s witnessed some beginning 
attempts to regulate certain aspects of the labor-capital relationships. For example, 1987 
ushered in the Labor Department‘s mandate on the prohibition of hiring child labor and 
the following year a mandate to protect female laborers.  
But these were merely single, exploratory mandates, and although they resembled bits of 
labor laws, the People‘s Congress passed a nation-wide set of labor laws only later. The 
first such draft was attempted in 1979, and the second attempted in 1983. Neither were 
effected at the national level, but the third attempt finally had a nation-wide hearing in 
1994, a transition period following the Economic Reform. Finally, a comprehensive set of 
labor laws was put in effect on January 1, 1995. 
When I asked P.X. about the legality of her initial work experience when she first 
traveled to Guangdong in 1988, before she turned 16—the very year that underage child 
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labor law was passed—she said ―The enforcement of the laws was not strict at the time. It 
was not until a few years later that there was something called illegal underage working.‖  
 
Meanwhile, Q.Y.G., now 45, talks empathetically about the nation‘s progression toward 
perfecting labor laws. ―The country itself has had to walk through the river by touching 
the rocks,‖ an expression that means taking things one step at a time on a trial and error 
basis without having a set blueprint from the onset. She continues, ―It‘s only been 
recently that the country has a standard on how bosses should treat workers. Now there 
are also labor laws to protect us.‖  
It is remarkable that migrant workers like P.X. and Q.Y.G. and the older generation they 
represent can be so empathetic about the country itself for lacking the laws or lacking the 
enforcement of laws to protect their rights. Instead of being bitter about what the lack of 
labor laws has meant—unregulated, sometimes outrageous hours that can last until 
midnight and during weekends—they sympathize with and forgive the nation for its 
backward origins. 
Often, especially in peak production season, workers work seven days a week until 10 pm, 
midnight, or 1 am, and occasionally when there was a miscalculation of workload or 
when there was really too much to be finishing up for the next day‘s truck load-up, the 
boss would call the whole factory to pull an all-nighter, providing a late night snack at 3 
am or so to replenish physical energy. This is not peculiar to China, Margaret M. Chin 
wrote about Chinese and Korean garment factories in New York City, which has to ―stay 
open all night to complete its orders. This, however, rarely happens. It is more likely that 
the shop will be open seven days a week so that orders can be completed.‖  (Chin, 2005) 
Because the base wage is relatively low to begin with, many workers desire overtime to 
increase their earnings. Going back to their dorms early after dinner in the canteen leads 
to an idle evening, does not maximize their earning potential, and negates their original 
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reason for working on the coast. Overtime work until 10 pm seems to be the optimal end 
time, allowing just enough time to collect hot water for showers, and washing and 
hanging laundry. While workers might whine and complain here and there about over 
time, they are most satisfied on paydays, counting the cash out of wage envelopes, many 
a time with the total take-home wage possible only with the overtime hours they worked 
and got paid for.   
The fact that the country is developing rapidly can be felt everywhere. During summers 
in college, in the late 1990s, when I visited my family‘s factory in a somewhat distant 
part of town, there used to be a herder who would walk his two cows around the factory. I 
recall looking out from one set of windows, at one moment, as they walked towards our 
building and then going to the opposite set of windows to follow them in the next 
moment. The land around the factory was a vast sea of greenery for as far as you looked; 
there were weeds, pasture, and small private farm units with water for irrigation balanced 
on bamboo sticks on farmers‘ shoulders. Very quickly, plot by plot, land was being 
developed. First, for example, just across the street from the factory one summer, a 
portion of the land was converted to narrow store fronts of auto repair and car wash 
establishments. The next summer when I returned, they would be gone, replaced by 
newly-constructed houses. A few years of time and they gave way to real estate 
developments. Now it is as busy as any part of town, hosting residential complexes and 
businesses that cater to the residents. 
A smart worker could see that land prices went up rapidly from year to year, at least in 
the coastal region. In fact, part of the make-up and incentive of migrant workers‘ travels 
and work to the coast was the ability to buy their own houses in their villages back home, 
and to be able to decorate the interiors with modern amenities. With each month, cash 
from the wage envelopes goes towards that goal.  
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Migrant workers I interviewed report being able to save as much as 80 percent of their 
wages, both because much of their lodging and food needs are taken care of within the 
factory and because they are just that thrifty. With development proceeding speedily they 
witnessed a flow of goods passing through their hands in need of making and assembling, 
migrant workers were hopeful and optimistic. 
When Q.H.H. invited me to her home in 2013, she and her construction worker husband 
had already built their new tile house, but they had not enough money yet to furnish it.  
 
Figure 4 Migrant worker Q.H.H.’s newly built tile house, ShuangFeng County, 
LouDi City, Hunan Province 
Then at the end of 2015, she invited me to go again. ―This time you can stay with me,‖ 
she said cheerfully and proudly, as she had by now finished the interior. Last time in 
2013, I had stayed with another worker from my father‘s factory, who had her big new 
tile house for herself, her husband, and her 20-year-old son, while her 70-year-old 
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father‘s mud house was a ten-minute car ride away. This mud house, I learned four years 
later, was torn down and a new tile house was built on the same plot of land. 
 
 
Figure 5 Migrant worker, Z.’s father’s mud house in 2013.  By 2017, this house was 
torn down and a new tile house is being built on the same plot of land 
Chapter Conclusion: 
The departure of the older generation of migrant workers has caught the attention of 
international media and domestic and international scholars. Migrant workers‘ migration 
out to the coast has been studied in geography, sociology, political science, and even by 
child development psychologists. Against and amidst various stereotypes, the older 
generation of migrant workers strived to earn a wage to support their families back home 
and maintain their bi-local existence by visiting once or twice a year and regularly calling 
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home while working on the coast—all well documented in the literature, in documentary 
films, and in vivid memories by the older generation of migrant workers. The long hours 
meant pay checks sent home to help build new tile houses, to finance children‘s education, 
and to command clout in family decisions.  
The hukou system, which is infamous for preventing agricultural hukou holders from 
settling down into the cities, loosened up in the 1990s, and settlement in the cities became 
possible. Except for a few exceptionally motivated individuals who strived for an urban 
hukou, my ethnography shows that the hukou was never a consideration for the migrant 
workers departing to or returning from cities in which they worked. They were merely in 
the cities to make money and always planned to return home where they belonged 
psychologically.         
Switching an agricultural to urban hukou was difficult for some but not impossible. With 
education and urban work experience changing hukou is possible, especially for the extra 
motivated. My ethnography explores how such people obtained urban hukous, the prices 
they paid, and the benefits they enjoyed.  
 
Chapter 3 Inside a Small Factory  
 
Lu Zhang‘s work is about the auto industry, whose labor relations differ from garment 
manufacturing. The auto industry is capital intensive and employees have what Beverly 
Silver calls structural power to stop work at any time. Idling capital-intensive machinery 
creates potentially great losses. In contrast, the labor-intensive nature of the garment 
industry means weak associational bargaining power. Garment manufacturers have low 
barriers to entry; their fixed capital costs little to acquire, and training is minimal—
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unskilled labor can be quickly trained on the job. Job attrition is high, and there are 
always people waiting to replace existing workers.   
Pun‘s Made in China, a shop floor ethnography of a labor-intensive electronics factory, 
and Chin-Kwan Lee‘s, Gender and the South China Miracle, also in labor-intensive 
electronics factories, in Shenzhen and Hong Kong, described work that takes place in 
large-scale factories, where the distance, both physical and emotional, between owners 
and employee is great. In their work, organizational hierarchies involving department 
heads, foremen, and line supervisors suggest that factory owners hardly know any 
front-line workers personally. In fact, in Lee‘s Gender and the South China Miracle, 
factory size is seldom considered important to management style: Matron workers in 
Hong Kong are described as being immersed in ―familial hegemony,‖ while unmarried 
young women in Shenzhen find themselves in an internal system of power based on 
regional politics and kin connections, or ―localistic despotism.‖  
Lee concludes it is the gender politics of the two labor markets that determine the culture 
of each factory, but it is also plausible that factory size affects culture. The factory in 
Hong Kong is small, producing almost only samples, whereas the factory in Shenzhen is 
vast and engages in bulk production for the same export clients. Since interpersonal 
relationships in a small place are different from a big one, it is easy to conceive that 
management is different as a result.  
Pun‘s and Lee‘s Shenzhen factories are not small- or medium-sized factories like the ones 
I worked in for seven years and where my ethnography was focused. Industrial (as 
opposed to wholesale, retail, or construction) small- and medium-sized enterprises are 
those with 3,000 or fewer workers with revenues below RMB 300 million or assets below 
RMB 400 million. Specifically, medium-sized enterprises are those with 600 to 3,000 
workers or more, with a revenue of RMB 30 million and assets above RMB 40 million. 
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The rest are small-sized enterprise.
14
 As of the end of 2012, there were more than 12 
million small- and medium-sized enterprises in China. They comprised more than 99 
percent of all enterprises within the country. They produce 60 percent of the GNP, 
provide 80 percent of employment in urban settings, and turn in more than 50 percent of 
the country‘s total tax revenue.15 In other words, the small factories I describe are similar 
to what many workers experience on a daily basis.   
Edna Bonacich and Richard P. Appelbaum (2000) in Behind the Label investigated the 
cut-throat nature of garment contractors in Los Angeles. Similar circumstances hold 
among garment contractors in China. Here, with my personal account, I wish to add what 
it is like inside a small factory—such as the one I worked in (my father‘s) for 7 years as 
well as the ones I have done interviews in and camped out at (respectively Top‘s main 
factory in Guangzhou, and its secondary factory in Sichuan).  
Concentrating on the business function of garment contractors and ignoring for a moment 
the ethnic entrepreneurial nature of many Los Angeles contractors, Bonacich and 
Appelbaum explain that contractors are businesses that respond to industry demands and 
serve as middlemen between manufacturers and workers, helping to control labor on 
behalf of manufacturers.
16
 Following this logic, they report that garment contractors 
                                                          
14
 Source: <Announcement of Temporary Printing Standard Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises> announced on 
February 19, 2003 by State Economic and Trade Commission, State Development Planning Commission, Department 
of Finance, and the National Bureau of Statistics. https://zhidao.baidu.com/question/755797276404312364.html, 
accessed February 9, 2017 原国家经济贸易委员会、原国家发展计划委员会、财政部、国家统计局于 2003 年 2 月
19 日发布了《关于印发中小企业标准暂行规定的通知》（国经贸中小企〔2003〕143 号） 
15 Source: http://www.docin.com/p-1059529797.html, accessed February 9, 2017 
 
16
 That contractors control labor on behalf of manufacturers is, in my opinion, a value-laden statement that 
depends on how the situation is viewed. One could argue that contractors are simply those entrepreneurs 
with a small pool of funds who look to enter into an entrepreneurial pursuit that requires little barrier to 
entry, and a workforce not difficult to train. I do not endorse either value in this dissertation but merely 
report their existence. 
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employ workers only when labor is needed, since contractor agreements with 
manufacturers are not long-term. Manufacturers can expand and contract production with 
seasonal shifts in demand or popularity of styles. Due to the instability of the work, most 
contractors—unless extremely close to one economically strong manufacturer—try to 
work for more than one manufacturer.  They wrote,  
Ultimately, the externalization of risk by the manufacturers is passed onto the 
workers by the contractors. If the flow of work slows down, they lay off some of 
their workers. If work picks up, they hire more people. Workers in contracting 
shops have no job security, and often suffer from continual, forced mobility 
from one job to the next. The contracting system means that the real employers 
of the garment workers, the manufacturers, do not have to bear responsibility for 
the workers‘ employment or unemployment. The risks of instability of work 
associated with apparel are thus borne by the workers and the contractors, not by 
the manufacturers.  
As I described in the introduction, I do not and cannot pretend to be who I am not. In the 
seven years of factory work, I was the boss‘ daughter, supposedly in opposition to the 
workers. My official title, however, was business development manager, which meant I 
shuffled between communicating with prospective and existing clients about different 
sizes, scales, needs, and protocols, our sample room, our bulk production shop floor, and 
the shipping companies to get samples or bulk production shipments out. This gave me a 
deep exposure to clients‘ psychology but more important for this dissertation to workers‘ 
lives and their psychology.   
In my experience in this small factory, there were more external conflicts between the 
factory and clients than between owners and workers within the factory. Granted, I was 
not responsible for managing the workers, but I worked and lived in the factory during 
the first few years of my life there, and I experienced management helping resolve 
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conflicts among workers themselves, as opposed to conflicts between management and 
workers. For example, workers themselves had scheduling conflicts about which security 
guards would stay behind for the Chinese New Year holiday.  
Another example of conflict from our factory would be determining which department 
made a mistake that showed up on a piece of apparel, which workers were to be blamed. 
This type of organizational fault-finding occurs frequently but is not an example of class 
conflict, It is a normal process that goes on whether an organization consists of a highly 
educated, white-collar work force or a minimally educated group involved in 
labor-intensive factory work.   
3.1 The Process of Generating a Product 
In this section, I will describe the process of generating a product, how globalization and 
a race to the bottom put enormous pressure on factories to survive.  
The process of generating a piece or a collection of apparel is as the follows:  
   
 
Step 1




•Diagrams or photos passed to factory
•Factory/Workers' input: discussion with sample room workers
Step 3
•Factory provides price quotations to clients. Samples may be ordered.
•Factory/Workers' input: calculation of labor costs on apparel's 
detailed work. For example, how much time does it take a worker to 
complete the studs insertion on a shoulder part of a women's jacket; 
or how much more time would sewing extra split pieces together as 
opposed to having one big piece.
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Figure 6 Flow chart of product generation 
As Robert J. Ross writes in Slaves to Fashion (2004), unrestrained globalization means a 
race to the bottom—low-wage countries‘ exports drive down domestic as well as global 
working conditions as businesses seek to purchase the lowest priced goods.  
Retail chains have the most power in the apparel supply chain. A buyer at Nieman 
Marcus whom Ross interviewed noted that retailers can calculate how many minutes it 
takes to sew a garment and based on the minimum wage, can figure out how much they 
need to pay per garment to cover labor costs. But for large orders, the retailer can cut 
back the price he is willing to pay, forcing contractors to pay less than the legal minimum. 
Prices start from the retailer and move down. It does not start from the real costs of 
making a garment; retailers can always find someone who can do it for less.  
Further, power is concentrated in a few hands: the top five U.S. retail organizations 
control 48 percent of the U.S. apparel market (Ross, 2004). So retailers have amassed 
enormous buying power, dictating price and putting cost pressures on contractors, while 
denying direct employment responsibility for workers. In this business climate, workers 
Step 4
•Price and other negotiations begin (delivery and payment terms)
•Factory/Workers' input: continued labor cost and time calculation 
for bulk production schedule and price. Might inquire subcontractors 
schedule and prices, too.
Step 5
• Order confirmed. Production starts at factory and/or subcontractors
• Factory/Worker's input: continuous and circular problem feedback 
system escalating to management, which decides on whether to 
escalate/report to clients.
Step 6
•Goods exit factory. Payment due.
•Factory/Workers' input: Sometimes factories are required to finance 
goods.
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are arguably in the same boat as factory owners are when negotiating with clients, i.e., in 
a passive position. 
As seen in Step 1, multinational or importer clients base their design decisions on 
forecasts from their markets and invest in the making products. At most in this stage, a 
factory gives clients price quotations on a few difference styles so that they can decide 
whether to proceed to Step 3 to order samples. Intense negotiations start at Step 3 and 4, 
when clients want the goods, but want them as cheaply as possible. ―Could we reduce this 
pocket?‖ ―How much more do YKK zippers cost?‖ ―If we use regular zippers, how much 
can we save?‖ ―Can we change to a cheaper fabric?‖ And most frequently and most 
important, ―Can we [the client] get a further discount?” 
Because these questions are answered by staffers at the factory who are in frequent 
communication with workers, workers learn about the difficulties and brutality of the 
buyer‘s market in the needle trade. For example, a trims warehouse manager would be 
sensitive to notice whether YKK or regular zippers are used for a particular shipment. He 
or she may then discuss with co-workers the quality of goods. Workers quickly learn to 
judge and evaluate the shipment of goods they manufacture and understand that factory 
owners do not necessarily make a profit. Factories producing large batch jobs almost 
always earn a lower, or even a negative profit, whereas those producing smaller quantities 
are more likely to generate a profit. They usually require more delicate manufacturing 
processes to produce finer details.  
At the same time as samples are made in Step 3, labor costs and time are calculated in the 
price quotation sent to clients. The sample-room workers‘ contribution is critical because 
the complexity of a product affects time and cost and is an important part of the price, 
which may make or break the entire order. However, the owner risks spending money 
and time on sample prototypes production, which requires studying and lots of trial and 
error. It takes longer than a line worker would take later during bulk production. Even 
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though it takes time to make the samples, client bulk production quotes have to be based 
on estimated labor time and costs at a standardized, faster assembly-line pace. The bulk 
production price has to be competitive to earn the order but reasonable enough to pay 
workers, especially on more-difficult-to-make apparel. This is the capitalist‘s risk. But it 
is worth noting that communication and a sense of camaraderie—that management and 
workers are working together to bid on the order—are critical to the success of the 
factory. Instead of fighting each other, the reality in a small factory is that the business 
owners and workers are united—at least in spirit—to fight their global clients outwards 
and externally. 
At Step 5 after an order is confirmed, production starts at the factory. If management has 
arrangements with subcontractors, they can be semi-finished goods or fully finished 
products done at one or several subcontractors. Instead of the seemingly numb workers 
who were merely given instructions that Pun (2005) describes in an electronics factory, 
the needle-trade assembly line workers have to assert and apply themselves in learning 
about the different characteristics of each shipment of garments. What I mean to assert is 
that workers have the power to change minute details of a garment because the client‘s 
technical specification may not always be correct (designers might not be as 
knowledgeable as factory workers about production details). Workers must also address 
the problems that may arise from the reality of the shop floor in a timely fashion. A 
thread required by the client might be too thin for the fabric used in a garment, and this 
type of feedback is only possible if workers are well-intentioned and escalate the problem 
to management quickly enough to meet tight production schedules, which are the norm in 
an industry governed by fast-changing fashion markets. 
At Step 6, clients often demand factories bear financial risks, too. To save banking costs, 
few clients accept the older practice of opening a letter of credit with their bank, which 
allows manufacturers to receive payments once their goods are on board vessels heading 
to the clients‘ destinations. Instead, clients make a first deposit, and can procrastinate on 
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making the final payment, putting enormous pressure on manufacturers who are waiting 
to receive payments for goods already made and packaged, payments that will reimburse 
workers and pay for raw materials.  
Garment manufacturers face stiff competition within China and from other Asian 
countries in which labor costs are lower. Since the Economic Reform, the legal 
environment has been loose, allowing for a huge opportunity for entrepreneurs to set up 
shop, especially in labor-intensive industries that have less stringent requirements on 
capital—so people with a small pool of funds can easily open up shop—and thus lower 
barriers to entry. This means that export buyers have many options, often making several 
domestic stops in their China trip, usually shopping for the lowest prices and the best 
terms. It is not difficult to find manufacturers who would be quick to admit that they 
sometimes take a loss on an order just to keep the factory going, to keep production lines 
occupied and workers from leaving. 
At any step along the process, workers have inside information about how their 
employers run the business. For example, it is customary to have a factory driver 
(sometimes more than one) who delivers and picks up raw materials, transports 
semi-finished products, etc. because long-distance vehicles ownership used to be low in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The driver chauffeuring around the boss would know intimately 
where the boss was going and for what purpose. One day he was going to the bank to 
negotiate more loans, another day to a subcontractor to negotiate more favorable payment 
terms (sometimes in anticipation of a client‘s late payment), yet another day to visit a 
worker in the hospital. Of course, information spreads quickly in a small community and 
soon enough, the driver‘s buddy knows the boss‘ whereabouts, and co-workers, too, 
would soon learn. 
 
3.2 Price Pressure and Small Profit Margin on Small Factories 
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Mr. L1 is a shoe manufacturer, whose client list includes snowboarding brand Burton, 
sportswear brand L.L. Bean, and other US and European snowboarding, cowboy boots, 
and casual shoes. He shared many of the difficulties running his multi-sited factory: 
My profit margin is five to six percent. Today, clients are too shrewd and 
vicious. Many don‘t let you make money; they come with a CBD (cost 
break-down) sheet, scrutinizing your material costs, wages, management 
costs, etc., and tell you straight out loud that your wages and management 
costs are too high. They also negotiate directly with the main material 
suppliers and nominate them to us so that we must buy from the 
nominated suppliers. Clients also compress production lead time from 90 
to 120 days in the past to 60 to75 days. 75 days for new styles, and 60 
days for existing styles. This is a lot of time pressure for us. As if this is 
not enough, they still want to slash prices by one to two percent after 
dictating whom we buy our main materials from. My policy is – if it is 
within the five to six percent of my profit, I let them get what they want. 
There are two reasons for this. One is that I understand clients also face 
competition—some get bought up or merged into another company, others 
have shrinking market shares. Second, I want them to at least stay buying 
in China.  
Despite the frustrating business climate, Mr. L1 speaks calmly about how he copes: 
Moving to places like Vietnam or other South Asian countries is too risky. 
First you have to invest with cash, then you have to worry about recruiting 
probably untrained workers from scratch, what about your middle 
management? Who is going to come with you from China—and who 
could really stay? Then of course, you worry whether the factory is going 
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to make money. Going to inland China is also not ideal, but that‘s what we 
have done so far. In the longer run, we will have to become like Nike or 
Adidas—we will have to build our own brand name in China. 
 
 
Figure 7 Map showing location relationship between Guangzhou, Guangdong and 
PingXiang, JiangXi. Source: Society of Anglo-Chinese Understanding 
http://www.sacu.org/provmap.html, accessed January 10, 2017 
 
Mr. L1 has opened a main factory in JiangXi Province, and two shoe-surface factories in 
more rural locations in JiangXi. When I asked if labor was stable there, assuming that the 
workers were local and could have a better work-life balance, Mr. L1 shook his head. 
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―Labor is not stable. Why not? All kinds of factories opened up next to us. We went from 
a stand-alone factory, to being part of an industrial park. Within ten years, there has been 
now 300 factories within the industrial park. I have a factory across the street from mine 
that puts up a huge sign advertising their ten percent higher wage, trying to attract my 
workers.‖  
―So what do you do?‖ I asked.  
I can‘t prevent others from doing what they wish. So I could only change 
from within. Everything matters – we have to treat our workers better, 
maintain a better work schedule that leaves enough time for them to rest. 
We have to care about workers; when they make mistakes, try not to harp 
on them, but instead, talk softer with them. When they want to get leaves 
of absences, be less strict about it. Of course, we also hope to maintain our 
orders so that the workers will stay with us and not leave for a nearby 
factory. Also, I have to increase the efficiency of my workers so that I do 
not need to ask for a higher price from my client to compensate for their 
mistakes. 
Mr. L1 chuckled as he compared himself to Foxconn: 
Unlike Foxconn, our product does not allow us to automate that much. We 
have already tried to automate some processes and I have already put in 
close to 40 machines in the JiangXi locations. But there is only so much 
we can do in automation. Foxconn‘s profit is probably also only five 
percent; what we have in common is a labor-intensive, low-profit business 
that must make money on volume. I also tried to simplify manufacturing 
steps, this ensures against my unstable labor because it reduces the labor 
necessary to make my products.    
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3.3 Wages and Wage Arrears  
 
Perhaps workers in my three needle-trade factories saw the difficulty and risk-taking 
business owners took. Perhaps they actually sympathized with their bosses much of the 
time. When sociologists and journalists who have read Marx intensively see businesses 
paying wages late they readily and righteously classify that as exploitation. But wage 
arrears, in the mind of the workers, have been normalized as standard practice. One could 
argue that they could only acquiesce to this condition. But another way of looking at this 
is that workers feel a psychological orientation that is aligned with their employers—they 
feel they are in the same boat as their bosses. Until there is militant labor resistance, 
which my ethnography does not find but has been the subject of many scholars, there 
seems to exist in workers‘ mind normalization and acquiesce to wage arrears and 
identification with the factory owner. Of course, I must acknowledge here again my own 
biased position as the boss‘ daughter or the boss‘ friend‘s daughter when interviewing 
workers about wage arrears. 
The reason I dare to steer away from Marx‘s doctrine here is because I see that workers 
see the precarious plight of a small-sized factory. And this empathy can translate into 
workers‘ acquiescence to wage arrears. My job involved business development, 
negotiating with new prospective clients and existing clients over prices. It was often the 
case that clients would not budge 50 cents on a garment that was, say USD 80 per piece 
(factory‘s selling price). Why the haggling over less than one percent? It may be that the 
price reduction is meant to meet investor demands or in the case of private companies to 
line the owner‘s pocket. In any event, in almost all negotiations on price, it felt as though 
the client always had the upper hand. With such price pressure, factories find it difficult 
to survive, and giving workers a generous wage payment is often a far-fetched goal. 
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My father‘s factory used to delay payment by two months. Top‘s main factory in 
Guangzhou delayed wage payments by a month. Yet all (18) workers I have interviewed 
across these two factories considered this normal. This is both because internally they 
have normalized this behavior in their mind, and externally, other employers might 
behave just the same. 
L.L. at Top‘s main Guangzhou factory said, ―the boss has owed us wages before, for a 
few months. But in recent months, no. It‘s just a one month delay.‖  
When I pressed further and asked him whether he found this reasonable, he said, ―It is 
reasonable. Companies have their own rules. It‘s been like this throughout.‖ 
Another worker, 24-year-old L., when asked if workers are paid on time at Top‘s main 
Guangzhou factory said, ―Yes. At the end of December, we get our November wage. It is 
on time. I have never been owned my wages.‖  
Australian business management professor Stephen Frenkel notes that average wages in 
foreign-owned firms and joint ventures tend to be around 125-145 percent higher than in 
their state-owned counterparts, many of which have been laying off workers, leading to 
increased unemployment (Lee 1999, UNDP, 1999). Foreign-owned firms and joint 
ventures paid a higher wage to workers because in the 1990s they were more profitable 
and demanded a higher skill set of their workers than their state-owned counterparts. 
Today, in the absence of state-owned enterprises, the comparison is between 
foreign-owned and domestically-owned enterprises. Informant T.Z. reports that in 
Weiyuan, Sichuan, Top pays twice the piece rate as domestically-owned factories, but 
that the quality demanded by Top is also higher.  
I can earn up to RMB 80-100 per day at Top, but there aren‘t enough 
goods to be made. So I have to go to domestically-owned factories to get 
freelance jobs. With lower piece rates, I can earn up to only RMB 50 per 
day. I don‘t want to become a full-time employee there, though, because in 
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addition to the lower piece rate, the hours are even longer. It would be 
from 7 am to 7 pm, compared to Top‘s 8 am to 5 pm. 
Confirmed by workers in Top‘s Sichuan factory and Top‘s management, wages in Top‘s 
Sichuan factory vs. Guangzhou main factory differ in two ways. Those in Sichuan earn 
on average a monthly salary of RMB 2000-3000, and the same job would earn RMB 
5000-6000 in its Guangzhou factory, due to different living standards. Informant M. from 
chapter 2 reported taking a 70 percent pay cut to come back home, revealing her 
commitment to family issues and desire to be home. Later in this chapter, I will explain 
why migrant workers value money so strongly because of the lack of insurance 
provisions. 
Although both garment manufacturing and construction workers lack labor contracts, 
they differ greatly in wage treatment and wage arrears (Swider, 2015). First, garment 
manufacturing workers are at least able to receive their wages monthly, as opposed to at 
the end of a year‘s work, or at the end of the project, as occurs in the construction 
industry. Second, because they are not owed a year‘s worth of wages, garment 
manufacturing workers can ―vote with their feet‖ and walk out any day, when they are 
dissatisfied with their current factory. And many do; in fact, attrition is a problem that can 
be so epidemic that some factories even have a standardized ―quitting sheet‖ printed out, 
ready for exiting workers to fill out. 
 
3.4 Frequent Entries and Exits from Factory 
 
If (relatively) low wages and long hours are the evil of workers‘ lives in the factory, then 
perhaps the flexibility that many small- and medium-sized factory owners allow their 
workers is the compensation. Since many workers‘ social reproduction takes place in 
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their homes of origin, many often take an extended leave of absence to, well, reproduce 
in the literal sense and come back to the coastal factories after they have given birth to 
their children. 
L. at Top‘s main Guangzhou factory commented: 
I came to this factory from inner Guangdong, in 1994. I have come to this 
factory three times and exited twice due to child delivery and child rearing. 
I left the factory to get married in 1998-1999. Then in 2000 I delivered my 
child, so I was out for seven months. Afterwards I came back again, and 
my mom was taking care of my child. Then I left again to take care of my 
child; after I felt ok that my child can be left, I re-migrated back to Top to 
work.  
When owners and workers are considering maternity leaves, what labor law mandates 
seems almost irrelevant. The conversation is almost never about what the law mandates, 
but what supply and demand, as well as what an on-going, mutually beneficial and 
well-meaning relationship between the owner and the particular worker would yield. The 
high substitutability of low skilled workers can put workers completely out of a job if 
they want to leave the factory for an extended period of time, but a few things become the 
saving grace for them, and more often than not, they are able to re-enter the factory they 
exited. First, everybody has social reproduction needs to go home due to family-related 
matters. So these problems are not individualized but rather common across workers. 
Second, despite their coming and going and despite their low skills in the grand scheme 
of China‘s industrial scene, they are still experienced workers, or they have occupied a 
specific position in the factory. Retaining workers is still worthwhile for owners because 
no re-training is required. Employers have learned to compromise with and adapt to the 
social reproduction needs of workers and accept the frequent coming and going of 
workers.  
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Just like how appreciating owners‘ hardships makes workers psychologically aligned 
with them, the flexibility of having their jobs back—some as long as after two to three 
years—is also what makes workers willing to continue ―eating bitterness‖ to work with 
and for an owner.  
 
3.5 Faux Kinship with Owners 
 
In a small factory, it is common for owners and workers to live together on the factory 
compound, drawing them close to each other not just physically but emotionally as well. 
Together, they work the overtime hours necessary to get a particular shipment out – 
sometimes until 10 pm, 1 am, or occasionally, an all-nighter packing, until a truck arrives 
the next morning for shipping.
17
 On days where such overtime is required, the factory 
canteen provides snacks, for example at 9 pm, or a 5
th
 meal at midnight. Eating in the 
canteen, for example, like in my childhood experience, means bonding, especially done at 
1 am. It is often not the case that the owner is sitting and chilling out or busy oppressing 
the workers, but, rather, the owner is helping with the tasks of that night. Management 
could be re-distributed to hand-sew the 500 buttons that need to be sewn that night as a 
last production step before the truck shows up the next morning. Or they are dispatched 
to place each garment into poly bags, with a hand tag and barcode that have been 
carefully printed without any typos in a language that is not their own.  
It is not hard then to imagine that there can be a faux kinship between owners and 
workers. L.L. at Top‘s main Guangzhou factory (where the owners live on-site in the 
                                                          
17
 As mentioned above, due to the low wage rate, workers desire to have overtime. In the 80s and 90s in 
the absence of a stringent set of Labor Laws, there was little overtime pay. Workers were paid the same rate 
in their overtime hours. But this began to change after the Labor Laws were put in place after 1995. 
Weekday overtime rate was 1.5 times the regular wage, and weekend overtime rate was 2 times the regular 
wage. 
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factory) said, ―When my sister‘s child needed a liver transplant, I borrowed money from 
classmates, friends, family, co-workers, and the boss. The child needed six chemotherapy 
sessions, and they amounted to a total of RMB 200,000.‖ 
I do not know what to make of the following episode, but I understand that whenever my 
father talks about this, he means it well, even if a little patronizing. The factory‘s cleaning 
lady had high blood pressure just like himself. They had seen each other‘s medicine and 
confirmed that it was the same—the same brand of medicine, and the same dosage. So, 
given that my father‘s doctor was willing to give him an extra amount, he considered it a 
kind act to give his extra medication to the factory‘s cleaning lady. Certainly exchanging 
personal medication is not to be encouraged, and is not my point, but this is an example 
of the intimate ties, or the lack of emotional and physical distance that goes on between 
an owner and a worker.  
What I wish to illustrate with these examples is that Marx‘s alienation of workers is not 
absolute. There are many factors that influence workers‘ sense of alienation. Factory size 
is one. In fact, in Ching-Kwan Lee‘s comparison of electronics factories in Hong Kong 
and Shenzhen, she failed to cite factory size as an important factor that contributes to the 
difference she observed across the two factories. My description above of the intimate 
distance between owners and workers is similar to what Lee observed in the Hong Kong 
factory, namely familial hegemony.  
I, on the other hand, maintain that it is a factory‘s size and ownership type (publicly 
traded vs. private) that affect how much owners are involved in an enterprise and affect 
the culture and management strategies of factories. I should also mention that both my 
father‘s factory and Top, and countless others, are small family businesses with the owner 
a middle-aged parent and middle management the adult children. Often, they live on-site 
in the factory, in a building separate from the workers‘ dorms. This set-up adds to the 
likelihood an entire factory will run like a family—to the extent possible, simply because 
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when top or middle management makes decisions, they are likely to consider implications 
not just for themselves but for the well-being of the people above and below them, just as 
adult children do when they make decisions big and small on a daily basis that affect their 
parents and children.  
 
3.6 Lack of a Labor Contract and Subsequent Social Insurance Provisions 
 
In small-sized factories, labor contracts do not usually exist between employers and 
employees for two reasons. From the employers‘ point of view, the lack of a labor 
contract means little need to follow government-mandated labor protection measures 
such as providing social insurance. From the employee‘s point of view, they are not 
pursuing such contracts because without them they enjoy more freedom to job hop. Labor 
activists may argue that job hopping stems from suboptimal working conditions in the 
first place. This is true; however, in my ethnography, most workers have had to acquiesce 
to wages that they wish were higher, canteen food that they wish was better, and dorms 
they wish were more comfortable. In other words, they have normalized suboptimal 
working conditions, and if they hop around, they only just wish to try their chances at a 
different factory that might just be slightly better in wage payment and other 
non-monetary provisions.  
Interestingly, the shoe manufacturer Mr. L1 shared that JiangXi‘s provincial government 
requires that 50 percent of all workers have social insurance. This number is at 80 percent 
in Guangzhou, but with negotiations, 30 percent passes, too. ―And contrary to what you 
might think about inland governments, they are quite strict about everything else. They 
criticized our environmentalism by picking on the fact that the trees we planted were too 
small. So we had to pull out all the small trees we planted and re-plant larger trees.‖ 
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The first problem that follows from the lack of a labor contract is that the 
employer-employee relationship is unofficial. Chinese scholar JunJie Wang reports that 
in 2014, only 38 percent of migrant workers had signed a labor contract with their 
employers, same as in 2013 (JunJie Wang 王俊杰, 2015). Without a labor contract, 
enterprises are not obligated to contribute to workers‘ social security insurance. This is 
especially common in small-sized enterprises where regulations and rules are skirted to 
save on costs. Unfortunately, however, due to migrant workers‘ low level of education 
and skills, they are concentrated in small- and medium-sized enterprises, without access 
to more standardized factories. Wang (2015) reports that 17.6 percent of migrant workers 
participate in medical insurance, 16.7 percent participate in retirement insurance, 26.2 
percent participate in occupational hazard insurance, 10.5 percent participate in 
unemployment insurance, and 7.8 percent participate in child birth insurance. Then, 
Chinese scholar GongCheng Zheng indicates that 26.8 percent of migrant workers have 
expressed that the most pressing social insurance for them is medical insurance, 20.4 
percent expressed the most pressing insurance is retirement insurance, 18 percent 
expressed the most pressing insurance is occupational hazard insurance, and 16.8 percent 
expressed the most pressing insurance is unemployment insurance (GongCheng Zheng 郑
功成, 2011).  
For those who sign labor contracts with their employers, many refuse to have personal 
contributions to these forms of insurance deducted from their monthly pay due to an 
already low wage and/or a low awareness of the concept of insurance. Often, their 
employers fail to convince them to do so and must require that they provide a signature to 
indicate they voluntarily forfeit social insurance coverage. Even though lawyers have 
warned small enterprises that the signature has no legal power, nonetheless small 
enterprise owners perceive some protection from the government‘s mandates. If ever in 
court, many employers believe an employee waiver will absolve them of legal 
responsibility. 
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This phenomenon comes about for a few reasons. First, labor contract law is loosely 
enforced with employers rarely checked for mandatory insurance coverage. Second, 
migrant worker employees have a misconception that their insurance is not transferrable 
from their place of employment in province A to their homes of origin in province B. 
Technical procedures make this transfer difficult (but not impossible) for migrant workers, 
giving them a rationale not to contribute. When migrant workers return home or retire at 
the end of the mandated 15 years, in the case of old-age pension, for example, they fear 
that their contributions collected in a coastal province cannot be paid in their home 
province. Third, migrant workers are either job hopping too much or have a too 
short-term horizon of things, making them unable and unwilling to consider the 
probability of sickness and old-age, especially because they are still in their prime 
productive years and retirement and old-age feel far away.  
We can see from the above statistics that low insurance participation rates make migrant 
workers vulnerable for sickness and occupational injuries, in old age, and, of course, 
unemployment. Chinese scholar GaoYa Yu surveyed 29,425 migrant workers and found 
that only 64.32 percent of them think their health is good, with the remainder rating their 
health as ―just ok‖ or ―not very good.‖ About three quarters of migrant workers 
responded that they have been ill during their work lives, and that 45 percent of them 
have been ill more than three times. Almost 80 percent have had to bear the burden of 
their own medical expenses (GaoYa Yu 余高雅, 2012).  
 
3.7 Misconceptions of Social Insurance Provision 
 
Current labor contract laws mandate five types of insurance jointly paid for by the 
employer and employee or by the employer alone: old age insurance (20 percent by 
employer and eight percent by employee), medical insurance (roughly ten percent by the 
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employer and two percent by the employee, for example in Beijing. It varies by location.), 
unemployment insurance (roughly 1.5 percent by employer and 0.5 percent by employee 
in Beijing, varies by location), and occupational injury (by employer alone, either 0.5 
percent for service industries, one percent for manufacturing industries, and two percent 
for mining industries), and child birth insurance (by employer alone, 0.8 percent in 
Beijing, for example, and 0.7 percent in Chongqing). 
In other words, were a factory able to survive and sustain itself in business, this is what is 
provided through employer‘s and employee‘s contribution to social insurance. Below is 
an example of a young, 22-year old person‘s insurance scheme based on a RMB 
4,000/month wage.  
Employer‘s contribution:  
 Retirement/Old-age insurance: RMB 4000 x 20% = RMB 800 
 Medical insurance: RMB 4000 x 10% = RMB 400 
 Unemployment insurance: RMB 4000 x 1.5% = RMB 60 
 Occupational injury insurance: RMB 4000 x 0.5% = RMB 20 
 Child birth insurance: RMB 4000 x 1.5% = RMB 60  
Total: RMB 1340/month 
Personal contribution:  
 Old-age insurance: RMB 4000 x 8% = RMB 320 
 Medical insurance: RMB 4000 x 2% + 2 = RMB 82 
 Unemployment insurance: RMB 4000 x 0.5% = RMB 20  
Total: RMB 422/month 
What these contributions translate to, assuming the worker retires at the age of 60, in 
retirement/old-age insurance, is the following calculation of how much this person can 
get after retirement until death.  
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Retirement/Old-age insurance payment = average wage of all employees within that 
specific city one year before retirement x 38% + personal account‘s sum of principal and 
interest ÷139. In this example, assuming the average of all employees within that 
specific city is also 4000, then the claimable amount is: RMB 4000 x 38% 
+ 119,040/139= RMB 2376. 
 
While this scheme seems fair and fine—with both the employer and the employee 
contributing to the insurances and the claimable amount after retirement decent enough 
for a modest living. In reality, the unwillingness to buy and misconceptions that the 
purchase of insurance is a choice (when it is not) is a common issue experienced in many 
small- and medium-sized enterprises.  
Like governments on the coast in Guangzhou, in the beginning when investments were 
few and governments in need of capital investment, they sided with employers in 
establishing businesses. As time went by and the country increasingly developed, the 
government favored industries—for instance high tech firms—that it believed would 
prosper, and discouraged what it believed were obsolete industries like labor-intensive or 
polluting ones. Favorable terms and incentives were denied obsolete industries.  
 
3.8 Buying Government-provided Insurance on One’s Own  
 
Instead of hoping for and not getting social insurance from their work place, many 
migrant workers (with agricultural hukous) opt for what has been in place since 2003 in 
select places and popularized in 2010, the New Peasants‘ Co-Op Health Insurance and 
the New Peasants‘ Co-Op Pension Insurance, sponsored by the government at their 
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homes of origin. This is the government‘s response to the reality that migrant worker 
social reproduction, including medical care, takes place in homes of origin,.  
Yet there is a problem with this, too. Because participation in this insurance is voluntary, 
and because there is still a monthly co-pay (of roughly RMB 150/month per person) 
many who want to save as much cash as possible opt out, leaving themselves uncovered 
and vulnerable. Research shows that participation rates in the nation‘s poorest counties 
awaiting government assistance have lower participation rates than non-poor counties. 
Poor populations as well as low income populations also have low participation rates 
(ZhongWei He 何忠伟, 2015).  
For peasants, medical insurance expenses are usually a large sum of money that families 
skip if they can. Researchers at Peking University found in 2001 and 2002 that in rural 
parts of Anhui, Hunan, Yunan, and Sichuan Provinces (all migrant sending provinces) 
81.25 percent of peasants requiring medical treatment were not receiving it. Half of this 
was attributed to financial concerns (ZhongWei He 何忠伟, 2015).  
All of my interviewees, except P.G.Z. at a newer, modern sweater factory in Weiyuan, 
Sichuan, which provided her with company insurance, have bought the Peasants‘ Co-Op 
Health Insurance and the New Peasants‘ Co-Op Pension Insurance because they have no 
contract with their employers. Because none has reached retirement age yet, none could 
give me information about their experience with the Co-Op Pension Insurance. But 
almost all of them have experience with the Co-Op Health Insurance. For a contribution 
of RMB 120/year, they receive an allowance of RMB 80/year worth of medication and 
outpatient services. For inpatient services, expenses are reimbursable for up to 60 percent.  
Anybody who has ever been mildly ill in China understands that health care is expensive, 
as is medication from drugstores. A set of simple cold medicine would cost RMB 20 or 
so. Therefore, the RMB 80/year seems low, leaving purchasers vulnerable for any 
medium or big expenses. 
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The point here is that despite these New Peasant Co-Op insurance schemes, migrant 
workers are still vulnerable in the face of major illnesses, whose treatment they must 
finance largely on their own. This lack of effective insurance is a major factor why 
migrant workers, and those in precarious life circumstances in China, value money so 
highly. Savings becomes the insurance they have against anything that should happen. 
 
3.9 Lack of Enough Social Security Makes Money Everything  
 
Many low-income workers—among whom are migrant workers—go about life with no 
provision of social security. Neither from their work place nor from the government. This 
creates a tremendous pressure on themselves to be earning cash, not only just to improve 
their lives but also to insulate themselves and family members against the prospects of 
illness. It is fair to observe that lack of enough social security (even if exacerbated by a 
refusal to contribute to government programs) partially drives these migrant workers‘ 
pursuit of money. 
In fact, even the urban benefits are a contemporary provision, and it‘s fair to say that for 
generations Chinese people have provided for their own old-age and sickness. For most 
of Chinese civilization, having children (and relying on them) has functioned as old-age 
insurance, as it is in many pre-modern civilizations. The saying ―feeding a son to prevent 
old age,‖ or 養兒防老 describes the general Chinese psychology of relying on the adult 
offspring in old age and in sickness. Peasant parents, who lack the ability to take care of 
themselves independently, rely on this psychology. They expect to be taken care of by 
their adult children. When adult children do not provide, family conflicts arise and family 
finances suffer. 
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In my research, I was told not to ask about things relating to social security by the owner 
of the factory in Sichuan on my first trip there. It was not until I established personal 
relationships with some workers that I asked them about this matter privately.  
 
3.10 Pressure from Labor Market Side 
 
Labor-rights-related NGOs (often receiving financial assistance from Hong Kong 
branches of overseas NGOs like Oxfam) alongside magazines for migrant workers 
increased awareness of workers‘ rights starting in late 1990s. 2001 ushered in the strict 
enforcement of social security laws, which the government had helped investors turn a 
blind eye to in the 1990s in the heyday of industrialization. Then, in late 1990s, as two 
major coastal industrial regions—near Shanghai and Guangzhou—competed for 
investment, labor conditions in both regions also improved.  
Mr. D., a Taiwanese owner of a 170-employee boiler machine factory, supplying ironing 
machinery to garment-making factories, relays his clients‘ plight: 
Many of my clients who manufacture for the US and European markets 
are facing a wage increase of RMB 3000/month to RMB 4000+/month 
after employers‘ contribution to social security. Their clients don‘t care if 
your production costs have gone up! They still have to buy cheap. Many 
of my clients have already gone to inland China from the coast. They went 
to Hubei and Hunan Provinces to set up factories. But the wages there are 
still not low enough compared to Vietnam and Cambodia, which offer 
wages at 1/3 of Chinese wages, at around RMB 680-700/month. So a 
European buyer‘s buying office in Shanghai might ask a factory: ―Ok, you 
are selling me this shift from China for $28, how about from Cambodia? 
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Will $20 do?‖ So manufacturers have gone to set up factories in Cambodia 
to continue receiving the European orders. In a client‘s factory in 
Cambodia, they bus workers in from two hours away, all 6,000 workers 
into 100 buses – a quick fix before the factory commits to building 
dormitories. It‘s really a scene. So how am I responding to this? I also go 
to Cambodia to set up an office there, to service my manufacturer clients 
and to sell to new factories that have set up shop there.  
The race to the bottom that Ross so vividly describes in the garment industry in Slave to 
Fashion also means, of course, a response by garment factories to this race to the bottom. 
Mr. D.‘s quote reveals precisely how some of them are coping by chasing after even 
cheaper wage labor in South East Asia.  
Mr. Y., another Taiwanese ex-factory owner of an eyewear manufacturing plant 
transitioned from running a factory with high wage expenses to trading and entered the 
restaurant business. Mr. Y. has been in China for 26 years since moving from Taiwan: 
We were a family business in Taiwan, and we were starting to experience 
a labor shortage in the ‗80s and ‗90s in Taiwan. The social security laws 
requiring health insurances for workers had increased workers‘ wages to 
an unaffordable level. The first thing everyone that would come in looking 
for a job would ask was: ―is there air conditioning?‖  
Mr. Y.‘s enterprise was ready to move to China in the late 1980s; in fact, he had paid a 
USD20,000 deposit for a piece of land near Xiamen, Fujian, which speaks the same 
dialect as spoken in Taiwan. But then there was the Tiananmen Square event, and 
everyone was scared about political stability and business prospects in China. ―So we 
moved to Malaysia for three years, as a first step out of Taiwan. But workers there were 
difficult to manage – they were gone shopping or whatever, the day after payday, nobody 
came to work!‖  
 96   
China was still in Mr. Y.‘s plans, and shortly after his investment in Malaysia, he went to 
check out Guangzhou, which was only a 1 3/4-hour train ride away from Hong Kong, the 
closest flight connection point from Taiwan. He then ran his factory making glasses for 
about a decade before wages increased in China, too. ―I feel that due to the large 
inequality in China, the government has turned all the way to side with labor, the lowest 
bottom stratum of people now. Or they put in action plans to look like they are siding 
with these people. For example, within the social insurance provision, why do men have 
to get child birth insurance? How about women in their 50s who are already 
grandmothers who are clearly not giving births any more? And before the legality of the 
second-child since 2016, what about the women who have already given birth to their 
one-child‘s—why must we pay for their child-birth insurance?‖ As a result of these 
expenses, Mr. Y. exited the factory by transitioning into a trading role. He said, ―Running 
a factory is too much responsibility, it‘s too difficult. Unless you run away, it seems 
difficult to stop a factory operation.‖ Indeed, many factories lack a healthy cash flow to 
lay off their staff properly with severance packages. Today, Mr. Y. goes inland to give 
orders in Jiangxi province and sells to his original clients.  
In China, the power dynamics of the capital-labor relationship were starting to change in 
the early to mid-2000s when migrant laborers started to return to their farms and stopped 
coming to coastal cities. 2006 represented a change in government policy—for example, 
the 2006 cancellation of agricultural tax—to promote and subsidize agricultural lives. Fed 
up by low-pay, long-hour factory jobs, some opted to return to their farmland where, with 
the new policy, their income is lower—but tolerably so—than that earned in a factory, 
but where the benefits of other non-financial factors like living with family members 
outweigh the reduced wages. For some, growing crops is not the whole of their lives back 
at home. In fact, many have already moved, and moved their hukou from their rural 
villages to the nearest township. These people then choose to work in industrial or service 
jobs within the townships. Some have the flexibility to help with their family‘s crops in a 
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peripheral way, and others still work for a business owner or become small-scale 
entrepreneurs. 
 The financial crisis in 2008 accelerated this process as workers realized their 
export-dependent employers now faced precarious business demands and could fire them 
on a moment‘s notice. Seasoned workers like the first generation of migrant workers who 
have lived in coastal areas since 1980s have now gathered enough funds and valuable 
work experience, further strengthening their sense of empowerment. An increasingly 
transparent domestic media eager to expose bad labor practices also tempered factory 
management. 
 
Chapter Conclusion:  
 
In the supply chain, factories are on the bottom passively receiving orders and demands 
from multinational brand clients. When they give price quotations, they often fear 
competition from domestic sources and Asian countries with low material and labor 
costs.  
In the 1980s and 1990s when China was just beginning to develop, there was little 
foreign capital invested in factories. The labor market at the time was a complete buyer‘s 
market with a few factories training a vast number of unskilled workers. The 
foreign-owned factories proved to be tax-generating saviors and with the government‘s 
help turned a blind eye to labor protection mandates like social insurance provisions.  
A difficult business climate arrived in the 2000s. Coupled with now official nation-wide 
labor laws passed in 1994, China‘s labor was beginning to become expensive, and its 
labor-intensive industries losing their comparative advantage. Social insurance now 
needed to be bought for employees without compromise, at least on the coast. The real 
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plight of a small factory reveals, however, that because labor contracts are usually not 
signed with employees, business owners could avoid social insurance payments and save 
on costs. 
Besides pressure from the labor market, factory owners also experienced tremendous 
pressure from the product market side. Multinational brand clients audited factories with 
cost-increasing demands to improve labor conditions but without guaranteeing orders 
from year to year. After the 2008 crisis, many factories on the coast could not resist the 
pressure and closed.  
From the early practice of holding back wage payments to control labor attrition, 
factories were often now paying wages with a delay due to late client payments. Workers 
displayed three sentiments: normalization of the situation, acquiescence in their plight, 
and identification with factory owners as they recognize a sense of resignation in the 
owners.  
I dare not steer too far away from Marx‘s alienation of labor and the labor-capital 
conflicts that are present perhaps in any labor vs. capital relationship, but here, what I 
want to portray is that this labor-capital conflict is not absolute and is not always the case.  
 
Chapter 4 Return of Older Generation Migrant Workers  
 
In the absence of more scholarly research about the phenomenon, geographer Kam Wing 
Chan observed that due to the global financial crisis in August 2008, migrant workers 
started leaving for home in October 2008, three months before the usual return traffic for 
Chinese New Year. According to one newspaper account covering eight major 
migrant-exporting provinces, Chan finds that close to 6 million migrant laborers had 
already left for home by late November/mid-December (Chan, 2010)  
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After sifting through varied statistical sources, Chan concluded that the rural migrant 
population was approximately 140.41 million at the end of 2008. About 50 percent of 
these workers (70 million) returned to their home villages before Chinese New Year. The 
50 percent return rate was higher than the average 40 percent in previous years because 
many had lost their city jobs due to the financial crisis. Of the returnees, 36 percent were 
from the manufacturing sector (Chan, 2010). 
 
4.1 Reverse Push and Pull Factors for Migrant Workers 
 
In the next two chapters, I will explore the plight of these returnees; chapter 4 covers the 
return of the older generation of migrant workers and chapter 5 the return of the younger 
generation. Workers have been returning to their homes as early as 2004, then again in 
big waves after the 2008 financial crisis. But what does it look like in everyday life?  
Mr. L2, owner of a garment manufacturer in Guangdong Province, laments that the new 
labor laws were too ―advanced‖ for his enterprise: 
As those with capital, we are not necessarily the stronger, compared to the 
workers. We take on a lot of risks—on raw materials, on payment terms, 
on consumption of the materials (garment manufacturers have a financial 
risks when the consumption of materials used quoted to clients differs later 
with actual consumption). Every little step involves a lot of risks. But our 
profits are too low. Sometimes we have to take an order at loss just to keep 
the factory running.  
Starting in the 2000s, push and pull factors between the coast and migrant workers‘ 
homes have been reversed. The new push factors have become the suboptimal working 
conditions that migrant workers face—for one, inflation in the entire country grew at an 
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unprecedented double-digit rate, while wages have not increased at the same rate. Any 
small enterprise owner would be quick to point out that workers have become ―greedy.‖ 
Despite a lack of performance improvement, workers are looking for wage increases, 
which enterprises have become increasingly unable to pay, due to severe competition that 
has kept product prices down.  
As a result of futile demands for higher wages and the inability of factories to pay, many 
factories—those that survived anyway— started to look for subcontractors in interior 
parts of China that could help capacity. Singtao Daily reported on December 28, 2008 
that in the third quarter, alone, 7,148 companies moved away from or closed in 
Guangdong, a speed unprecedented since the Economic Reform. In the last quarter of 
2008, 50,000 more companies closed shop, and in the entire year of 2008, a total of 
62,000 companies shut down in Guangdong Province (Chan, 2010).
18
  
For surviving factories, subcontractors allow a firm to enter into a usage-basis transaction 
just as multinationals avoid fixed manufacturing costs by entering into a 
buyer-and-supplier relationship with factories in their sourcing network. In other words, 
factories use subcontractors only when they need to fill an order for their clients; they 
enter into buying relationships with subcontractors in the same sort of relationship that 
multinationals have with them. Instead of keeping a fixed cost, a fixed staff that demands 
a higher wage, factories keep subcontractors at their fingertips ready to produce what is 
needed. Subcontractor establishments in western and central China, have in turn become 
pull factors for migrant workers, who are attracted to jobs closer to home, even at a lower 
wage.   
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 These are the estimates of the Guangdong government. Of course, Guangdong Province is a place with 
high enterprise failure rates. Many enter into a phantom mode, meaning that they close and open up under 
another name, to avoid paying workers‘ severance packages.  
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While Mr. L2‘s comments may sound like mere complaints, small-sized enterprises, 
especially those export-oriented and labor-intensive—like garments, toys, electronics—
have experienced tremendous pressure, both from product markets and the labor market.  
The new pull factor is the existence of jobs and economic opportunities closer to home. 
As inland provinces develop with large-scale infrastructure projects and accompanying 
industrial setups people have started to desert their long-distance work destination for a 
closer work location—some in the very townships where their parents and children live, 
some in towns near their homes. Infrastructure projects include hydro-powered electricity 
stations generating energy for the coastal region, coal mining, construction of new office 
and residential buildings, and equipment manufacturing. Accompanying the development 
of this infrastructure are service industries like hospitality and retail. Depending on the 
geographical location, migrant worker sending regions have also developed tourism as a 
vibrant income generator, making long distance travel to work unnecessary for many.  
Starting from coastal cities and now westbound inland, infrastructure projects and 
urbanization are knocking on the doors of many regions, changing the physical landscape 
with high-rise buildings and the options migrant workers now have with construction, 
industrial, and service jobs. 
 
4.2 Pressure from the Product Market Side 
 
From the product market side, many factors pressure enterprise owners. First, for 
example, e-commerce has been a mix of blessing and curse for many. Before internet 
commerce, middlemen or agents held tight, dear, and secret their sources of goods (called 
sourcing). But suddenly with internet commerce, end (corporate) buyers can find 
factories and do their own sourcing; likewise, factories can reach corporate buyers, 
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circumventing middlemen. But with this, the cost of goods for end buyers has gone down 
and so have product prices. Price wars follow. Business owners need to manage and 
control suppliers (factories), a function that used to be taken care of by the middlemen. 
Corporate buyers put in place things like manufacturer manuals that dictate how, for 
example, products must be packaged—where the tags need to be hung and barcodes 
shown, etc. Heavy fines are implemented when a manufacturer fails to act perfectly—and 
perfection is often difficult under time pressure when, due to uncertain economic 
conditions, buyers do not send orders until the last minute, squeezing production lead 
time.  
Since the 1990s Nike, Mattel, and Gap sweatshop scandals,
19
 brand name corporate 
buyers have been extremely careful about protecting their reputation for fair labor 
treatment in the factories they use. Since they do not directly own these factories, but 
only maintain a buyer-supplier relationships, they audit factories (or hire third-party 
auditors) on labor-related issues such as wages, overtime hours, overtime wages, and safe 
working conditions. Auditors visit factories every three months to interview workers and 
check on improvements like, for example, back support for those sitting down to work 
and foot padding support for those standing up to work.  
This is one side of the client—making demands that increase production costs. On the 
other side, the merchandising department, there are demands to decrease product prices. 
In other words, the client wants to buy cheaper but with better and more expensive 
working conditions, a contradiction that again puts factories under enormous pressure if 
they want to keep business. In addition, there is no guarantee of orders from year to year 
even if the factories comply with all working condition improvements. This all begs the 
question whose financial responsibility is it—the brand‘s or the factory‘s. To evaluate the 
production of socially responsible goods is beyond the scope of my work; I merely wish 
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 Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html, accessed 
March 13, 2017 
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to document the enormous pressure that factories are burdened with when facing their 
multinational brand clients.  
 
4.3 Chinese factories Move Inland to Western and Central Regions 
 
Leading labor scholar Beverly Silver documented the phenomenon of automobile 
corporations moving across international borders in search of lower-cost labor in a race to 
the bottom (Silver, 2003). Similarly, Japanese economist Akamatsu (1962) coined the 
term ―flying geese‖ to describe the catching-up process of industrialization in late-comer 
economies, which develop an orientation toward industrial production by shifting from 
consumer goods to capital goods. Industries shift from making simple to more 
sophisticated products. Also, as factor prices rise, the labor-intensive industries in a 
developed country will gradually lose comparative advantage and likely be moved to 
developing countries with lower factor costs. This is certainly the case with 
labor-intensive factories in coastal China gradually moving either to interior provinces or 
South East Asian countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, or Myanmar. Chinese scholars Ruan 
and Zhang (2014), using 1998 to 2011 data from the textile and apparel industry, 
confirmed the trend within China of relocating labor-intensive industry to interior 
provinces. My research gives a qualitative dimension to labor conditions in coastal and 
inland factories in the textile and apparel industry.  
 
Enterprises seek to lower labor costs by locating production in low labor cost regions. To 
illustrate the differences in regional labor costs, instead of providing a chart of GDP or 
GDP per capita rankings of provinces in China, which can be misleading because some 
provinces have high income inequality due to the presence of mega high-tech centers, I 
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provide the Human Development Index
20
of the four coastal regions, China‘s average, and 
select central and western inland provinces in which my fieldwork takes place. 





Beijing City 0.891 
Shanghai City 0.908 
Guangdong Province (Coast: Pearl River Delta) 0.844 
Zhejiang Province (Coast: Yangtze River Delta) 0.841 
Jiangsu Province (Coast: Yangtze River Delta) 0.837 
Shandong Province (Coast: Circular Bohai Region) 0.828 
Fujian Province (Coast: Southeast Coast) 0.807 
Mainland China average  0.7923 
Hunan Province (Central) 0.781 
Sichuan Province (Western) 0.763 
Guizhou Province (Western) 0.690 
Source: China Development Research Foundation, 2008/2010 report 
                                                          
20
 The Human Development Index is an index developed by the United Nations based on a few measures: 
life expectancy, adult literacy rate, school enrollment, average number of years of schooling, GDP per 
capita and purchasing power. It is arguably a better gauge of quality of life than purely GDP or GDP per 
capita.  
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My main ethnographic site, Top Knitwear, like many factories on the coast in Guangzhou, 
was losing workers in the early millennium. Still strong in his 50s and with two adult 
sons taking over the factory, Mr. W. the owner was in an excellent position to address the 
labor problem by setting up a secondary factory. After setting up small workshops and 
dabbling in JiangXi and GuangXi Provinces and losing money because quality control 
was not up to par, Mr. W. learned to do exit interviews with his departing workers. Where 
were they going?  
 
The W.‘s found that many of the departing workers were leaving for home, Weiyuan 
county in Sichuan, some 1600 KM away from Guangzhou, to get married or have 
children.  (See map in Figure 2.) In addition to workers leaving for this home destination, 
Mr. W. has a long-time acquaintance Miss C.S.W. (of no relation to him) also from 
Weiyuan, a woman now 45 who had a long history as a restaurant and club manager. She 
was an older-generation migrant worker who had come out to Guangzhou from Sichuan 
in the mid-1980s. Instead of going to the factories, she worked in the restaurant and 
clubbing business. In later years, she managed de facto prostitutes, a restaurant staff, and 
eventually became the co-owner of a restaurant. Because of her exposure to the restaurant 
sector, she got to know many businessmen in town. Mr. W. was one of them. In 2006, 
they took a trip together to Weiyuan, and Mr. W. decided to rent a space downtown as his 
secondary factory. He made C.S.W. (of no relations to himself) the legal owner of the 
factory, although he remained the de facto owner. After rehiring departed workers, 
shipping some obsolete hand-cranked knitting machines
21
 from Guangzhou, and 
employing a cook and security guard, the Weiyuan factory was officially up and running.  
                                                          
21
 Most of Top‘s goods are now made by computerized machines. When Mr. W. was looking to open his 
second factory in Sichuan, hand-knitting machines were less expensive than computerized machines. But 
computerized machine prices were beginning to fall significantly. He knew that computerized machines 
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Top management knows that computerized machines are the wave of the future, but their 
older hand-cranked knitting machines needed a home. With the knowledge that the older 
generation of migrant workers desired to go home, Top opened this second factory and 
shipped their out-of-date machines there. The workers that followed and continued 
working at Top were overwhelmingly those lacking up-to-date computerized knitting 
skills that the market valued.  
Top‘s six or seven sweater factory competitors in Weiyuan, Sichuan, were mostly 
founded by people who were close to upper management in competing coastal sweater 
factories in Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces. They had a small source of funding, 
customer orders, and knew enough of these return workers to be able to organize a 
manufacturing set-up. These owners themselves were the cream of the successful return 
migrant workers. A worker earns about RMB 2000-3000 when working at home in 
Weiyuan, vs. RMB 5000-6000 on the coast, a figure confirmed by workers themselves 
and by managers at Top. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
were becoming ubiquitous but wished to keep a ―reserve army‖ of capacity in case his computerized 
machines were over-loaded with orders. The cost of transporting goods between his Guangzhou main 
factory and the Sichuan factory outweighed the lower costs (mainly due to lower wages in Sichuan) of 
making the goods there, but for Mr. Wu, having extra capacity was important in case orders in the main 
Guangzhou factory exceeded capacity. Computerized machines do not require more education to operate 
than hand-knitting machines because even the imported machines now have programmed their operation 
systems into Chinese. Instead, the hand-knitting machines required talents and experience in knitting pieces. 
The hand-knitting machine operators were not retrained to operate computerized machines because they 
had the Sichuan factory to go to. 
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Figure 8 Return migrant workers and author on locking machines in Weiyuan 
factory.   
 
4.4 Why Did the Older Generation of Migrant Workers Return?  
 
Return migration is a concept capturing the phenomenon of migrants who suspend their 
migration by returning to their places of origin (Vanderkamp, 1971; Lee, 1974). The 
return flow has been associated with both international and domestic return migration 
(Cerase, 1974; Lindstrom, 1996; Zhao, 2002). The returnees can return both voluntarily 
or be compelled to return. Both skilled and unskilled laborers are involved in return 
migration. Some return migrations are short-term, such as seasonal migration (Dustmann, 
1997), or circular migration (Ortiz, 1996; Duany, 2002); others may be long-term 
migrations such as permanent return migration (Vanderkamp, 1971; Ley and Kobayashi, 
2005), or repatriation (Ripmeester, 2005).  
 
Both international migration out of China and domestic migration out of interior 
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provinces of China have received more scholarly attention than return migration. In terms 
of domestic return migration from the coast, there are two opposing views in Chinese 
policy circles. One considers returnees to be negative, burdening and exacerbating the 
problem of surplus labor in rural areas (Huang, 2005; Ma and Jin, 2009). The other 
considers returnees to contribute positively to the development of their homes of origin as 
bearers of capital, technology, and entrepreneurship (Li, 2003; Huang, 2005; Xu, 2005; 
Liu, 2006; Ma and Jin, 2009). But regardless of the findings, these studies have been 
done mainly using survey data, recording only returnees‘ objective data, like age, marital 
status, education, whether spouse is also a migrant, land ownership, per capita income, 
and presence of children and parents over 65. Statistical regressions are performed to find 
the likelihood of returning (Zhao, 2002, Yue et al., 2010). My work seeks to uncover the 
how of these phenomena and to understand subjective decision-making processes.  
 
In my fieldwork, I found most older generation migrant workers return to their exact 
towns of origin or to small cities close to their villages of origins to find new work, to 
continue working for the same employer‘s interior factory, or to retire or semi-retire. 
Many have already moved their hukou from their rural villages into the nearest townships. 
When they return, it is to the townships that they return, not the more rural villages. Many 
of them also reported that they no longer have the ability or desire to farm from scratch. 
With farming, they unanimously agreed, one could never make enough money, one is 
exposed to the elements, and crucially, not many of them know how any more, since they 
only provided peripheral help to their parents when they left their homes in their late teen 
years. In this way, my finding disagrees with the stream of research that finds returnees to 
be burdening their homes of origin with a surplus of people and agrees with the opposing 
research stream that views returnees as positive contributors to their hometown, simply 
because most continue to work in various settings. The informants included in this 
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chapter have moved from Top‘s factory in Guangzhou on the coast to its secondary 
factory in Weiyuan, Sichuan. 
The media have portrayed—and therefore, it is the public‘s perception— migrant workers 
as poor victims who toil days and nights for coveted products but will never be able to 
afford them, as if they actually want them in the first place. Many, and my fieldwork 
suggests most, do not. When asked about what would make an ideal life scenario for 
them, they often cite being able to unite with their family members (aging parents for the 
older generation and children for the younger generation), residing in their villages in a 
self-built house, having aging parents‘ health needs met, having children attend school 
and feeling hopeful about their own futures, and more important, having work nearby. 
There is no intention of moving or making it in the big city.  
Why do some migrants return and others not? There are a few theoretical perspectives 
that attempt to explain the causes of voluntary migration. These perspectives are divided 
into two groups: the first focusing on economic factors, often through a neoclassical lens 
(Qiu, 2001; Wang and Yuan, 2003; Ding, 2005; Huang, 2009; Sheng and Hou, 2009; 
Xiao and Yao, 2009; Zhang, 2009), for example, changes in wage differentials 
(Dustmann, 2003), employment opportunities (DaVanzo, 1976; Lindstrom, 1996), and 
cost of living differentials (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 2001). The second group takes 
an approach that focuses on social psychological factors that affect individual processes 
of return migration. They have noted that behaviors and behavioral intentions in return 
migration may not be rational and that influences of cognitive and psychological factors 
tend to be underestimated in studying settlement intentions (Ding, 2005; Hu and Hu, 
2009). See 2.3. 
My findings confirm the second group of scholars‘ work. For example, informant M. 
took a 70 percent pay cut to return home, accompanying many of her colleagues who 
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decided to return home due to family concerns, despite a clear knowledge of a pay 
reduction on moving from Top‘s Guangzhou to Sichuan factory.  
Even though the older generation of migrant workers had to orient themselves to market 
oriented aspects of life—being pressured at work to produce more with less—it is a false 
assumption that they wish to abandon their life inland altogether and desire an urban life 
with all its modern amenities. Some modern amenities would be nice to have back at 
home—and many but not all do already. Popular media too often makes the general cry 
that migrant workers cannot afford the products they produce—be they the newest smart 
phones, pieces of luxury clothing, or gadgets—or more important, property in the city 
they helped construct as evidence that they are underpaid and mistreated. While this may 
be valid, or at least logical, at a glance, possession of modern amenities is not always the 
benchmark that migrant workers measure their satisfaction and social mobility in life.  
When discussing why she returned to Sichuan after a 20-year job history in Guangdong, 
M.J., who in chapter 2 we learned supported her brother‘s education, said: 
The key was my relationship with my son. In order to take care of him (he was 
in high school then), I returned. Actually, monitoring his studies is not the 
primary concerns as nowadays college is much easier to get in than before. A lot 
of us (return migrant workers) think this way. It‘s the relationship and everyday 
behavior and interaction that matter the most. We weren‘t home to teach home 
good manners and daily habits—he doesn‘t know how to tidy and organize his 
space. When eating fruits for example, he doesn‘t think of his parents, etc.22 My 
son also has an incorrect concept: he thought that studying was for us, not for 
himself. Maybe that was also attributable to us being away. When we were away, 
                                                          
22
 Sharing food is a common cultural practice expected of people in Chinese culture. Here, by not sharing 
fruits, JianMei is conveying the sense of self-centeredness of her son because of her absence to teach him 
basic mannerism and cultural expectations. 
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we could only call and the phone conversation could only be about test scores. 
When he scored badly, he would say, it‘s because we had failed our promises.  
In M.J.‘s case, we see that being back in Sichuan fulfills her needs to be near her 
family. At work, she continues to be respected as a supervisor as she was in the 
Guangzhou factory; and she gets to live and spend time with her family. (By the 
time I interviewed her, her son had already gotten into college and moved away. 
But she has a 12-year-old daughter with whom she spends time.)  
Despite what is true about the hukou system, most of my informants have 
overwhelmingly stated that hukou was not an overt issue or a consideration in departure 
or return decisions. In their departure, all they needed in the coastal host city was a 
temporary resident permit, with which they could legally live in dorms or rent near the 
factories. Factories with good guanxi [relationship] with the authorities even had so much 
clout that their workers did not have to have their temporary resident permit on them all 
the time. As long as they report the name of the factory as their employer, the police let 
them go. In their return decision, hukou also played a peripheral role. Workers were 
simply returning to their families, which is naturally where their hukou is or is near. 
 
4.4.1 Parenting and Education of Children  
 
M., who we learned in chapter 2 rejected her parents‘ attempts at arranging a marriage for 
her at home in Sichuan, continued her story after her marriage to her free love
23…  
Today, my husband works at another factory that sometimes has night shifts, 
operating on hot stoves for energy generation. When he has night shifts, he 
supplements his earning by driving motorcycle taxies during the day.  
                                                          
23
 See Footnote 12. 
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In 2000, when my child reached two, I went out again to DongGuan, Guangdong. 
But I eventually opted to come back to Weiyuan when my child was 5 because I 
knew that in life, you can‘t have it all. Life outside is hard on the body, and hard 
on the heart. Especially if you are out alone—as a couple it would be much 
easier and better, but not alone. You must prioritize and choose. I had no 
childcare. My husband‘s mother came from the village to Weiyuan county for 
childcare, but she wished to go back to be together with my father-in-law. So I 
prioritized my child over the opportunity to continue working in Guangdong. 
For me, family was more important. I took a 70 percent pay cut to come back 
home.  
At home in Weiyuan, at first I took a job at a supermarket. But that was no good 
because you had to work through lunch hours, which made it impossible to go 
home and cook for my school-aged child. [Lunch breaks from primary to high 
schools in China can be as long as 2 1/2 hours; students have the option of going 
home for lunch and a nap.] So I changed into this factory job operating the 
mechanical knitting machine. Mr. W. is lax about lunch hours—he allows 
workers with families to leave a bit early to go home. So this is a nice 
arrangement.   
For 19 years now, she has owned an apartment downtown, just across from the main bus 
station, where the factory is. She has been back for 11 or 12 years. She explains her 
whole building is a hot commodity on the real estate market because it‘s only one block 
away from the city‘s best high school, and many from surrounding villages want to come 
and rent places for the school. 
It was July 2015when I made my first trip to Weiyuan. M.‘s 18-year-old daughter R.Y. 
had just finished the university entrance exam and decided that she did too poorly to enter 
in the same year. She decided she would repeat a year and try again. A soft and sweet 
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spoken girl, R.Y. was an intelligent, sensitive, and curious girl as she perhaps should be 
at the age of 18. As a hard working migrant worker, Miao has instilled in her daughter‘s 
mind the importance of having a diploma. ―It cannot be…life without a diploma.‖ To M., 
a diploma means working in air-conditioning, the difference between sweating and 
cooling down, literally and figuratively. In fact, I had a discussion with her about air 
conditioning. Because there are, in fact, many shop floors that have started to offer air 
conditioning, I asked if she was averse to the fact that theirs did not. Her response 
surprised me; she said, ―Air conditioning consumes a lot of electricity, a lot of money, 
especially for a big space like a shop floor. Mr. Wu is a very nice boss; you cannot 
dagong for a boss and not think about the interests of your factory!‖ 
So striving on her way to becoming an air-conditioning consuming white-collar staffer 
somewhere, R.Y. complained to me and sought my advice on her studying strategies. Of 
course, having a mother who has never gone to high school, even if she is loving and 
supportive, does not help with improving study skills and ultimately improving test 
scores, crucial in China as it is the only indicator of performance in the one-shot 
university entrance exam system. In a year‘s time when I visited M. again in 2016, R.Y. 
got into a teacher‘s college three to four hours away from home. R.Y. came home, and 
we met over a home-cooked lunch.  
What I describe here is a common problem, and a problem that can be several-fold more 
serious than M. and R.Y.‘s example demonstrates. China‘s current compulsory education 
is 9 years. This means migrant workers have mostly 9 or less years of education. If they 
are out in their dagong destinations on the coast, they are not near their school-aged 
children. Even less educated and oftentimes illiterate grandparents are bringing up these 
children. And if migrant workers are living with their children at home, they may not 
have the education level to help their children with school work. 
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Up to the end of middle school, which is up to the end of the compulsory education, 
money is not a primary factor in students‘ dropping out. Elementary school costs about 
RMB 200-300 per semester, and middle school about RMB 300-400. There is an 
additional RMB 100 per semester for room and board for children who live too far away. 
They board at school and return home Friday afternoon and go back to the dorms Sunday 
afternoon. If the school is within 2 hours walking distance, a student usually walks to and 
from home on a weekly basis, because otherwise, they incur a transportation cost for the 
family. Up to the end of middle school students drop out because they lack parental 
supervision, parental love, and proper role models that show how education changes 
one‘s fate. The short-term gratification of not doing homework, of playing outside are all 
too great to overcome—for those without parental supervision. Many students in rural 
settings speak to their parents in dagong destinations only once a week. Parental love and 
caring may not be easy to convey on the phone. Asking: ―Have you eaten yet?‖; ―How is 
grandpa‘s health?‖; and ―How are your test scores recently?‖ is not the same as having 
your parents around.  
Migrant worker priorities vary.  Where the family is financially?  How old are their 
children?  What kind of childcare is available?  How good or bad do the children 
behave?  What is the health of the parents?  These are all factors that influence whether 
a migrant worker choose to stay in coastal work locations or to return home. Some 
families decide to have the husband or wife stay on the coast, while the other spouse 
takes care of the children at home.  
H.X., a Guizhou native whose spouse is from Sichuan, reported going home alone due to 
the lack of childcare, leaving her husband on the coast. She paid a large ―ransom‖ trying 
to get her son into a better school in a more urban county than her husband‘s farming 
village. 
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When the child was 1-year-old, I left for Guangdong to dagong again until he 
graduated from elementary school. I returned because nobody was at home to 
care for him.  
H.X.‘s son had finished elementary school while living with his farming grandparents in 
the village. The grandparents, typical of their generation in China, were 
semi-literate—the grandfather was more literate than his wife. When I was invited to visit 
them at home, the grandfather spoke more to me than the grandmother, due to more 
verbal confidence, although he was speaking in his Sichuan dialect and not Mandarin. 
H.X. did not want to entrust her son in their hands when he got to the middle school stage, 
with a greater stake in the future. We also passed by the middle school where the boy 
would have gone if he had not been moved by his mother to Weiyuan County. It stood in 
the middle of the one road that connects Weiyuan County to one of its surrounding 
villages. Surrounded by corn fields, it was a lone, simple, and old building inside the 
school yard that one quickly associated with a lack of modern amenities and better 
teachers.  
I was preparing to take him to Weiyuan County for middle school. Schools in 
the town are better. To get to a better class in the school, I spent RMB 9,000 as 
―construction fee‖24 to the school through the acquaintance of a relative. Much 
of this money was scammed from us (just RMB 1,000 was refunded to us), and 
when I wanted to reveal this to the public, the relative came to beg us not to. So 
we did not. My son was very bitter on my behalf and said ―our village couldn‘t 
produce a good education and good human resources? It must be the city 
schools?‖   
                                                          
24
 ―Construction fees‖ are fees charged agricultural hukou holding parents by schools in urban settings to 
compensate for the usage of school facilities, thus the name ―construction.‖ 
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P.X., now a white-collar employee in accounting at Top, remembers the days when she 
was plagued by guilt for not being with her son. 
In 2003, my Dad‘s health deteriorated, and my son was two, he was just learning 
to talk. I would be working during the day, and at night I would have dreams 
where he said, ―Mom, if you come back to be with me, I will talk. If not, I will 
not talk.‖ Finally, when he was five, my husband and I decided to come back.  
P.X. showed me a smart phone photo of three half omelets with ham, cucumber, and egg. 
This was a nice home-cooked breakfast for the now high-school 10
th
 grade son. 
Following photos of the omelets were photos of sushi, which she also enjoys making 
every now and then. It is not an overstatement to describe P.X.‘s life as centered around 
her son‘s needs. Today she accompanies him to the hospital for IV injections for a cold, 
tomorrow she pays for after-school cramming lessons (remedial classes). 
P.X.‘s son is 15 years old today, but P.X., absent as a dagong migrant worker, holds on to 
the belief and guilt that she was not a good parent before he was 5.  
My son‘s general health, his immune system is not superb. Maybe because I did 
not bring him up. He has recently passed his rebellion phase. A few years back if 
we went out with him, he could get annoyed very easily. Wouldn‘t want this, 
wouldn‘t want that. I think this is because I was not with him when he was little. 
P.X. talks as if she were a developmental psychologist. She believes that personality is 
formed between the ages of two and three. And because she came home only when her 
boy was five, she believes she missed out on the golden opportunity to mold his 
personality. I could not help but wonder if she might be over-compensating as a parent 
now and whether her teenage boy would have been awkward and rebellious simply 
because he was a teenager.  
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My view is that, general conditions at home are much better now. Who would 
want to leave their home and family to go out to dagong? Indeed, my [dagong] 
wages and my husband‘s together were quite significant. But everything was for 
the family. When family members needed us, we went back. Otherwise we 
would regret it. She then cites a popular quote by Confucius: ―Even though trees 
wish to be silent, the wind goes on; and even though children wish to be familial, 
parents are no longer alive. What for then?‖ 
 
4.5 What Did the Older Generation of Migrant Workers Gain in Their Dagong 
Experience? 
 
Pun (2005) in her early book Made in China, observes a young generation of women 
workers being recruited into assembly lines as if their bodies were machines that could 
take the cruel work schedule and as if there were no human judgment, no ―brains‖ 
required in the repetitive tasks involved in the production line.  
It is possible that Pun‘s and my observations are different due to differences in industries; 
after all, the electronic industry seems to tolerate few errors, and its heavy use of 
machines means humans only help to keep the machines operating.  
Nevertheless, I question her analysis by providing evidence from another industry— the 
garment manufacturing industry—that requires and appreciates those migrant workers 
who have accumulated years of experience and who have become specialized in what 
they do.
25
 Sometimes their skills and judgment make a difference between a shipment of 
                                                          
25
 It is true that garment manufacturing industry has a low entry point for unskilled workers. But after years 
of working in it, workers become specialized and skilled; like in any other industry then, re-training would 
be costly. Workers‘ experience becomes precious and often plays a crucial role in resolving production 
process problems or in saving time, for examples. 
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goods being accepted or rejected by the customer. This makes a difference of whether 
money for a particular shipment is received, discounted, or worse yet, not received at all.  
M.J., as noted in chapter 2, left to dagong initially for her brother‘s high school expenses. 
She has the clout in the family to plead with her father to let the brother repeat a year for 
the university exam. Now a supervisor in Top‘s daughter factory inland in Sichuan, she 
recounts her job trajectory, being promoted by her first and second boss to learn a higher 
set of skills in knitwear manufacturing. 
―In two years, I was promoted to a line supervisor because Mr. H.(first boss) 
said to me: ‗You are young now, your eye sight is good. What happens when 
you are in your 40s and 50s? This is a skill to learn, to gain, and to have. You 
would be employable when you are 50. If I can‘t hire you any more, you can be 
hired elsewhere.‘ My original response was: my wage would be RMB 1200 
during the training period, and the same afterwards. But workers with piece rate 
can make up to RMB 1500~1600 a month. So why should I bother? 
Mr. H. countered: ―You have to trust my ability to read people. I have 
confidence in you.‖  
M.J. listened and remained a supervisor. Today, knitwear workers flock to her when they 
get stuck on their machines or have questions. Having stayed on and therefore, made 
herself a career path in knitwear manufacturing, her skills, experience, and judgment are 
crucial to the factory. Being a supervisor at the daughter factory in Sichuan also means 
that without her, problems may not get solved and production may be stalled. She is an 
invaluable asset to the factory—she knows it, and her boss knows it, too.  
It is common that ordinary migrant workers who have the average status of a line worker 
become supervisors, technicians, consultants, or group leaders when they come to the 
inland factory. In fact, this is a (formal or informal) transfer of skills and knowledge. It 
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happened between Top‘s headquarter in Guangzhou and the daughter factory in Sichuan 
and in many other factories in other industries.  
The knitwear manufacturing industry, compared to the electronics industry, may require 
more human judgment at various junctions in the production process. Pun‘s Made in 
China did not concern itself with the career trajectory of assembly workers. Her 
cross-sectional account describes all assembly workers as stuck in dead-end, monotonous 
jobs that not only have no future but also have no ―present‖ – they stifle the existence of 
workers.  
When Tufts University child development scholars Lang Ma and Francine Jacobs 
interviewed 12 young women working in four production chain factories in Guangdong 
Province in China, their informants frequently spoke as if they had no reasonable 
alternatives but to come out to dagong. These scholars, however, found that informants 
found ways within their reach to shape their own life trajectories by, for example, 
proactively researching candidate factories before making their selections. They asserted 
a sense of agency by ―voting with their feet‖ – they simply left subpar factories (Ma and 
Jacobs, 2010). In addition, they sought out opportunities to enter training programs: 
computer language skills courses. In sum, their informants had planned out goals, and 
despite modest origins, they were ambitious, seeking to give their children good living 
and educational environments, to be promoted, to establish their own businesses, and to 
pursue more education (Ma and Jacobs, 2010). 
Despite my informants being older and married and no longer seeking training programs, 
my fieldwork echoes the above finding of a sense of agency. Even though M.J.‘s 
trajectory is not extraordinarily great, and certainly her wage does not proportionally 
reflect her importance in the company—garment manufacturing generally pays low 
wages. I argue that she has had agency and choices along the way. She is well positioned 
to jump ship any time to another knitwear company, if she so desires. Being able to make 
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those conscious choices and assert agency have given her the poise that she has today and 
the experience and supervisory position that she commands now, even if it is not reflected 
in her current wage.  
Mr. W. (current boss) sent her to the machine manufacturer for 15 days of training on 
how to fix the machine early in her job history.  
I‘m a direct person. I feel that being a worker (as opposed to being a supervisor) 
is simpler and purer. If there is work, there is money. But if there is no work, 
there is no money. If I‘m in management (as a line supervisor) to fix machines, I 
get paid even if there is no work. This is more stable. But the responsibility is 
greater – if there are mistakes, it‘s my responsibility. Fine, then I want more 
responsibility because piece-rate wage is not stable, and management wage is 
stable as an hourly rates. But with the management job, I have to be on my toes 
about being more knowledgeable than workers because they, too, know the 
machines. I have to constantly improve myself to be convincing. 
Granted, part of Pun‘s observation in Made in China, is that unmarried young women 
were able to use dagong as a means against their patriarchal families‘ pressure to marry. 
Her account is largely about these young women‘s struggles during the prime of their 
productive lives. I encounter a later stage and experience their wisdom as they recount 
life strategies. It is as if the dagong days were like a university experience that enlightens 
them and teaches them about themselves, the world (highly competitive on the coast), and 
how they ought to interact with it.  
 
 
4.5.1 Earning Ability and Marital Relations after Dagong  
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As dagong workers within the leather garment factory, women can earn more than or as 
much as men.
26
 This means, wives can earn more than or as much as their husbands. For 
a variety of reasons, however, wives and husbands are often separated in different 
factories or job locations so that sharing a dinner together or sharing the same bed at 
night is impossible. This phenomenon has several implications. First, dagong gives 
married men and women an opportunity, an excuse, to exit marriage by leaving for a 
work destination in the name of making money for the family. It is not rare to see a 
spouse who no longer enjoys communication with the marriage partner but nevertheless 
commits financially to the household to care for the young and the aging parents or 
parents-in-laws. Dagong becomes a legitimate escape for many.  
Second, one factory may not offer suitable positions for a husband and wife to be both 
working there. And even if there are suitable positions, the owner may prefer that 
husband and wife do not work together, for whatever reasons. Furthermore, even if a 
husband and wife are working together for the same employer, they may in fact be 
staying in sex segregated dormitories, if the factory does not provide for couples. The 
physical distance between a husband and a wife can be a few blocks away at different 
factories within the same industrial park, or it can be a few provinces away. Migrant 
workers have learned to swallow this kind of bitterness: the necessity to endure a 
long-distance relationship with their spouses and other family members because the 
husband and the wife‘s jobs may likely be in different locations. There are only so many 
manufacturing jobs in China, like electronics assembly lines, which are perceived as 
―gender-neutral.‖ Many manufacturing jobs, by the physical nature of the work, take only 
                                                          
26
 Certainly, there is gender segregation in jobs as will be stated below; and certainly the predominantly 
female jobs pay poorly overall. But my research and work experience show that within the leather garment 
manufacturing industry, women can make more or as much as men, especially those whose wages are 
based on piece rates, as they could be faster in sewing than their male counterparts.  This is different from 
Margaret M. Chin‘s finding of men‘s higher earnings than women‘s in garment factories in New York City, 
largely because in the New York City factories, the higher-earning men are sewing denim, which is a 
rougher, faster job than the more delicate and time-consuming silk that women are sewing. 
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men; many others, like in the needle trades, take mostly women. Then there are other 
blatantly gender-specific industries outside of manufacturing: construction sites take men 
over women, and beauty or hair salon jobs take women over men exclusively. 
As part of multigenerational family life strategies, one could argue that couples engage in 
dual-location life strategies, too. If a husband and wife are stably or gainfully employed 
at their respective jobs and in separate locations because finances are prioritized over 
staying together, there is no strong incentive for one partner to relocate. A dual-location 
life strategy is often the norm. This is because migrant workers often cannot take the risk 
of losing one partner‘s income. The location of one partner‘s job may be so specific or 
isolated that there simply isn‘t the option of relocating for the other partner, unless one 
chooses to stay home and not work. But staying home and not working defeats the 
purpose of migrating to work in the first place. So, we are left with countless 
long-distance marriages. Sometimes one partner is designated the care taker of the family 
and stays at or close to the family by working in the nearest township or having a small 
store front in the village, while the other partner ventures out long-distance. Other times, 
both partners work in far-away places. The bond that binds them together, however, 
oftentimes is not each other but loyalty to the family since traditional Chinese families 
are child-centered rather than couple-centered (Xu, Xie, Liu, Xia, and Liu, 2007).  
  
If a woman becomes good or fast at her job, it is common that her earning power 
surpasses that of her husband‘s. Combined with the long-distance factor, many marriages 
start to fray as women become financially superior and command greater clout in the 
family. 
Q.Y.G., 45, appreciates her migrant work experience for the help it gives her in 
understanding how the world works, for help in becoming assertive, articulate, but 
nevertheless compassionate. Her husband was the last thing she would talk about in her 
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multiple conversations with me, seeming to indicate the low priority of marriage in her 
life.  
I went out in 1985. I had a classmate who went before me. She wrote me a letter 
from Guangdong. When the letter arrived, I thought, ‗Who do I have in 
Guangdong that would write to me?‘ I realized that she had gone out to dagong 
only after I opened her letter. Her uncle was in the military in Foshan, 
Guangdong, and she went to a nearby place to find work. 
Q.Y.G. invited me to spend a night at her home, just 45 minutes on the bus from the 
township of Top factory.  When at work, she still lives in a Top Sichuan-provided 
apartment, a crowded space with two bunk beds to a bedroom, and a living room area 
occupied by three bunk beds. Only water boiling, as opposed to real cooking, is done at 
the apartment. Meals are provided every day at the factory, even on off days, to retain 
workers. 
Q.Y.G. and I took a bus one morning at 7 am to come to Q.Y.G.‘s real home. Entering 
the two-bedroom apartment, there was a huge plasma TV, a spacious kitchen connected 
to a spacious dining area, and a modern couch with protective bedsheets on it to prevent 
her two year old grandson from to soiling it. The most impressive of all, however, is a 
framed embroidery called ―Golden Foliage All Over‖ hung above the plasma TV. It was 
roughly 1 1/2 x 1/2 meters and took her seven months of after-work embroidering to 
complete. She said she made another one for her younger brother‘s wedding. Even 
though her job at the factory is not as eye-sight harming as the knitting or the piecing 
people‘s, it was impressive to see a massive endeavoring like this…to separate out the 
different shades of yellow threads and the detailed embroidery hand work required a 
massive amount of concentration.  
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Figure 9 Q. Y. G.’s embroidery work, hung in her living room 
Framing and hanging this large piece on top of the TV in her living room was her way of 
expressing herself in pursuit of an esthetically better lifestyle. Underneath the umbrella 
term ―migrant workers‖ are vast differences in how each and every one expresses life. 
Q.Y.G. is someone who has the patience and an esthetic appreciation to engage in a 
pastime hobby such as embroidery, which, with its beautiful patterns and glorious names, 
shows her enthusiasm for life and life‘s promises. Q.Y.G.‘s life is not defined by or 
confined to her worker status. She has much more to look forward to. She maximizes the 
resources she has on hand in exchange for maximal family outcomes and circumstances. 
In 1993/1994, I had proposed buying a new house in my husband‘s town near 
where you saw our current house. When I was back for Chinese New Year, I 
saw developments going up. But I didn‘t have time to look into it and had to 
return to Guangdong right after the new year‘s holiday to work. So I wrote my 
father-in-law a letter, asking him to inquire into it. It was going to be a new 
house for RMB 20,000, which I was 50 percent short of with my savings from 
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working in Guangdong. But I thought, being RMB 10,000 in debt from friends 
was manageable as long as I was still working.  
My father-in-law was too old-fashioned. Even though he himself always had a 
salaried job and did not rely entirely on the farm for his family‘s livelihood, he 
had a farmer‘s way of thinking. He thought I was crazy—that if we were to live 
on the town away from the farm, we would be away from the land and therefore 
starving.  
With his objection, I couldn‘t buy the house. Moreover, my father-in-law asked 
my mother-in-law (whom he read my letter to because she did not recognize 
many characters) not to go around town advertising the fact that I had written 
with such a proposal. He worried about my image, that if the villagers heard I 
had such an idea, they would think what kind of dirty [sex-related] money I was 
getting in Guangdong!  
In 2000, there came an opportunity to buy our current two-bedroom apartment. 
The price was now RMB 46,000. This was a pre-mortgage era. You had to have 
the full amount in cash. At that point, since I hadn‘t been making real money for 
five years because I had returned home to be with my school-aged son, my 
savings were down to RMB 20,000. So I was short of RMB 26,000. I was very 
angry at my indecisive, negative, and un-cooperative husband; I only just wanted 
his verbal support and nothing else. I would have been the one going around 
trying to solve the problems anyway. But he could not even give me verbal 
support. In the end, my father-in-law lent me in RMB 7000, and I borrowed 
RMB 10,000 from each of my sisters and my brother. Renovation costs, I still 
remember, was RMB 3988, and this fund I had borrowed from friends. In the 
end, I paid it all back, of course. And I couldn‘t have done it without working in 
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Guangdong: the money, the knowledge, and the confidence that buying 
properties was the right thing to do [for use as well as for investment]. 
Q.Y.G. is not alone. All but one of the return migrant worker interviewees in Weiyuan 
have bought houses to live in. Although owing the bank a mortgage is something 
undesirable for many of them, they managed to get mortgages to pay for the houses they 
have bought. Some purposely chose the lesser number of years (but higher payments each 
month) to be debt-free earlier.  
However ambitious and aggressive that she may seem, Q.Y.G. is first and foremost a 
family woman. But a family woman in the vertical direction in doting on her 24-year-old 
son and her grandson, and not so much in a horizontal direction with her husband with 
whom her relationship is more of a formality now than an actual bond and union. 
Traditional Chinese culture has never emphasized the husband-and-wife relationship until 
modern times. Family relationships in vertical lineage between parents and children are 
reinforced, emphasized, and carried out more than other types of relationships, like 
between a couple or among siblings (Xu et al., 2007). 
 
Now that she is a grandmother, the focus of Q.Y.G.‘s life is her grandson. In China, 
grandparents are de facto care takers, culturally assumed so before the grandchildren‘s 
births. Often, Q.Y.G. broadcasts her excursions with the little boy over social media: a 
visit to the waterfalls here, a walk around the grape fields there. Because of the 
fluctuating production cycle in the factory, she does not always have work. On her days 
off, she has the option of either going home 45 minutes away or staying in the 
company-provided apartment and hanging out in the town. With free time on her hands, 
she has plenty of opportunities to take care of her grandson, especially because her son 
works in a town 1 1/2 hours away from their home and only gets to go home four days a 
month, and her daughter-in-law works a full-time job. Q.Y.G. often wears a lime green 
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T-shirt with a large pineapple print on the front. She explained that her grandson had just 
gotten to know how to say the word ―feng li‖ [pineapple], so she bought this T-shirt when 
she saw it, to help stimulate the little boy‘s learning.  
Q.Y.G. spoke with a superior attitude about her husband; such superiority, perhaps, 
would not be as accentuated if she did not migrate to the coast to work and had stayed on 
an equal footing with her husband.  
My husband had never ―eaten bitterness‖ in his life. He grew up with his father 
being a salaried staffer (even if low) vs. my having a farmer father. I think his 
parents spoiled all three of them, the male children. It is always me making 
decisions big and small; he never had an opinion. All big expenses come from 
me, too: besides the property buying episode described above, the dining table 
[large furniture item] comes from me. Son‘s middle school expenses, 1000+, for 
example, came from me, too. For much of the duration of our marriage, he 
stayed home and did not have an incentive for a better life. It‘s really so 
frustrating, I tell you. Really, if my parents-in-law were not so kind and nice, I 
would have left this marriage a long time ago. My mother-in-law had always 
supported my ideas, and my father-in-law, eventually approved of me after 
several incidents that proved I was right or had a better judgment. 
Q.Y.G. has an extremely compassionate soul, one that cares for and goes many extra 
miles to help her peers, not just her family. The husband of a colleague of Q.Y.G. had 
been sick with leukemia for nine years. He was getting treatment in the big city 
ChengDu
27
 and resting at home with medication. Q.Y.G. said one of his medications was 
not available in Weiyuan, only in Zigong where her family lives. So she was on a mission 
to help the colleague‘s husband get this medication. In the beginning, the doctor refused, 
and Q.Y.G. thought to herself, how could this doctor be so cold? Then she went to the 
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 Two hours away from Weiyuan, Sichuan.  
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pharmacy department of the hospital and met a young man working there. This young 
man said to her, ―We are the out-patients‘ pharmacy, you should check with the in-patient 
pharmacy.‖  
Just this small helpful sentence was very very moving to me. Later on, every 
time I went, he recognized me and we would say hello. Last year, the patient 
passed away. I was very emotional for a long time and I wanted to say to him, 
―The person we have been helping is gone.‖ But I didn‘t, I swallowed it. 
To help the colleague and her husband, sometimes I went home to Zigong on 
extra trips when I did not plan to…because anything else I could not have helped. 
This was the only thing I could do, so I did.  
After her husband passed away, I, or I should say we—us co-workers, have been 
on the lookout for someone suitable to matchmake her with. If we come across 
someone suitable, we would first check out his background and then judge 
whether it would be a good thing to introduce him to her. Anything that we 
could do within our ability, we would. Losing a husband is devastating and we 
just want to be there for her. 
As I was writing this chapter, I received a forwarded message from her, with two further 
voice messages. The husband of an ex-colleague that she has known since 1998 in the 
same factory had a car accident in 2014. Since then, he had been incurring an exorbitant 
sum of medical expenses (RMB 800,000), and the forwarded message was one organized 
by the family to try collecting donations from the general public. 
―This is a true story. I worked with her before.‖ Q.Y.G.‘s voice said vehemently. 
I haven‘t seen this colleague for 10+ years. This time, this incident is talked 
about by a group of other colleagues/ex-colleagues on social media. Her 
husband has been in and out of the operation room five times, and here are some 
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photos of the family before and after the accident. The last photo is the one I 
most dare not look at, where the husband is pushed in a wheelchair by his aging 
mother with white hair. 
I read and re-read the forwarded message, looked at my own finances, and decided I 
would contribute a meager RMB 1000. I wrote to Q.Y.G.: ―My ability is limited as I am 
still a student myself, living a life where I would go to the cheapest grocery store on my 
second-hand bike. I would, however, like to contribute RMB 1000, but it has to wait until 
my next trip to China to wire the money.‖  
She sent back a sophisticated, thoughtful message: ―Do not mind this message. You are 
still a student. Other ex-colleagues requested that I forward this message out. I hesitated 
for a few days before forwarding it to you and two other ex-classmates. I do not want this 
message to bother my friends. Let us pray for the protagonist and wish him a speedy 
recovery.‖ The man passed away in 2016, just a day before my second visit to Weiyuan.  
Even though Q.Y.G. herself—or anybody else, for that matter—had not expressed this, it 
was clear to me that the bonding among co-workers was as important a factor for 
encouraging workers to stay as any other. Especially for the older generation of workers, 
their inertia to change workplaces was great, and so was the psycho-social factor of 
belonging.  
 
4.6 Multigenerational Lifestyle 
 
The older generation of migrant workers often expect, and are expected by their adult 
children, to retire or semi-retire from their coastal stints and take care of their 
grandchildren. Most do when they return to their homes of origin. They are different from 
the younger generation of migrant workers, whom we will discuss later. As previously 
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discussed, Chinese cultural values expect intergenerational contributions to the family. 
Quach and Anderson (2008) state the family constitutes a crucial support network, 
particularly through intergenerational relationships. Having grandparents take care of 
children is not unique to rural China nor to farming communities. Urban folks do so, too. 
In the cities, the grandparents‘ generation lives under the same roof as the core family, 
and in both one- and two-income families, is expected to contribute to household chores. 
They are found buying groceries in the morning, picking up children at kindergarten and 
primary schools in the afternoon, and in many cases, making dinner for their sons and 
daughters and their sons- and daughters-in-law who work 9 to 5 jobs. Standard apartment 
interiors in high-rise buildings are designed to suit this cultural practice with three- or 
four-bedrooms: a bedroom for each generation. Real estate developers advertise their 
property by marking and labeling rooms such as ―grandparent‘s bedroom,‖ alongside 
parent‘s and children‘s bedrooms.    
When I walked into Top‘s Sichuan factory, I was first greeted by a small black board on 
the wall near the entrance. It instructed: No children in the factory during summer 
months. 
Yet, because Miss C.S.W., the legal representative/owner of the factory was hands-off or 
absent herself, and because Mr. W.‘s management team is all the way in Guangzhou, 
what is in place is actually a lax policy on having children on the shop floor.  
Children and grandchildren (like Q.Y.G.‘s) are brought to work when school is not in 
session. For a factory of 20 plus workers, four to five children sometimes showed up. 
One day, a 12-year-old girl, M.J.‘s daughter, spread out on a big ironing table to read her 
colorful story books. Two children were running alongside the aisle between the 
mechanical knitting machines and the locking machines. The weather was hot, so the 
children had their shoes off. As I approached the locking machines to sit down with 
someone to chat, I noticed that there were long needles on the floor. My Western-trained 
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child-safety alarm clock went off, and I got up quickly to start picking them up. Workers 
agreed with me that it was a potential danger, but when I sat down again with my small 
collection of needles, I saw why they were not as nervous as I was. The needles were dull 
and long and were resting mostly in the narrow grooves ―in‖ not ―on‖ the floor. So in 
theory, it was not likely that children would get poked even if they did step on them.  
Ever since Nike‘s 1995 child labor scandal, large brand companies, mostly in North 
America and Western Europe, started to audit factories on measures of workers‘ rights, 
wages, hours, etc. Workplace safety is certainly on the list of things these auditors check. 
Is there a specific place designed to store (potentially dangerous) tools of production? Is 
this place safeguarded? Long documents and checklists are passed out from the brand 
companies to their contractor factories and pressure is applied on the latter to comply 
with regulations and rules the brand companies make up. 
Of course, bringing one‘s children or grandchildren to the workplace seems so out of the 
question that they would not appear on the checklist of things not to happen. But it 
happens every so often when a worker has no alternative childcare. And when there is no 
pressure—like that applied by Western brand companies to forbid this—management, 
especially at smaller factories turn a blind eye. 
The Chinese mentality and practice of childcare does not generally make room for 
outside ―professionals‖ like a daycare center. Kindergartens exist and are utilized, but a 
few factors make them a non-necessity. First, kindergartens exist only in more urban 
regions. In rural villages, such setups rarely exist. Or kindergartens may be too far away 
to get to because there is too few of them. Second, attending kindergarten or a daycare 
center means that instead of family members taking care of their children, the children are 
cared for by ―outsiders.‖ Many Chinese reject this idea; they overwhelmingly desire to 
over-protect their youngsters by keeping them within eyesight. Third, either a 
kindergarten or a daycare attendance means extra family expenditures. And this is one 
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too many expenses to many frugal Chinese or frugal Chinese migrant workers whose 
budgets are not so big to begin with.   
Again, the existence of children on Top‘s shop floor reflects both the cultural proclivity 
to not outsource caring for the young and the unofficial, informal way that the workplace 
meets workers‘ real needs by de facto allowing them to attend to their family obligations.  
 
4.7 Rites of passage 
 
What I meant earlier by likening dagong with a university experience is not so much the 
freedom endowed on carefree university students—migrant workers are burdened with a 
host of worries—but the sense of empowerment and the rites of passage that a university 
experience grants. Dagong on the coast is a kind of rite of passage for migrant workers 
from knowing nothing of capitalist arrangements of work and organization to becoming a 
busy participant. Some older generation migrant workers I interviewed in the last chapter 
repeatedly expressed sympathy for their boss who was struggling to keep the business 
afloat. Being in a factory long enough teaches you about the things that can go wrong 
with a shipment of goods and the things that must go right for the boss to receive a proper, 
full payment. When business is bad, some older generation migrant workers even state 
that they understand if they must be let go. ―We will be alright back home. Our children 
are adults now. We can go and wait to take care of our grandchildren.‖ 
For those that climb into supervisory roles, the rites of passage continue and make them 
keepers of capitalism, however small that role is. Harry Braverman, in Labor and 
Monopoly Capital—the Degradation of Work in the 20th Century (1974), points out that 
middle management, despite being workers, functions to guard capital on behalf of the 
business owners. In my observations, seasoned and senior migrant workers—especially 
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those in a small-sized factory in which interaction and bonding with the boss is intense 
and frequent—develop a loyalty and mentality to work as if they were running the show. 
By this, I mean that they are usually conscious of their entitlement or at least use of 
company resources, a car ride with the driver, consumption of production and other 
material, or they pay attention to whether the lights and air conditioning are off when 
people leave a room, to name a few examples.  
Further, they are molded and socialized on a daily basis to be concerned about costs and 
prospects of profits when taking an action. Behind their work stations, they chat about 
whether a garment they are currently making will sell or not—is the pocket on the chest 
big enough for cell phones? Does the tassel look good with this length or that length? The 
technical specification says this, but we think that makes a better product because of 
reasons XYZ.  
These are at the same time technical details and tiny business decisions that concern a 
migrant worker with his or her subdivided tasks because they have learned—through 
observing the boss‘s mood, for example, at various times against the happenings in the 
business, through going to lunches with the client and listening in on the conversations, 
through sharing a car ride with the factory‘s accounting staff to pay the electricity bill. 
These should not be their concerns, yet they have been socialized into capitalism day in 
and day out to learn to care. They care not only because everything is in a small way 
related to their wage payment and whether they will still have this job next month. But 
they care also because there can be a general sense of camaraderie with the factory 
owners and their co-workers. And when they share the company‘s concerns, they are 
appreciated by upper management; even if there may be no room for many of them to rise 
to middle management or supervisory roles. A business mindset earns them an approval 
rating with upper management and the owner. And in a small factory setting where upper 
management or the owner‘s words dictate the daily world, they have earned a new status. 
Now they can be entrusted with greater tasks—with greater autonomy, or eat with upper 
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management in a room separate from or adjacent to the larger canteen. Indeed, in a small 
factory, a separate facility indicates status, and smart, hard-working migrant workers, too, 
have a way to advance in their jobs.   
 
4.8 Empowerment  
 
As I argued earlier, after the dagong experience, many older generation migrant workers 
return home having a stronger sense of empowerment, a can-do attitude because anything 
at home could be easier and less threatening than the ―bitterness they had to eat‖ when 
out on the coast. They are more aware of their human rights because work and life 
experiences on the coast, where laws are more complete and fully implemented, imbued 
them with a general sense of being savvy. They have also seen, observed, and interacted 
with urban folks, and now they know how things are done in a more civilized, 
sophisticated way. Having seen how capitalism works in its most cut-throat region of the 
country, they now talk and walk with a confidence about them that cannot be taken away. 
Objectively, despite their relatively low level of education, almost all of them speak 
better Mandarin, the country‘s official language, than their counterparts who did not 
migrate. They have had to communicate and collaborate with superiors and white-collar 
staffers usually from local coast areas, as well as fellow migrant workers from different 
parts of central and western China. In theory, there should be economic returns to 
speaking better Mandarin (Gao and Smyth, 2011), but because all my interviewees have 
continued working for the same employer, they did not report greater economic returns 
for speaking better Mandarin.  
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J.D.W., 44, is a conscientious, hard-working mechanical knitting machine operator. She 
has a high school aged daughter, and her husband, a migrant worker, is away in the 
adjacent Guizhou Province.  
In 1994 in March, my cousin and I went to Guangzhou Train Station, en route to 
Shenzhen Bao An district, which required a Border Pass. It was an era that such 
a Pass was required for anybody to enter the special zone. We stayed overnight 
in a small hotel in Guangzhou with the kind of a huge, communal bed for a 
group of people. There was a small fire in that hotel that very evening—we were 
scared to death for a while before it was quickly put out. The next day, security 
people laughed at us jokingly and said we hadn‘t experienced the world.  
Finally we got our border passes and got to this small factory in Shenzhen. The 
Shenzhen factory canteen food was much better than the one in Jiangsu where I 
had been previously, but after a while, there were no more wages and the owner 
vanished.  
A group of us workers went on a march in front of the Shenzhen labor bureau 
holding signs which we had helped write. The labor bureau eventually liquidated 
the facilities and paid us. I remember I was owed RMB 380 and got paid 
eventually.  
Of course, this is not to say that the dagong experience was carefree and intentionally 
growth-oriented for the sake of workers. It is not. It is in many cases cruel with long 
hours, far away from home and repetitive. Yet post-dagong, workers told me they think 
of dagong positively as something that built character and life experiences. 
Chapter Conclusion: 
This chapter explores the reverse push and pull factors that occurred after the Economic 
Reform in the 1980s, which explain migrant workers‘ return home. Pressures on small- 
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and medium-sized enterprises that employ a large percentage of migrant workers and 
work opportunities in newly developing western and central China have led to return 
migration. Coastal factories sought to move to western and central regions of China, as 
well as South East Asia, for lower cost labor. On average, workers returning inland 
receive half of what they used to earn on the coast.  
The older generation of migrant workers are willing to take this pay cut to be living with, 
taking care of their growing children, and providing parental supervision for their 
education, which they deem important in their upward intergenerational social mobility.  
My informants are overwhelmingly female, and many are separated from their 
spouses—although many did not stay close to their spouses spatially to begin with, as 
traditional Chinese culture never prevailed on the husband-and-wife relationship, but 
rather, on the parent-to-child relationship. Although the larger body of literature on 
factory workers has documented and emphasized their powerlessness, a small group of 
scholars, including me, has found bits of evidence that coming out to the coast means 
acquiring a sense of agency and empowerment, as well as a rite of passage. 
Because of western and central China‘s development, the relocation of coastal factories, 
or the opening of daughter factories, older generation migrant workers have returned 
home to continue working. Those who are past their productive years have returned home 
to retire or semi-retire by becoming caretakers of their grandchildren. Despite retirement, 
their coastal experience has made them more confident, evidenced by improved 
Mandarin skills. While they may not have capitalized on these qualities, their newfound 
self-confidence is a positive outcome of their dagong experience. 
 
Chapter 5 Return of the Younger Generation of Migrant Workers 
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5.1 Why Did the Younger Generation of Migrant Workers Return? 
The younger generation of migrant workers returned home for more varied reasons than 
the older generation, which due to their age generally stay in the same factory, same 
industry, or retire. Compared to the destitution that the older generation encountered at 
home in the wake of the Cultural Revolution when they had few opportunities to make 
money, the younger generation of migrant workers finally has choices. In their choice set, 
they could continue to migrate out to the coast to work, return home, or stay closer to 
home to work. Others chose to become small-scale entrepreneurs.  
Yue, Li, Feldman, and Du found in 2010 (Yue et al., 2010) that members of the younger 
generation have stronger desires to do nonfarm work and that returning to native villages 
to seek a nonagricultural job has become the most important goal for this generation. 
Using survey data, they found that the younger the migrants, the more likely they intend 
to be nonagricultural returnees and settlers. Their quantitative study cites a higher return 
to increasing education level as a reason the younger generation is returning; they also 
found that social capital, migration motives, and social and economic conditions in areas 
of origin affect the younger generation‘s intention to return. My qualitative study, 
however, suggests that it is their family status—whether there is a family back in their 
homes of origin to feed and to be together with—that is the main determinant of whether 
the younger generation of workers returns. In my study, there is almost no difference in 
the sense of family responsibility between older and younger generations of workers. 
More economic opportunities exist in western and central China now, making returning 
home an option. 
Chinese anthropologist Zhou Daming reports on job hopping frequency among the 112 
workers he surveyed in a stationery factory in the Pearl River Delta.  
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Above 4 times -- 27% 2% 
2-3 times 29% 62% 36% 
1 time 71% 5% 37% 
Never -- 1% 20% 
Did not respond -- 5% 5% 
Source: DaMing Zhou and XiaoYun Sun, Research of Migrant Workers‘ Job 
Hopping—Mobility of Enterprise Migrant Workers Series, Part II 周大鸣与孙箫韵，农
民工‖转工‖研究—企业农民工流动研究之二, 2010 
 
Zhou and Sun‘s findings show that workers in their 20s have the highest job hopping 
frequency, which confirms my ethnographic evidence. Although my sample size is 
relatively small (40), it allows me to see that younger generation migrant workers are less 
stable, even in their jobs at home, after their return from the coast. They either job hop at 
home, or job hop between the coast and home region. We will discuss what this means 
with the example of P.G.Z., later.  
For many younger generation migrant workers, the distance away from loved ones 
quickly reminds them of their priorities in life. They have not even had a chance to 
accumulate any work experience or savings on the coast. Their consumption patterns 
have not made it conducive to saving. Thanks to China‘s internal economic development 
that makes work at home possible, the difference for the younger generation between 
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staying home to work and going to the coast is no longer the difference between earning 
nothing and making a livelihood. Also, thanks to internal economic development, the 
consumption level of western and central China has risen so that entrepreneurship of all 
kinds is a possibility. All of this is another way of saying, this generation has a choice, 
even if sometimes a hard one. It is an improvement over the older generation‘s lack of 
choices. 
T.Z. was 30-years-old when I met her in Top‘s factory hallway. After I explained my 
purpose, she readily shared her story. Just a few sentences into her story, she quickly 
teared up sharing how she decided to leave her infant child to pursue work on the coast.  
I was a child of migrant workers myself. My parents are still out working, as we 
speak. They left when I was just an 8-month old baby, my paternal grandparents 
raised me. But I did not want to repeat this family history, I did not want to be a 
migrant worker again myself, but I tried leaving when my baby was small, for 
lack of alternatives to make money. I recall that my father-in-law was holding 
the baby; they were across a valley and I was walking towards the train station. 
They walked in parallel with me and my father-in-law was saying to the baby, 
―Call out to your mother!‖ It was very unbearable, the pain. I regretted the 
decision as soon as the train got out of ZiGong, the nearest train station to where 
we were living. When I arrived in Guangzhou, I wanted to turn back right away 
but I knew this would not solve any problems. So I stayed and worked. In those 
initial 56 days, I worked for 40 and made a whopping RMB 5600. Then, there 
was no more goods to make, even the boss said so. In the beginning when I 
called home, my baby boy knew to call me ―Mama.‖ As time went by, he 
stopped calling me. I told my husband, I did not want to work here anymore, I 
wanted to go home. As soon as I hung up, I went to buy a train ticket. When you 
go out to work, aren‘t you doing so for the sake of the child? But in fact, 
returning is the real sacrifice you can do for the child. 
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T.Z. had another problem: just a month before we met, her husband was diagnosed with 
end-stage uremia and had to go through dialysis every 2-3 days. She fears for his life, and 
she fears for the medical expenses to come. A middle school teacher, her husband has 
state-provided medical insurance. But still, now that he is not working and rests at home 
every day, she fears his medical expenses will be unaffordable on her meager wages 
locking together knit pieces into finished garments. Doing this, she makes around RMB 
3000/month, which is unstable due to the instability of factory orders. But T.Z. is too 
tough to be quickly defeated. Having just a middle school education, she is limited in 
what she can do to make a living. Through personal connections, she managed to buy a 
second-hand locking machine that she places on her balcony at home. With the machine, 
she processes extra work as a freelance, piece-rate worker for other owners than Top‘s 
Sichuan factory, which has not signed a labor contract with her and which does not have 
enough work to occupy her time. 
Here we see that T.Z.‘s potential choice set would be between staying at Top‘s 
Guangzhou factory being paid for her full-time work capacity and coming home to 
Sichuan and soliciting freelance jobs.  
At one point, I started a small business. I bought from wholesale cheap women‘s 
clothing and toys, and tried to sell them to workers by having a stand on the 
street near where they would pass by to and from work. This was a bad decision, 
and I have some stock clothing left.  
She abandoned the business and the idea of doing business on her own altogether. She 
then started to get freelance jobs doing the same task she does in Top‘s Sichuan factory. 
When I saw her again in 2016, she was splitting her time three ways. Work at Top when 
there were goods to be made, freelance work at home, and on-site work in a custom-made 
sweater shop. Since the summer of 2015, she has broken up her day by fitting in her 
husband‘s dialysis sessions at the hospital. If she is at work in the factory, she goes home 
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right after lunch to take her husband to the hospital on her moped. She stays with him 
during his session, and comes back to work later than the lunch break allows. 
Management is nice about it and does not give her trouble. Earning RMB 3000/month 
and having to pay an RMB 1200/month mortgage, she and her family are living frugally, 
especially now with an on-going medical expense. But however frugally she lives, she 
does not miss spending family time on mini vacations and surely does not miss taking her 
now 8-year-old son to eat an American hamburger and milkshake on his birthday. After 
all, this is what all the struggles are about, this is the reason she returned: quality family 
life together, not apart. 
Not all younger generation migrant workers‘ return are as final as T.Z.‘s. Unlike 
white-collar workplaces in the West, factory owners in China accept the numerous 
comings and goings of the same worker. So, you could have a worker quit for two 
months to go home inland due to boredom in the factory, due to a family event, and then 
decide to come back out to the same factory again. If the factory is still in need of helping 
hands and if the worker has no real conflicts with his co-workers, then there would be no 
reason to stop him from entering the factory again. 
P.Y.Z., 35, a locking machine operator at Top, worked alongside T.Z. whom we got to 
know in the above section. A year after my first visit to Weiyuan and to P.Y.Z.‘s 
two-bedroom apartment with her husband and their 12-year-old daughter, she suddenly 
announced on social media that she was ―departing.‖ ―Departing for where?‖ I asked.  
P.Y.Z. and her husband were leaving for Suzhou. They were taking a 12-hour high-speed 
train ride. She felt bored and posted a photo of her departing train on social media. She 
was excited for her trip and her new life in a factory peeling plastic membranes. In the 
first few days after she arrived, her husband got into the factory smoothly without a 
problem. She, on the other hand, had to resort to forging a health certificate, because of 
low blood pressure, which for her employer might be a sign of possible fainting on the 
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job. She said to me, ―We will see what happens around Chinese New Year.‖ Her plans 
for staying at this job extended for only six months. 
 
5.2 Infrastructure and Telecommunication 
 
Infrastructure and telecommunication have changed dramatically in China in the past 20 
years. Train rides, thanks to the development of increasingly extensive high speed 
railroad networks, have been shortened to as much as 1/5 of the time it used to take. The 
oldest ex-migrant worker I have in my study, B.W., the mother of the triumphant 
Shenzhen hukou receiver L.C. from chapter 2, used to take five- to six-day one-way train 
rides to get from her Fujian work site to her home in Sichuan. ―Despite the incredibly 
long distance and the pain of traveling, I found every opportunity to go home and visit. It 
was really really hard, every train ride was guaranteed to have large crowds, and you had 
to transfer so many times, waiting and waiting between trains.‖ Now living with L.C.‘s 
family in Shenzhen, B.W.‘s travel mode has changed to high speed rail and even flights, 
when she goes all over China to visit her relatives: driving with L.C.‘s husband to her 
younger sister in Fujian, high speed railroad to another younger sister in Tianjin, and a 
flight back from her youngest daughter‘s place with a connection, three hours away from 
ChengDu. 
B. W. also experienced the drastic improvement in telecommunications in the country 
and how it affected the way she kept in contact with her family. ―In the ‗80s, I never went 
to the outside world and knew nothing of that world. We learned everything step by step. 
For example, I struggled to learn how to send text messages on the phone. In the 
mid-1990s there was the telecommunication companies‘ 200 fixed landline phone 
program. I did not have a phone in my home in Sichuan, but a niece had married into a 
family in the nearest township that had a fixed telephone. So, that was why a lot of times 
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after dinner, I would say to my employer, ‗I am going out to phone the family.‘ Every 
time there is something happening in the family, I was very anxious, always calling and 
calling. I was only making a few hundred a month, but over a year, I would have to spend 
over a thousand in telephone fees! It was only after the 200 fixed landline phone program 
did we have personal cell phones. It was then that I started to learn how to send text 
messages.‖  
Q.Y.G.‘s daughter-in-law, a slender and beautiful woman who used to work in the beauty 
industry in Shenzhen, dabbled around at home for a few years selling food at a storefront 
and then working in town before returning to Shenzhen for a job in the beauty industry. 
Q.Y.G. warns her, ―You will find out how much you will miss your son. I went through 
the exact same thing. In our era, we had no social media, no video-conferencing abilities. 
A letter took half a month to arrive; that‘s the only difference. But the pain of missing 
your child stays the same. It‘s your son, it‘s your decision.‖ 
 
5.3 Job Hopping  
 
P.G.Z. is 34, she had previously worked in handbag factories in Guangdong, starting 
when she was 14, using her older sister‘s ID to fake her age. Now a mother of two, her 
family of four is considering going to Guangdong again after a few years back home in 
Sichuan.  
We want to go out again, together, as a couple, even as a family with the 
children, if we can manage. First we will renovate our house this year, rent it out 
so our mortgage is taken care of, then we will be free to go. My husband wants 
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to try his hands at selling computer electronics
28…His sister owns an electronics 
factory in Huizhou near Shenzhen. So, it‘s been a project for my husband to 
learn driving, but he‘s been too bogged down by his current well-paid job in 
welding to really study for the driving tests. 
Just as I was wondering about her a few months later and helping her to brainstorm a way 
to achieve this move, she went back to Sichuan again, telling me that the thought of 
moving to Guangdong had been scrapped.  
P.G.Z. has job hopped so much between Guangdong and Sichuan that it takes her a while 
to recall her past job trajectory. Below I illustrate this past job trajectory with a timeline.  
1997 (age 14): Sichuan  Guangdong. Not reached age 15 yet. ―Borrowed‖ older sister‘s 
ID.  
2002 : Guangdong Sichuan, came back to Weiyuan, left for ChengDu for a few months, 
then back to Weiyuan again. Marriage and birth of Child 1.  
2003: Sichuan  Guangdong, a few months after Child 1 was born.  
2012: Guangdong  Sichuan, after staying put in Guangdong for about nine years, only 
coming home on major holidays, she returned to Sichuan on a more permanent basis.  
2013: Sichuan Guangdong, but went out again.  
                                                          
28
 The computer electronics market in various parts in Guangzhou is occupied by small-scale entrepreneurs from 
various provinces. In my district, there is a high percentage of small-scale entrepreneurs from Hunan in the market. 
They are between 30 and 50 years old, and typically rent a space in a computer electronic market that hosts rows of 
small individual spaces for small businesses. Typically, it is run by a family—either couples or siblings, where a basic 
division of labor takes place. One person would be responsible for fixing computers, for example, with the other person 
selling and going out to get sales contract from small- and medium-sized businesses around town. A family successful 
in running such a business would not think of returning home to their village—there, such a mature market does not 
exist, and they would be giving up the fruits of their efforts thus far.  
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2014: Guangdong Sichuan.  
2016: Sichuan Guangdong for a few months, after buying a new apartment and having 
an immediate need for cash for the apartment‘s interior designs. 
After I had gotten to know her, one summer day in 2016, she announced on social media, 
―I am now in Guangzhou, dagong! I just got here 3 days ago, so tired, everyday working 
until midnight!‖ Then she started to explain, ―we bought a house back at home. All our 
money has gone into that. We need money urgently, so I came out to dagong again in 
Guangzhou, helping the family.‖ 
She found this Guangzhou factory through friends. She left her two children at home with 
her husband—since, compared to her husband, she finds it easier to get work with her 
locking machine operation skill set—took a direct bus from Weiyuan County to 
Dongguan, and started working in a knitwear factory.  
At the expense of such a long trip and what seems like a big endeavor to move again, 
P.G.Z. will be leaving her two small children. She is still job hopping in Guangdong, 
looking for a factory where she did not have to work so many overtime hours but that 
paid between RMB 5000 and 6000. A few days passed, and when I next heard from 
P.G.Z., she was already working at a ―better factory‖ in the same Dongguan region. She 
said she can‘t work the terrible long hours because she has hepatitis B. But to earn RMB 
5000-6000, overtime every day until 10 pm is inevitable. I half-jokingly told her that she 
would be alright, that my grandmother lived to 96 with hepatitis B. Then she said, in 
these modern days, it‘s more likely the case that we can‘t live to this old age because we 
are all eating gutter oil.
29
  
Alice: Are you living in the dorms?  
                                                          
29
 Gutter oil is a term used in China and Taiwan to describe illicit cooking oil which has been recycled 
from waste oil collected from unsanitary, unlawful, and unimaginable sources like restaurant fryers, sewer 
drains, grease traps, and slaughterhouse waste.  
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P.G.Z.:Yes, it‘s room and board provided. 
Alice: Then you must be eating gutter oil. 
I snapped in a joking mode.  
Alice: Couldn‘t you find a place to rent on your own, and that way you could at least 
cook dinner for yourself?  
P.G.Z.: I am in for a quick buck. I only want to work until Chinese New Year. She said. 
In this seven-month period she intends to work out on the coast in Guangdong before 
returning home to plan next steps. Meanwhile, her husband is at home learning to drive. 
When he masters driving, the two of them plan to switch places. He will go out to 
Guangdong and help his brother-in-law do sales in his electronics factory. 
A month later, P.G.Z. bought a slow cooker so she could at least make some soup for 
herself when she wants.  
Anonymous and highly substitutable, these factory jobs make coming and going easy for 
workers, unlike white-collar jobs which require greater efforts to find and get into and are 
taken more seriously.  
Four months before Chinese New Year, four months before her planned return, she quit 
and left for home in Sichuan, yet again. She said she could not stand the pain of missing 
her two children and could finally find another sweater factory at home that utilized her 
skills on locking sweater pieces.  
Job hopping is not something that belongs strictly to migrant workers from interior 
provinces. Twenty-seven-year old younger-generation sales assistant at Top‘s Guangzhou 
factory spoke of dissatisfaction with her wage. ―Sometimes I want to quit, I want to look 
for other jobs outside. But after doing this for so many years, I don‘t know what to do 
otherwise.‖      




Entrepreneurship is what many younger generation migrant workers aspire and resort to 
when they return home. In fact, the second half of their coastal dagong experience after 
the initial hardship is over prepares them in all aspects for entrepreneurship back home: 
finances by saving their wages, experiences by observing how their bosses do business, 
and connections with co-villagers or co-province friends, laoxiang.  
But entrepreneurship also means risk. Some migrant workers-turned-entrepreneurs are 
resorting to dagong when the going gets tough and when they cannot earn as much as 
they would have liked as entrepreneurs because a wage is a surer livelihood.  
P.G.Z.‘s older sister, now 37, who started her working life doing dagong in an electronics 
factory, returned to Weiyuan to start a bakery shop. But after a few years when the 
bakery was not making as much money as she had expected, she went out with P.G.Z. to 
Dongguan, Guandong to work in a sweater factory. In fact, from the onset, not having 
sweater-factory skills like P.G.Z., she could only do quality control work at the end of all 
knitting processes. But for her, dagong was a solution to the problem of having three 
growing daughters to feed and when entrepreneurship did not work. After the bakery, her 
husband opened a shop to send and receive courier packages. Yet that proved to be 
difficult, too, because there are too many couriers in the market and too much 
competition. This family hedges its earning potential by having at least one parent shift 
between entrepreneurship and dagong, the possibility of making more money 
(entrepreneurship) vs. a stable income (dagong) to live on.  
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With China opening and developing its western and central regions, the economy back 
home is picking up speed, leaving residents there desiring similar goods and services that 
have already been available on the coast.  
Scholars that view return workers as a positive force have argued that they promote rural 
economic development, non-agricultural and agricultural sectors (Xu 2005; Liu 2006; Ma 
and Jin 2009).  
The failed bakery and struggling courier entrepreneurship case and the hair salon place 
(detailed below) reflect what this group of scholars have observed. My work finds their 
claim an overstatement because most entrepreneurship by return migrants employs only 
the entrepreneurs themselves, with no job creation just yet. The trend, however, is correct; 
returnees are the carriers of capital, sophistication, and sometimes technology to diffuse 
to their homes of origin.  
27-year-old hair salon owner-I and hair salon owner-II are classic cases. Owner-I used to 
work in his aunt‘s hair salon in a district of Guangzhou for more than seven years before 
returning home, buying home property, and signing a rental lease for his salon.  
In the beginning in my aunt‘s salon in Guangzhou, we used to just sleep on the 
salon beds when she did not have that many helpers. Later, she upgraded us to a 
rental residence where guys were sleeping on the couches in the living room, 
and girls were sleeping in rooms with doors. Now that I have my own home 
property back home in Sichuan, I wish to find a partner and start a family in 3 
years. Maybe I/we will go out to the coast again when I‘m in my 30s or 40s 
depending on the will of my other half, but for now, I am staying put to develop 
this salon. 
Owner-II in his mid-20s said that to start and develop his salon business at home is just as 
hard as it was to develop his joint-venture salon business in Guangzhou. He has been 
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back for nine months, and he set up shop right when he returned. “My connections and 
friends are all there. To start and develop this business here, I am starting from scratch.” 
If it is equally hard in Guangzhou and back home, what brought him home?  
Everything is related. My 2 1/2-year-old child, my aging parents. You know, it‘s 
like my parents aged suddenly. All of a sudden they have illnesses. When I was 
in Guangzhou, I was young and my parents were young. You don‘t feel any 
burdens when you are young. You just think, this is fun. But business at home is 
more difficult. You have to spend more time convincing the clients to pay for a 
certain service that was easier to get paid for in the city. Here, people really 
bargain! 
In 2010 Taiwan‘s own Business Week magazine reported the trend of migrant workers 
returning home, citing a whopping 3.6 million returnees between 2008 and February 
2009. A particular village of 4700 in Sichuan is reported to have 70+ returnees. 
Thirty-six-year-old He is such a returnee. After leaving home at the age of 18, Business 
Week reported, working as a security guard, a cook, and an assembly worker for traffic 
lights in Guangdong, Beijing, and Yunan, his last job was as a foreman in a shoe factory 
in Guangdong, making RMB 3000+ a month. After the 2008 financial crisis, the factory‘s 
orders shrank from a few thousand pairs per day to under 300. He was out of a job. 
Within 20 days, he was on the train going back to ChongQing (the municipality adjacent 
to Sichuan, where Sichuan dialect is spoken). He took out RMB 10,000 to bid for a fish 
farm, and during the time he waited for the fish to grow he bid on a 500+ Mu
30
 (33.35 
hectares) plot of land to grow trees. He negotiated with 100+ farms to hire them to plant 
trees—all the farmers would receive more than RMB 1000 a month in wage, plus the 
rental fees they get. The farmers‘ incomes were elevated to better than a coastal wage. 
HE spoke of the comparison between his dagong life before and his entrepreneurial life 
                                                          
30
 Chinese Unit of area. 1 Mu=0.165 Acres. 
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now: ―Before making money was just to live, but now it‘s not the same. I am full of 
motivation and energy. In the future, I dream of opening a martial arts school.‖31  
From the returnees, we see that not all migrant workers value earning ability above 
everything else in their decision-making. If they did, they would choose to stay on the 
coast as wages on the cost are still higher than they are in western and central China. 
Many prioritize being together with family over a higher wage; some treat the return 
home as a long-anticipated opportunity to try their hands at entrepreneurship, something 
they have observed from a distance and experienced as a worker with their owner(s) on 
the coast. 
J.C. (the youngest sister of L.C. from chapter 2) and her husband Zh. returned to Sichuan 
in 2014 and 2012, respectively. Both native Sichuanese, Zh. has always wanted to try his 
hands at growing vegetables to sell. Before his return, he was a line leader at a packaging 
department in a Philips-acquired lighting factory. J.C.‘s wife commented that continuing 
in a factory was not a way of life. ―It was a dead-end job that led nowhere. No high 
wages and no room for promotion. He only had a middle school education, and no real 
skills, so it‘s hard for him to find a satisfactory job. Entrepreneurship became a real 
alternative.‖   
But returning to Sichuan has not been easy, either. Zh. has family in two places, five 
hours apart by bus. J.C. followed Zh. to one of his homes, ShiMian, to be near his sister, 
but Zhang had to relocate to near his other family in GuangHan, where he recruited his 
nephew to go into the farm business with him.  
―Do you miss him?‖ I asked J.C. when she and I visited the farm together. The couple 
hadn‘t seen each other for three months since her last visit.  
                                                          
31
 Source: Kuang,Wen-Chi. 曠文琪 March 2010. ―They Will Not Return to Their Jobs.‖ 
“他們不回崗‖ Business Week, Taiwan. 商業周刊 Vol. 1164. P.98 
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―Nope! I have two daughters to keep me busy!‖ J.C. replied. Perhaps it was a superficial 
answer for an outsider, but it is true that even young Chinese couples, like their parents‘ 
generation, are used to separation with spouses and family members.   
I visited Zh.‘s farm only half a year since he started, and so far, he has been losing money. 
―1 Mu of land costs RMB 700-800 just for the fertilizers, not counting labor yet. I learned 
that a neighbor‘s radish was down to a few cents per half a kilo, and the only thing they 
could do was to destroy the crop. Even destroying the crop costs money, then you‘ve got 
to find a way to get rid of the crop itself. It‘s really hard—the prices of vegetables 
fluctuate a lot, we don‘t have the experience yet to be making a sure profit, and it depends 
a lot on the elements.‖  
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, co-founded by Babson College and the London 
School of Business coined the term, ―necessity entrepreneurs.‖32 Many a type of 
entrepreneurship I witnessed in Weiyuan, Sichuan, belongs to this category. A quick 
glance at help-wanted ads shows that many jobs discriminate on age and take only those 
below 45. So what did return migrant workers do when they exceeded that age? Many 
become small storefront and restaurant owners and are forced by necessity to be on their 
own.  
So what made Zh. choose the farm business? ―It‘s been a dream, and also, in ten year‘s 
time, food safety is going to be a big issue. People are going to have a great demand for 
safe food.‖  
                                                          
32
 Source: http://www.gemconsortium.org/wiki/1177, accessed January 26, 2017 
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Figure 10 Zh.’s 3.3 acre33 farm 
This gave the couple faith to invest RMB 70,000 to 80,000 into the farm business. J.C. 
says she is supportive because ―if we don‘t try creating our own future with this venture, 
we will soon lose our risk-taking ability as we get older.‖  
She herself was making RMB 6,000 in Shenzhen at the Philips-acquired lighting factory, 
where she had met her husband some eleven years ago when she was an assembly line 
record keeper. Now back in ShiMian, Sichuan, she found a job making RMB 4,000. ―On 
the surface,‖ she explained, ―it seemed like I am making less. But now I don‘t have the 
kind of pressure you get when you live in a mega city. Everything is more expensive: 
kindergarten was RMB 1,000+/month in Shenzhen, and RMB 1,000/semester in ShiMian. 
Dance lessons was RMB 2,000/term in Shenzhen, and RMB 500/term in ShiMian.‖  
This is not to mention that because she did not have a Shenzhen hukou, her two children 
didn‘t, either, so they could attend the type of schools reserved for migrant workers‘ 
children, requiring extra fees. Also, they could not qualify city medical insurance and 
could only go through the school‘s system, making it more expensive.  
Why didn‘t J.C. try to apply for a Shenzhen hukou like her eldest sister? The birth of a 
second child made her ineligible to pass one criterion, which was compliance with the 
one-child policy. A fine would have solved the problem, but the fine was RMB 200,000, 
an amount she did not have nor would be willing to pay. So her choice was clear: return 
                                                          
33
 Author‘s conversion from the Chinese unit of Mu.  Zh. rents 20 Mu‘s of land. 1 Mu = 1/6.07 Acre 
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home. And like the group of scholars holding a positive view of return migrant workers, 
even though J.C.‘s husband‘s small-scale agricultural business employs no one other than 
his own kin, at least the capital investment is a type of investment that otherwise would 
be absent in his village of origin.  
P.X. admitted to me that she had tried entrepreneurship back at home and failed. ―Since 
we came back in 2003, we have tried many things, none of them was easy. I realized that 
suddenly we needed to manage our interpersonal relationships, those were so important if 
you wanted to be an entrepreneur. All kinds of relationships, parallel ones with your 
peers and vertical ones with the people you are trying to employ. These are things you did 
not have to worry about if you were just a dagong worker.‖ 
When we first came back, we invested in the trucking business with my cousin. 
We bought a truck for sand mixtures. But in the end, our money was scammed 
by my cousin‘s friend. That was almost all our savings from our dagong lives, 
close to RMB 200,000. Then we opened a lamb soup restaurant, a popular type 
of cuisine here in Weiyuan. The taste of our restaurant food was not bad, but we 
did not have enough helpers in the restaurant. Our son was small and did not 
help, so we asked my husband‘s father. He helped for half a year. In the end, we 
closed down and chose to find jobs with salaries instead of being entrepreneurs. 
It‘s easier. In fact, being someone else‘s employee is easier than not working. If 
you don‘t work, you are at home worrying about your child – what he wants to 
eat, what groceries to buy, etc. Now that I am working, I am eating lunch in the 
factory. For dinner, sometimes my mother would make it [so I don‘t have to 
worry about it.] 
X.G.W. is a small-scale entrepreneur who owns an ethnic clothing shop. In her small 
shop of about 25 square meters in the heart the township of Zhouqin, Guizhou, she has 
many lines of businesses. The Shui ethnic minority clothing is famous for its hand 
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embroidery. X.G.W. has five to six women as her ―reserve army‖—non-working women, 
some peasants, in the village that she could go to for embroidery pieces. Once these 
pieces are done, she collects them and sews them together. X.G.W. first draws patterns of 
the embroidery, hands out the small pieces with patterns on them, collects them, and sews 
the pieces together into the various products she carries: dresses, baby carriers, shoes, and 
purses that she wishes to develop. 
 
Figure 11 Wang’s sewing machine and embroidered baby carriers on the wall 
Her reserve army of village women resemble what Ping-Chun Hsiung (1996) considers in 
her book Living Rooms as Factories—Class, Gender, and the Satellite Factory System in 
Taiwan, invisible production lines in the living rooms in which women take piece-rate 
jobs to work on at home. Hsiung observes Taiwan‘s 1980s economy with its many small 
and satellite factories revolving around a core large factory that produces a finished good. 
What she observed about Taiwan then is true in China today on two accounts. First, 
everyone has a ―boss syndrome,‖ meaning that everyone wants to be a boss (Chang, 
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1988). This was one of the central themes in the last chapter when I discussed that many 
return migrant workers aspire to be small-scale entrepreneurs in their home. Second, the 
heavy density of factories making finished goods gives ample opportunities for small 
subcontracting factories. These small subcontractors then create jobs for even smaller 
manufacturing set-ups. This putting out system is not new. It was used in English and 
American textile industries early in the industrial revolution. Known also as the workshop 
system, it is a means of subcontracting work to offsite facilities, either in craftsmen‘s 
homes or in workshops with multiple craftsmen.  
Hsiung argued in her book that whereas large manufacturing setups accounted for Korea 
and Singapore‘s economic miracles, another one of the Asian Tiger, Taiwan, had its 
miracles founded on smaller satellite-type factories. They are small in nature, centered 
around families and the married women that produce piece-rate goods from what Hill 
Gates termed ―part-time proletarians‖ (Gates, 1979).   
In the township of Zhouqin with a surface area of 154 square KM and of a population of 
160,000, X.G.W. is probably one of five or fewer tailors. One could see from both the 
location and the merchandise displayed in X.G.W.‘s shop that she is more ambitious in 
wishing to include a greater number of products than her competitors, one of whom, for 
example, is situated in the township‘s central traditional market and offers just women‘s 
tops and bottoms, where the trims have machine-made embroidery, unlike X.G.W.‘s 
hand-made ones.  
A majority of people in their productive years still choose to go to the coast for migrant 
work, evidenced by the town‘s empty look—few pedestrians are on the street at any 
given moment. There are not many jobs to be had. If there are store fronts, usually the 
family that owns the store provides enough human resources to run it. On the wall of a 
storefront, there hangs a plaque indicating that it‘s a pick-up spot for long-distance buses 
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that travel to coastal Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong Provinces where people sell their 
labor power to factories or services, and repeat the kind of lives described in chapter 2. 
 
Figure 12 Bus ticket booth for ZhouQin Town to coastal dagong destinations 
 Route A: ZhouQin to Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, & Changzhou, 
Jiangsu province 
 Route B: ZhouQin to Wenzhou, & Ningbo, Zhejiang province  
 Route C: ZhouQin to Dongguan & Shenzhen, Guangdong province 
 Route D: ZhouQin to Zhenjiang & Lingbei, Guangdong province 
Yet the village women that X.G.W. employs receive their first lesson in capitalism from 
dealing with X.G.W. Things like deadlines, quality, returns, and piece rates are 
something these women must grapple with if they want to work with X.G.W. They are 
economic aspects different from what they have encountered in their farming lives. E.P. 
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Thompson (1967) wrote in his landmark paper ―Time, Work, and Industrial Capitalism‖ 
that ―in mature capitalist society all time must be consumed, marketed, and put to use; it 
is offensive for the labour force merely to ‗pass the time.‘‖ And this is what is happening 
to women who for the first time are learning about the import and precision of time, as 
required in the capitalist way of things. As Thompson wrote, indeed,  
In all these ways – by the division of labour, the supervision of labour; fines; 
bells and clocks; money incentives; preachings and schoolings; the suppression 
of fairs and sports—new labour habits were formed, and a new time-discipline 
was imposed. 
 
Figure 13 Ex-migrant worker, small-scale entrepreneur X.G.W. 
5.4.1 Piece Work at Home 
Through an American couple who traveled to the tourist town Fenghuang in Hunan 
Province and started a small factory that produces small pouches and bookmarks that 
feature the hand embroidery of the ethnic minority Miao women, I got to see a third 
group of workers. Calling them workers is an overstatement, actually. This is a group of 
peasant women who either never left their rural village or left and came back not to the 
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nearest township but to the very village of their houses of origin or that of their husbands‘. 
The embroidery is done in the villages by these peasant women, who engage in this piece 
work around their farming schedules. 
We used to go into the villages physically to be with the Miao people ten years 
ago when I had more energy. I don‘t do that so often now, but I have the women 
come to me to turn in their finished products and to collect new blank 
embroidery pieces. I see them that way and I will pay their bus fares.  
The wife from the American couple said. At their office, a staffer readily provided her 
insight that in this type of handcraft industry, the wage is never comparable to one 
received in an assembly line industrial job. The population here, if choosing to leave for 
work, mostly goes to Zhejiang or Fujian.  
This explains why on any typical day in the villages—like almost all farming villages 
across China—most able-bodied people in their most productive years are out in coastal 
regions making a living away from home, leaving behind their elderly parents and young 
children. Villages are empty and quiet, and occasionally a group of children comes out to 
play in someone‘s front yard, many a time supervised (or for that matter, un-supervised) 
by grandparents who usually stay indoors.  
Gao-ao village is no exception. When I approached the village, greeting me immediately 
was a cow. The village was awfully quiet, with no one out on the small roads. Surely by 
virtue of being a village, there were no streets for pedestrians to stroll on, only houses 
that lay one next to another, connected by small cement roads wide enough only for 
motorcycles.  
Although Fenghuang is a tourist town, domestic Chinese tourists do not value hand-made 
embroidery; they are unwilling to spend money on embroidery. It‘s often looked down on 
as a lowly handcraft done at an unprofessional level. But in fact, even though it is a 
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rudimentary skill, good embroidery does require a high level of focus, patience, 
experience, and discipline. 
T.Y. (in the picture below), is 62 years old, the women‘s director in her village, as well as 
the village‘s National People‘s Progress representative. She received me into her typical 
farm house on a hill, reachable only by foot beyond a certain point, as the cement roads 
beyond a certain point become just wide enough for a tri-cycle moped at most, with steps 
going up or down. In front of her house piled up against the front wall are dried corn 
stems that families collect for fuel. There is electricity but no indoor plumbing or water. 
A restroom is in a shed outside of the main house. T.Y. has two years of elementary 
school education, but there was an unusual sophistication about her. I could see how with 
her communication skills, she has become a leader in this small village. 
She started our conversation by getting right to the point that young people don‘t care to 
stay home and do embroidery. ―It pays too little, so the only ones that do it are we 
middle-aged and old people. When regular employers see my ID card, they don‘t want 
me.‖ 
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Figure 14 Piece-rate worker T.Y., also women’s director34 of her village 
She was the first to do embroidery for the American couple‘s company.  
I was selling embroidery on my own in Fenghuang center. The boss saw it, and 
asked me if I was willing to take their embroidery jobs to do. You can count on 
the money from embroidery for nothing. Not my grandchild‘s kindergarten 
tuition, nothing. Just some small pocket money. At RMB 6 or 7 we get per 
bookmark depending on the size of the bird to be embroidered, you can‘t even 
afford a lunch box in Fenghuang center making two a day. 
 This is true. A lunchbox in Fenghuang costs at least RMB 12, and making the maximum 
of RMB 14 per day—if one is fast enough to complete two, that is—and that would be 4 
                                                          
34
 Women‘s directors are a government-appointed position in villages in China.  They are tasked with the 
responsibility to record pregnancies and births in their villages, as well as to distribute contraceptive 
devices.  Before January 2016 when a second child was allowed in China, they were tasked with reporting 
on the women who did not comply with this government policy for fines. 
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bigger birds and some small flowers around them—one cannot afford a simple meal in 
the center of Fenghuang center.  
She complained about such low piece rate and asked me how much each of these 
bookmarks sells for. I told her that each bookmark costs RMB 40, and she was quick to 
understand without harboring a sense of resentment. 
When I relayed the complaint to the American couple, they said they knew, but the 
market simply does not allow room for a higher embroidery wage. I imagine this to be the 
case because at RMB 40 it is just about the proper market rate for a delicate bookmark. 
Anything higher might be rejected by prospective customers. 
 
 
Figure 15 Y.T.’s piece rate embroidery bookmarks, designed by the American 
couple 
We make either pieces to go onto small bags, or we make pieces to be made into 
bookmarks. For the bookmarks, we coordinate our own colors, and the bags 
have been color-matched by the company. Every time, each of us would take an 
equal amount of blank pieces to make: usually a batch of bookmarks would have 
20 in it, and it depends on each woman‘s speed, which depends on their family 
circumstances, how long it takes to complete something. 
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The same 20 bookmarks, for example, can be collected in anywhere from two weeks to 
two months, depending on the woman. T.Y. helps her neighbors collect the blank pieces, 
especially the older women for whom mobility is a problem.  
Of the six people in this village who still do embroidery, I have met five, all in T.Y.‘s 
living room. What they have is a cash-diminished economy, in which agriculture is still 
the main staple of their livelihood, or I should say, taking care of their own household 
food consumption is the major activity of these peasant women, as the agriculture they 
engage in is too small scale to be sold on the market. 
 
Figure 16 Y.T. opening up her living room for village women to gather and make 
embroidery in an afternoon. 
One of the embroiderers was back on leave from her industrial job in a ship-building 
company on the coast in Zhejiang Province. It takes her 18 hours on a direct bus from 
Fenghaung to get there. She was home for a few days to visit her 73-year-old mother, 
who embroiders to pick up some extra cash, so she chips in helping her. Hers is a set of 
hands that normally works on a polishing machine which polishes parts and accessories 
for large vessel ships, and now she is picking up a small needle to do embroidery. When 
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she was looking after her children and staying at home, she, too, took this job for two 
years. ―But it doesn‘t pay, you can‘t depend on it for your livelihood. So people go out to 
Fenghuang center to wash cars, to wash dishes, or they travel the distance to Zhejiang to 
work.‖  
Embroidery serves to absorb the lowest-skilled group of peasant women in this 
cash-diminished economy, who would otherwise be doing other manual labor such as 
car- or dish-washing, but do not or cannot due to individual circumstances. Some have 
grandchildren to take care of, some may be handicapped. They are normally uneducated 
and do not have the education or dare to go far to coastal cities for industrial jobs. As I 
watch them manage the rising and falling thread, I realized that it really is a simple, light 
pre-industry type of work that requires no more than a pair of scissors as tools. Some 
women wear their scissors on a string in front of their chest, making themselves mobile 
―on the job.‖ Wherever their set of hands are, this work can be done.  
―My mom is old.‖ The Zhejiang migrant worker says. ―But if she does not do this, she 
has zero income. On her own, she embroiders children‘s hats and shoes. So, she might as 
well utilize this skill.‖  
Most acquiesce to the low pay of embroidery work, but if their alternative is doing 
nothing, they choose to work because having some income, however small, is better than 
none.  The Zhejiang migrant worker continues, 
As to me.  In my family there are four girls and one younger brother. So I did 
not get any education and I am really suffering from that. The tasks we 
uneducated workers do are harder. Easier jobs are for people who had gone to 
school. They‘d be operating a computerized machine.  
The alternatives to staying home to do embroidery is going up into the mountains and 
harvesting herbs and cigarette leaves. ―With cigarette leaves, they want you at 6 am. It 
takes one hour to walk to the cigarette leaf farm, and you are working from 7 am to 7 pm, 
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making RMB 60 a day.‖ T.Y., for example, cannot do this because it starts too early. She 
has to send her grandchild to the kindergarten bus later in the morning than the start time 
and receives him back earlier than the end time. On their four Mu (1/3 hectare) land, T.Y. 
and her husband grow rice, corn, yams, and they feed a cow, which helps with plowing, 
because it is too heavy to move a machine up to the hills where their farm is.  
W. at the age of 54 seems young to be doing embroidery. When asked why she does not 
work elsewhere, maybe in Fenghuang center, she said her foot is hurt and can never get 
better. Due to her handicap, there are few alternatives. 
C.H. in Kaitang Village in Guizhou Province—another migrant worker-sending 
province—is 30 years old, and had just returned from coastal QuanZhou, Fujian less than 
three months ago. ―I was a waitress in a restaurant there, but I would not go out to work 
again, because now I can do embroidery at home.‖ She said. ―The pay is comparable, 
plus I get the benefit of being at home with my 12-year-old child. Also, embroidery is 
much easier on the body. I hope to get it as a stable source of income.‖  
Peasant women want to make money as long as it helps pay family expenses, get a child 
through school, or get aging parents through illnesses and medical bills. Choosing 
between having your labor process exposed to a Foucauldian panopticon in a factory or 
restaurant vs. doing hand embroidery in the comfort of home and at the convenience of 
your own schedule seems obvious for many, especially if they are meticulous and fast 
enough that wages would be comparable or even if wages from embroidery would be 
slightly less.  
A 10 cm by 10 cm flower pays RMB 30 piece. Depending on how much she works, she 
can make anywhere from half a piece a day to three pieces a day, making an income of 
anywhere from RMB 15 to RMB 90 per day. Because there are bigger patterns than the 
RMB 30/piece flowers, it is possible to make RMB 900/week, which translates to RMB 
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2000-3000/month
35
. This is, indeed, comparable to any blue-collar job even on the coast. 
But the work can be sporadic and unstable. By outsourcing these jobs to village women 
living at home in such a putting out process, a company does not have to pay workers a 
fixed wage. Wage payment is only paid when there are orders. Currently, a company 
called Sun Drum, which sources from a village co-op
36
 that organizes the women in the 
putting out system, gives out orders. Sun Drum then sells these embroidery pieces to 
other companies; one example is the French brand Hermès.  
C.H. grows rice, corn, yams, peanuts, and feeds a few pigs at home. But all of this is for 
her own household‘s consumption, none for sale. She utilizes her free time from farm 
work and animal husbandry to do embroidery. When I asked what expenses she has 
besides the child‘s tuition and her in-law‘s medicines for high cholesterol, triglycerides, 
and blood pressure, she told me that she has to buy salt, oil, clothes, and some meat. 
W.Y., a neighboring woman across the village‘s only road, too, learned embroidery as a 
child. ―I learned from my mom.‖ She recalled with a grin. ―We used to make big bridal 
pieces for anybody in the village getting married, but I haven‘t done that for a long time 
now.‖ Before she returned home, she went to coastal Guangzhou to be a jewelry street 
vendor. ―I prefer being at home than being out. I miss my child. If I am not home, neither 
I nor the child is happy.‖  
As a street vendor in Guangzhou, she can make between RMB 2000 and 3000 a month, 
which is comparable to making more than RMB 2000/month doing embroidery at home. 
―If I have time, I will do more. If I have less time, I will do less.‖ 
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 Jobs will include both big and small patterns, so the possible RMB 900/week does not necessarily 
translate to RMB 3600/month.  It depends on the combination of the sizes of patterns to be made. 
36
 The village co-op was started by the women‘s director of the village. On one end, it mobilizes idle 
peasant women to do embroidery in their off time from farm work; on the other end, the women‘s director 
endeavors to get orders from companies that buy embroidery pieces to make into bags and shoes. 
 166   
H.C. is in her 30s and has two children, one in 3
rd
 and the other in 5
th
 grade. ―Before I 
came home, I have made everything: in Shenzhen I have worked in a telephone factory 
and an electronics factory. I came back for my children two or three years ago. Before, 
my parents-in-law could help me take care of them, but now they can‘t anymore.‖ H.C. is 
a reticent woman, and I wonder how she would get along with fellow workers in a factory 
setting, whether she could be happy having to navigate so many interpersonal 
relationships. I asked her if she felt a sense of being her own boss with this embroidery 
job. She responded by saying, ―Doing embroidery at home is much freer than in the 
factory—you just wash your hands and you‘re on the job already, but you can‘t earn 
money on it.‖ 
When I countered citing the numbers other interviewees have given me, that a total of 
piece rate payment of RMB 2,000-3,000/month was possible, she said ―But I have to 
farm, too, I‘m not just doing this [embroidery, so my payment is not as much.]‖  
Like everyone around her, H.C.‘s crops are not sold on the market; they are for the 
household‘s own consumption. A commonality shared by almost all these village women 
who have ever received embroidery work to do at home is that there exists what I call an 
economic imbalance. Being now at home as opposed to being a migrant worker, they all 
engage in agricultural work growing crops on their own plot of land. This to them is 
natural and taken-for-granted. However, this poses an inherent economic imbalance. The 
plot of land is almost never big enough to justify selling the crops, which consist of a 
combination of rice, corn, cabbage, beans, peanuts, yams, and whatever the climate 
allows, plus pig husbandry. Not only is the land not large enough, but their locations are 
almost always too far from any urban locale in which there is a customer base. Neighbors 
and near-by families grow their own crops, too.  
Village women thus spend precious physical labor hours on the farms without getting a 
reward other than being able to supply their families with produce without exchanging 
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money; what we have here is a cash-diminished economy. Many interviewees 
commented that ―being at home to do agricultural work makes your stomach full, but it 
doesn‘t give you money.‖  
If a village woman chooses to return home, it is almost always expected that she expects 
no more income, certainly no more of the industrial income that she used to receive as a 
migrant worker. Not only are industrial enterprises in or near her homes non-existent, but 
the necessity of having to do agricultural work also takes away her time. Although 
agricultural work does not require an everyday presence; for example, during seeding 
season, sometimes a few days of rest is needed after the soil is loosened for it to absorb 
nutrients from the sun. This means that the women have periods of free time in their daily 
schedules. This is where embroidery work can exist: in between agricultural work.  
Embroidery is not rocket science. It is a skill that most can master if they apply 
themselves and are attentive and dexterous enough. Companies provide training every 
now and then for the village women. After a 15-day training, most women are good 
enough to start making quality embroideries for sale.  
L.S. is a woman who was learning from scratch. But she does it more out of boredom 
than the necessity for the money. ―I just returned from being together with my husband in 
Shenzhen.‖ A young mother of two at the age of 19, L.S. has her hands full. Often, after 
she puts down one kid, the other one starts a tantrum. As we proceeded in our 
conversation, she started nursing in front of me. ―My time is split between the 10-month 
old and the 2 1/2 year old. I do the cooking for the household. Everything else, my 
parents-in-law take care of, like farming, pig husbandry, and laundry. When I have a 
quiet moment, I will pick up the embroidery. I just picked up a few pieces to make, they 
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are due in two weeks. I am just 2 or 3 pieces short.‖ 
 
Figure 17 L.S.’s home with her husband’s family 
L.S. has never worked for a wage in her life. After middle school, she married a man in 
the next village whom family members introduced. ―My husband and his cousin run a 
furniture factory in Shenzhen, and I live between Shenzhen and home. Each place for 
four or five months.‖ She plans to reunite with her husband by going out to Shenzhen 
again when her kids are older and can be left for the parents-in-law. ―At that point, I 
would not be staying home just for the embroidery.‖  
―What would you do then, as a job?‖ I asked.  
―I don‘t know yet. Will have to see what is available and suitable for me.‖  
For L.S., embroidery work is something she certainly can live without. If it is there to be 
done, she will pick some up. If not, it is not the end of her world. Like all other women 
and even more so for her, it is merely a nice opportunity for some extra pocket cash. 
When I asked her what her biggest expense is, she said, ―Going to the relatives. You have 
to give a few hundreds if there is a newborn and if there is a death.‖ As we spoke, she 
played with her smaller baby while the older boy entertains himself.  
These village women, unlike city folks, do not have an urgent and constant need for cash. 
City folks need to pay rents and have all kinds of bills. But the village women are living 
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in their husband‘s house passed down through the generations, for example, and they are 
growing their own produce and butchering their own pork. 
 
Figure 18 L.S.’s embroidery kit on the balcony 
J.N. was the last person I interviewed. Sitting in her front yard with neighbor W.Y. whom 
I interviewed earlier, J.N. works deftly on her piece. She did not require training. Since 
childhood she has embroidered, and in fact, she can train others. She has worked in 
Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Fujian, in shoe and pajama factories. ―Doing this 
[embroidery], I can look after my children and the old. It‘s very free. Working in the 
factory is very tiring.‖ She continued, ―of course it‘s better being at home. After a few 
months in the factory, you miss your children, you miss your husband. I went to dagong 
for 20+ years, and just got back this year. Actually when I was working in the factory, I 
would bring the materials to make embroidery in my spare time, for my own use. It‘s 
very expensive to make a big piece now, a lot of work, it‘s not possible.‖  
―Can you ask the boss to increase our piece rate?‖ She asked me persistently as I ended 
the conversation with her. Indeed, to many women, this is the only opportunity at making 
any money, so it is sensible trying to have a higher piece rate. But would they get their 
wish? Unlikely because as long as they accept jobs at this current rate, the company is 
unlikely to increase its piece rate.  
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The co-op takes physical space in an unused elementary school that the women‘s 
director
37
 applied to the local education bureau to use. It serves in theory as a training 
and working ground for village women to gather doing embroidery. In practice, this space 
is only used when there is training going on. Almost all women take their embroidery 
work home to do. The women‘s director plans to receive a share of the government‘s 
financial assistance, and then to grow the co-op into say 20 people to receive more 
funding under a different funding category.  
Village peasant women in Sichuan, Hunan, and Guizhou are on the absolute bottom of 
the socioeconomic ladder – much lower than the return migrant workers, who have gone 
through the great coastal odyssey. These women are either old, handicapped, or caring for 
children, which makes them unlikely candidates for any type of work but handcraft piece 
work at home like embroidery.  
Chapter Conclusion:  
The same new push and pull factors for the older generation to return are what make the 
younger generation of migrant workers return home. However, the return of many in the 
younger generation is not yet final; many engage in job-hopping between coastal 
factories and work at home. The decisions can be short-term and short-sighted, fueled at 
times by, say, a quarrel with a spouse or an instant need for money (say for house 
renovation). That wages at home in Sichuan are about 50 percent less than they are for 
the same job on the coast is treated differently by returnees with different needs. Those 
who have absolutely no child care or just do not wish to go out again are de facto content 
with what they could get at home, despite occasional complaints of low pay. Those with 
greater expenses tend to have a greater proclivity to go out again, after being home for a 
while. Yet others who would not tolerate the lower wages but who desire to go home start 
                                                          
37
 See Footnote 34. 
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their own entrepreneurial pursuits at home, confident that entrepreneurship allows for a 
better material well-being.  
There is another group lower on the socioeconomic ladder than migrant workers, they are 
the women who have never left their farming villages, or who have returned not to their 
townships but to their farming homes from their coastal work. They live in an extremely 
cash-diminished economy, managing their livelihoods by growing their own rice and 
crops for subsistence and relying on the occasional embroidery piece work given out by a 
local co-op. This kind of piece work in a putting out system is the only cash these women 
can make, since they cannot sell their produce because all farming neighbors grow their 
own crops, and the volume is generally too small to justify incurring transportation costs 
to sell in the nearest city.  
In sum, in this chapter, we learned about the unstable nature of the younger generation‘s 
return, the situation of necessity entrepreneurs, and the plight of farming village women 
whose only cash-earning opportunities come from occasional piece-rate handcraft work.  
 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
Every year, news on TV used to report the vast annual movement of migrant workers 
returning home on trains and buses for Chinese New Year. This year, however, TVBS in 
Taiwan reported a reverse traffic of elderly going to the cities to their adult children who 
have settled down there, to celebrate the New Year.
38
 
Since the Economic Reform, scholars‘ attention has been on the hukou system that has 
created a bi-local existence for migrant workers, whose official status is agricultural 
farmers but who have crowded into cities for manufacturing, construction, and service 
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 Source: TVBS News, Taiwan, accessed January 27 2017. http://news.tvbs.com.tw/china/702751 
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jobs. Time has passed, and the hukou has loosened up, especially most recently in the 
2000s. With bachelor‘s degrees and work experience, or with specialty skills, those from 
the provinces can qualify for an urban hukou and begin to live like citizens equal to the 
city natives. They qualify for government-assisted housing to rent or buy, their children 
can go to public schools instead of schools reserved for migrant workers‘ children with 
fewer resources and less-qualified teachers.  
Earlier scholars like Pun Ngai in Made in China (2005) and Ching-Kwan Lee in Gender 
and the South China Miracle (1999) have studied labor issues in purposeful 
ethnographies situated in electronics factories. In other words, their ethnography 
happened for the purpose of their research work. I differ in that I had first worked at a 
garment factory for seven years before my research work took place. Therefore, I contend 
that this gives me an in-depth view, especially inside the factory, of the relationship 
between globalization and workers‘ daily lives. In chapter 3, I examined these global 
social forces that led to, for example, wage arrears, which workers normalized both 
because they identified and somewhat empathized with factory owners and because the 
―grass (treatment) is not greener in other factories.‖ The sentiment of normalization and 
empathy with factory owners experienced by workers is similar to Roger D. Waldinger‘s 
description of ethnic garment manufacturing business owners‘ relationship with their 
co-ethnic workers; that is, there is a sense of camaraderie and reciprocity not found in 
other types of employer-employee relationships (Waldinger, 1986). 
Further, Pun Ngai‘s Made in China (2005), Ching-Kwan Lee‘s Gender and the South 
China Miracle (1999), and Lu Zhang‘s Inside China’s Automobile Factories (2015) 
documented workers‘ lives in large factories. Except for Ching-Kwan Lee‘s Hong Kong 
workshop, these ethnographies reported workers‘ lives in large factories. But 99 percent 
of all enterprises within the country are small- and medium-sized enterprises. What goes 
on inside these small- and medium-sized enterprises is just as important to understand as 
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what occurs in large factories, because that is where many workers live and work every 
day. 
As Robert J. Ross pointed out in Slaves to Fashion (2004), buying prices of goods from 
factories are calculated by buyers in a top-down fashion from the department store‘s or 
multinational brand‘s selling prices. From these end-product selling prices, buyers then 
go around factories in Asia or China, looking for factories whose price structure can fit 
into the calculation. Factories never have a say in the price; if anything, they could only 
be pressured to move it downwards.  
To make matters worse, buying power is concentrated in a few hands: in the U.S., the top 
five retail organizations control close to 50 percent of the apparel market (Ross, 2004). In 
other words, every buyer a factory encounters behaves similarly, holding all 
buying—thus selection—power in hand. Some of these buyers face demanding 
Wall-Street investors and must buy at the lowest price to make the most profit for their 
shareholders and investors.   
Factories face enormous pressure to lower prices and have experienced numerous 
closures, especially after the 2008 financial crisis. Those that survived started using 
subcontractors to expand their production capacity when they needed to, making many 
workers redundant.  
Push and pull factors for workers to come out and work on the coast in the 1980s and 
1990s have been reversed. Push factors used to be poverty and lack of job opportunities 
at home, and pull factors used to be the opportunity to work in factories to make a stable 
income. Now, as western and central China (migrant-sending areas) develop, it is the 
suboptimal working conditions in coastal factories that have become the new push factors. 
Family reunions, work, and entrepreneurial opportunities at home have become the new 
pull factors.  
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The 31 migrant workers I interviewed
39—about 20 of them staying on the coast and about 
ten of them returning home—are a tenacious and versatile group. Their tenacity is shown 
in everything they do, whether it‘s related to work or life in general. Even in their teenage 
years, they were a self-selected group of extra motivated people, who, at such a young 
age, dared to change their life trajectories by migrating more than ten hours by train from 
home to work. And that has made all the difference: 10 to 20 years later, the old 
generation of migrant workers is a group that has bought or built houses earlier than their 
counterparts who never left home. They speak better Mandarin, and there is an air of 
confidence in them that cannot be stolen away. It was the migration work experience that 
gave them this sense of empowerment.  
Many of the old generation of migrant workers have returned home on a more permanent 
basis, live in the houses they built earlier in their villages, or bought apartments in 
townships. In their houses and apartments reside their parents or parents-in-law, 
sometimes with their spouses missing because they are still out dagong in another city. 
But this is already the best that they could be doing, owning a home bought from the 
savings they acquired working on the coast. More often than not, there simply are no jobs 
back home that utilize skills acquired on the coast. So one of the couple remains away, 
working.  
The new generation of migrant workers has returned home on a less permanent basis, to 
settle down, yes, but also optimizing family mobility by being flexible regarding their 
locations. Some new generation migrant workers have returned home, completely 
abandoned what they did on the coast and became necessity entrepreneurs. Others, like 
their older generation counterparts, have a spouse still working at a distance and one 
spouse at home. Still others are only home temporarily, dabbling in some kind of work 
                                                          
39
 In total, I interviewed 40 people.  Only 31 of them are currently migrant workers or return migrant 
workers.  The rest are ex-migrant workers who have become small-scale entrepreneurs or take piece 
work at home to make, like the women interviewed in the latter part of Chapter 5. 
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waiting for a more apropos time—like their children‘s graduation from a certain level of 
school—to leave for the coast again. 
Despite possessing desirable factory skills, wages are about half inland from what they 
are on the coast. Living standards and costs are at the same time lower inland. Unless 
there is an urgent need for cash, as there often is, for the new generation of migrant 
workers, returnees in general are content settling back home and maneuvering within 
their lower wages and standard of living.  
This is what is happening to migrant workers in small factories in China. It remains 
interesting to ask the question of whether construction and service industry workers are 
experiencing similar types of new push and pull factors to return home. I recommend that 
future research streams
40
 covers these two industries because often, their jobs are even 
less secure than manufacturing jobs, and seeing the plight of migrant workers in these 
two industries would shed lights on what lives are like on the bottom of the 
socioeconomic ladder.   
                                                          
40 Sarah Swider‘s Building China draws on research in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai and focuses on 
the current lives and social relations of construction workers. As western and central China develops in 
both commercial and residential real estate sectors, it remains interesting to see whether these migrant 
workers in China‘s three biggest cities are also returning home for the same construction jobs, or switching 
into less physically exhausting opportunities.  
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Appendix A  
 
List of Interviews 
 
 
Interviewee Categories Number of Interviewees 
Migrant Workers  
MTY Factory, Guangzhou (2013) 
10 
Migrant Workers,  
Top Factory, Guangzhou (2013) 
9 
Return migrant workers,  
Top Factory, Sichuan (2015, 2016) 
8 
Individual returnees/small-scale entrepreneurs, 
Sichuan 
4 
Individual returnees/farmer women, Guizhou 5 
Urban hukou holders, ex-migrant workers 3 
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